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The Myth of the Gender Monolith
INTRODUCTION
From August to November 1991, Joseph Oncale, a married, heterosexual
father of two, worked on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. He quit his job,
however, after two of his co-workers restrained him in the shower and forced a
bar of soap into his anus while threatening to rape him.' An automotive
mechanic named Mark McWilliams reported to work each day to face not only
constant teasing about his sex life and inability to "get" a woman, but also
physical harassment. His co-workers exposed their genitals to him, placed a
condom in his food, flicked their tongues at him while saying, "I love you, I
love you," tied his hands behind his back, blindfolded him, forced him to his
knees, and simulated sexual acts by inserting a finger in his mouth and a
broomstick between his buttocks.' Over the course of two years, Phil Quick, a
welder and machine operator at a plant in Iowa, was subjected to a practice of
"bagging," common in his workplace, in which men would grab and squeeze
other men's testicles. Quick, a heterosexual, endured repeated homophobic
epithets and over one hundred bagging incidents, including one in which a co-
worker restrained Quick's arms while another grabbed and squeezed Quick's
testicles hard enough to produce bruising and swelling.' During the summer of
1992, the city of Belleville, Illinois, hired J. Doe and H. Doe, two heterosexual,
sixteen-year-old twin brothers, for summer maintenance jobs. When they
arrived, Jeff Dawe, a heterosexual "former Marine of imposing stature," began
picking on H. Doe, who wore an earring. He called him "queer," "fag," and
"bitch;" questioned whether he was "a boy or a girl;" threatened to take H. "out
to the woods" and "get him in the ass;" and on one occasion grabbed H.'s
testicles.4
A growing body of scholarship recognizes that sexual exploitation,
domination, intimidation, and abuse of men by other men5 constitutes a long-
1. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct.
998 (1998); see also Petitioner's Brief at *5, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998)
(No. 96-568, 1997 WL 458826).
2. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir. 1996).
3. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374-75 (8th Cir. 1996).
4. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183
(1998).
5. This Article focuses primarily on harassment perpetrated by men against women and by men and against
men, for the simple reason that the case law is rife with examples of such conduct, yet contains only sparse
examples of harassment perpetrated by women against targets of either sex. The courts have, in rare instances,
encountered allegations of hostile environment sexual harassment perpetrated by women against women. See, e.g.,
Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979
(9th Cir. 1997); Ecklund v. Fuisz Tech., Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Lamar v. NYNEX Serv. Co., 891
F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995); McCoy v.
Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp.
754 (D.D.C. 1995); Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate
Management Co., No. 93-2351, 1995 WL 241855 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995); Kelecic v. Bd. of Regents of Regency
Univs., No. 92C20358, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17972 (N.D. HI. Dec. 16, 1994); Marrero-Rivera v. Department of
Justice, 800 F. Supp. 1024 (D.P.R. 1992); Roberts v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., No. 89-0822, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 890
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 1991). Although these cases involved allegations of female-on-female sexual harassment, in
most instances the claims were resolved on other grounds and did not require the courts to address the issues of
sex-based causation analyzed in this Article. See, e.g., Lamar, 891 F. Supp. at 185 (dismissing hostile work
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overlooked form of gender discrimination that asserts the dominance of the
masculine over the feminine and thus reflects and perpetuates deeply-rooted
patterns of gender inequality.6 Such conduct focuses intensively on portraying
the target as a passive, feminized recipient of the harasser's aggressive,
stereotypically masculine sexual advances. As a result, the conduct echoes and
enforces entrenched notions of male dominance in which power is identified
and allocated based on the possession of stereotypically masculine physical and
behavioral characteristics such as larger physical size, superior physical
strength, aggressiveness, and sexual assertiveness.7 By vividly invoking
stereotypical paradigms of male sexual power and female sexual submission,
such conduct operates to exert and preserve the power of stereotypically
masculine males in a gender-defined hierarchy by relegating males identified as
exhibiting more stereotypically female, traditionally devalued traits to inferior
status.8
Increasingly, men who have experienced this type of sexual humiliation,
intimidation, and abuse at the workplace, many of whom have been forced to
leave their jobs due to emotional distress and fear of rape,9 have brought suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which proscribes acts that
subject an employee to adverse terms and conditions of employment "because
of' the employee's "sex."' Although these complaints have been founded on
well-established principles that have emerged from over twenty years of
litigation involving sexual harassment directed at women, the courts have been
far from uniform in applying these principles to allegations of male-on-male
sexual harassment."
environment claim brought by female employee against female employer because alleged harassing conduct was
"too mild and infrequent to constitute sexual harassment as a matter of law"); Ryczek, 877 F. Supp. at 765
(granting employer's motion for summary judgment because defendant took "prompt and adequate remedial
actions" to remedy the "unpleasant and unprofessional manner" in which plaintiff was treated by co-worker);
Myers, 874 F. Supp. at 1546 (holding that female employee's hostile work environment claim against female
employer was not actionable because same-sex sexual harassment was never actionable); Marrero-Rivera, 800 F.
Supp. at 1024 (dismissing hostile work environment claim brought by woman against another woman for failure
to procure a right-to-sue letter).
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 11-35
(1997); MALE VIcrlMs OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (Michael B. King & Gillian C. Mezey eds., 1992); Mary Anne C.
Case, Disaggregating Gender From Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Elizabeth J. Kramer, Note, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape Shield
Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293 (1998); Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal Ideology
and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037 (1996).
7. See infra Part ll.B. (analyzing conduct that asserts the dominance of masculinity over femininity); see
also infra notes 449-450 and accompanying text (discussing attributes stereotypically associated with males and
the power and privilege derived therefrom).
8. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 236 (1994) ("[Mien cannot simultaneously be used 'as women' and stay powerful because
they are men.") (quoting ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 129 (1983)); Kramer, supra note 6, at 317.
9. See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001; McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1193 (4th Cir. 1996).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (1994). Although plaintiffs have challenged these types of conduct under
both state and federal laws proscribing sex-based employment discrimination, this Article focuses primarily on
cases construing federal anti-discrimination statutes.
11. For an overview of the cases addressing same-sex sexual harassment see Kathryn Abrams, The New
Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Robert Brookins, A Rose by Any Other
Name... The Gender Basis of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 441 (1998); Amelia A. Craig,
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In analyzing workplace harassment directed at women, courts have
consistently recognized the sex-based nature of conduct that invokes gender
stereotypes, either by devaluing stereotypically female traits or by punishing
those who diverge from stereotyped gender roles. Likewise, in the context of
harassment directed at women, courts have recognized the sex-based nature of
sexualized conduct that humiliates and intimidates the target by focusing on her
sex-based physical attributes or vulnerability to sexual domination." When the
target is the same sex as the harasser, however, many courts have been reluctant
to recognize the sex-based nature of conduct that demeans the target for
possessing feminine traits or diverging from stereotypical gender roles. In the
context of harassment directed at men by men, most courts have been equally
hesitant to recognize the sex-based nature of degrading, abusive sexualized
conduct that exploits the target's vulnerability to sexual domination. Although a
few courts have recognized the actionable sex-discriminatory nature of such
conduct, some courts have imposed categorical rules precluding same-sex
harassment claims. 3 Others have required a showing of general hostility to all
males. 4 And yet a third line of cases has required a showing of homosexual
attraction," resulting in deep divisions in the lower courts' jurisprudence.
Recently the Supreme Court addressed the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.16 In a terse,
unanimous opinion, the Court held that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a
claim of discrimination 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the
defendant ... are of the same sex."' 7 The Court resolved some of the conflicts
among the lower courts, effectively overruling both cases that had categorically
precluded same-sex sexual harassment claims and cases that had precluded such
claims absent proof of homosexual attraction between the harasser and the
target.' However, in recognizing a cause of action for same-sex sexual
Musing About Discrimination Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation as "Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL.
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STU. 105 (1995); Christopher W. Deering, Comment, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment: A
Need to Re-Examine the Legal Underpinnings of Title Vi's Ban on Discrimination "Because of' Sex, 27 CUME.
L. REV. 231 (1996); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691
(1997); Carolyn Grose, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Subverting the Heterosexist Paradigm of Title VII, 7 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 375 (1995); Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing
Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RtUrGERS L.J. 383 (1996); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment Claims Afier Oncale: Defining the Boundaries ofActionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677
(1998); Ronald Turner, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: A Call for Conduct-Based and Gender-Based Applications
of Title VII, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 151 (1997); Deborah Zalesne, When Men Harass Men: Is it Sexual
Harassment?, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 395 (1998).
12. See infra Part LB-C. (examining cases recognizing the actionable sex-based nature of conduct directed
at women that devalues stereotypically feminine traits, invokes gender stereotypes, and evokes sexually explicit
imagery to humiliate, intimidate, and demean the target).
13. See infra Part IH.A.4. (analyzing cases recognizing actionable sex-based nature of male-on-male
harassment); infra Part I.A.l. (discussing cases categorically precluding same-sex sexual harassment claims).
14. See infra Part HI.A.2. (analyzing cases requiring a showing of an anti-male environment as a prerequisite
to same-sex harassment claims).
15. See infra Part II.A.3. (examining cases requiring a showing of homosexual attraction as a predicate to
same-sex harassment claims).
16. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
17. Id. at 1001-02.
18. See id. at 1002.
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harassment, the Court offered little guidance regarding the distinction between
mere "locker room antics"19 or heterosexual "horseplay"2 and the types of sex-
based degradation and intimidation that constitute actionable discrimination
"because of' the target's "sex" within the meaning of Title VII.21
This Article examines the jurisprudence applying Title VII's "because of
. . . sex" requirement in the sexual harassment context, contrasting the
formulations of this standard that have emerged in the opposite-sex harassment
cases against those that have developed in the same-sex harassment cases.
Based upon this examination, this Article argues that the same-sex harassment
cases, in their failure to acknowledge the sex-discriminatory purpose and effect
of gender stereotypes and sexual humiliation and intimidation directed at men
by other men, have adopted unduly restrictive conceptions of "sex" and sex-
based causation that are at odds with established Title VII jurisprudence. This
Article then analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court's Oncale decision on
this fragmented area of the law and posits that, despite its dicta that appear to
perpetuate some of the myths and misperceptions pervading the lower courts'
jurisprudence, Oncale does not disturb the significant body of precedent
elucidating Title VII's "because of ... sex" requirement. Accordingly, Oncale
must be read in the context of the broader Title VII jurisprudence, which, in
contrast to much of the same-sex harassment jurisprudence, does not focus
myopically on biological sex. Rather, this jurisprudence focuses on the
individual plaintiffs sex- and gender-related attributes and recognizes the
relevance of gender stereotyping and sexualized conduct in establishing and
enforcing workplace gender hierarchies. Thus, this Article urges the courts to
look beyond the constrained conceptions of sex implicit in Oncale's dicta and
to conduct a rigorous and principled analysis of the sex-based causation issue
that comports with established legal formulations and contemporary
understandings of the term "sex."
Part I of the Article examines cases involving sexual harassment perpetrated
by men against women. In these cases the courts have readily inferred the
requisite sex-based nature of the harassment from the nature of the conduct
itself. This conduct frequently derides the target based upon gender stereotypes
and humiliates and intimidates the target through sexualized conduct focusing
on the target's sex-based physical attributes and vulnerability to sexual
domination.
19. See, e.g., Bolt v. Norfolk S. Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Va. 1997) (analyzing whether conduct
constituted harassment or mere locker room antics); Torres v. National Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 961
(N.D. 111. 1996) (noting that the task of distinguishing between locker room antics and sexual foreplay often
involves a highly subjective inquiry); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 740 (N.D. I11. 1996) (same);
Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (noting the difficulty of distinguishing
between "mere locker room antics, joking, or horseplay," and true harassing conduct (quoting Tietgen v. Brown's
Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va. 1996))).
20. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1198 (4th Cir. 1996)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for characterizing conduct as mere "horesplay"); Dixon v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 4:94CV165, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17482, at *11-12 (E.D. Va. July 23, 1996)
(discussing the distinction between "horseplay" and sexual harassment).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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Part II discusses the cases addressing harassment directed at men by men. In
these cases, despite the similar invocations of gender stereotypes and sexualized
conduct to demean and intimidate the target, the courts have been far more
reluctant to recognize the gender-based and sex-discriminatory nature of this
conduct. The jurisprudence in this area is consequently fraught with tensions
and inconsistencies arising from the divergent conceptions of sex and sex-based
causation implicit in the array of lower court opinions analyzed in this part.
Part III analyzes the impact of Oncale on judicial approaches to same-sex
harassment claims. Although the decision effectively overruled both the cases
that had categorically precluded same-sex harassment claims and the cases that
had precluded such claims absent a showing of homosexual attraction, it
implicitly lent credence to some of the most problematic aspects of the lower
courts' jurisprudence. This part argues that Oncale's dicta, like many earlier
same-sex harassment cases, implicitly view the concept of sex under Title VII
in a simplistic manner defined by biological sex that obscures the numerous
gender-based distinctions and the potent gender-based power dynamics that
occur within each biological sex. By conceiving of sex in this biologically
dichotomous, gender-monolithic manner, Oncale's dicta fail to acknowledge
the significance of the gender stereotyping and sexually subordinating conduct
that marginalizes and demeans certain individuals on the basis of their sex- and
gender-related traits. These dicta thus perpetuate the tendencies in the prior
same-sex harassment jurisprudence to disregard these forms of conduct that the
courts have viewed as centrally relevant to the "because of sex" inquiry in the
context of harassment directed at women.
Finally, Part IV examines Oncale in the context of established Title VII
principles and observes that Oncale does not purport to overrule the
understandings of sex and sex-based causation in the broader Title VII
jurisprudence. Because the monolithic conception of "sex" implicit in Oncale's
dicta is at odds with established legal formulations and contemporary
understandings of the notion of sex, Part IV urges the lower courts to eschew
Oncale's narrow conception of "sex" and sex-based causation and to undertake
an independent analysis of the aspects of an individual's sex and gender identity
that affect his or her status in terms of workplace gender hierarchies. By doing
so, Part IV concludes, courts addressing claims of male-on-male harassment
can begin to develop an analytic framework for same-sex harassment claims
that better comports with the broader principles and policies of Title VII.
I. OPPOSITE-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES:
RECOGNIZING THE RELEVANCE OF THE MANY ASPECTS OF SEX
This part examines cases addressing claims of sexual harassment
perpetrated by men against women. In these cases, the harasser frequently
invokes gender stereotypes to demean women who possess traditionally
devalued, feminine traits and to penalize women who fail to conform to
prescribed gender roles. Moreover, the harassment often employs sexually
1999]
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explicit conduct that is calculated to humiliate, intimidate, and degrade women
in ways that are inextricably linked to aspects of their sex by exploiting their
vulnerability to sexual domination and abuse. In analyzing these forms of
harassment directed at women, the courts have recognized, implicitly or
explicitly, that the plaintiffs sex consists of a constellation of factors including
not only her biological attributes but also her conformity to gender-based
stereotypes and her projected or perceived sexuality. Thus, in the context of
opposite-sex harassment, the courts have readily recognized the actionable, sex-
based nature of these forms of conduct that are based on one or more aspects of
the target's sex or gender identity.
A. The Evolution of Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence: Judicial Cognizance of
the Nexus Between Gender Role Stereotypes, Sexualized Conduct,
and Employment Discrimination Based on Sex
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to ... terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's ... sex."22 In setting forth this prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual's sex, Title VII does not define the term"sex." Moreover, because the statute, originally aimed at redressing racial
discrimination, was expanded to include a proscription against sex
discrimination only during the final stage of legislative proceedings in an
apparent attempt to defeat its enactment, its legislative history does little to
elucidate the concept of sex.23 Because of this sparse legislative history, the
jurisprudence defining the parameters of a cause of action under Title VII has
evolved with little legislative guidance on the question of when the challenged
conduct occurs "because of' a person's "sex."
The courts' recognition of sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination has evolved gradually over the past two decades. Initially, many
courts rejected women's contentions that sexual harassment constituted a form
of actionable sex discrimination.24 In the view of these courts, sexual
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
23. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964); CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACr 84 (1985); Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV.
813, 816-17 (1991) (concluding that legislators who added the term "sex" to Title VII were opposed to the Act and
"hoped that the inclusion of sex would highlight the absurdity of the effort as a whole, and contribute to its
defeat"); Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (noting that proscription against sex discrimination was added at end of legislative
process with no meaningful discussion). The inclusion of the word "sex" came as a result of a floor amendment by
Representative Howard Smith, an opponent of Title VII, who proposed the amendment in the spirit of "'satire and
ironic cajolery.' to inspire opposition to the bill. See Deering, supra note 11, at 235-36 & n.28 (quoting Francis J.
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 441-42 (1996)). The bill passed as
amended, however, with little debate on the issue of sex discrimination. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57,64 (1986).
24. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d
1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163-64 (D. Ariz. 1975) (describing sexual
harassment as "nothing more than a personal proclivity" on the part of the harasser rather than a condition of the
plaintiffs' employment), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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harassment was an inevitable component of interactions between men and
women that constituted a private, interpersonal matter beyond the purview of
employment discrimination laws.25 In the late 1970s, however, courts began
recognizing that the conduct at issue was intimately related to the target's status
as a woman and thus began to hold that conditioning employment-related
benefits on sexual favors constituted a form of sex discrimination that has come
to be known as quid pro quo sexual harassment.26
Several years elapsed before the courts began to recognize that sexual
harassment could constitute a form of sex-based discrimination even where the
harasser did not demand sexual favors in exchange for tangible employment-
related benefits. In Bundy v. Jackson,27 the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit held that sexual harassment that creates a hostile environment, thus
altering the conditions under which an employee must work, constitutes
actionable sex discrimination.28 In 1986, the Supreme Court adopted this
reasoning in its landmark decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson and held
that Title VII forbids not only quid pro quo harassment but also "hostile
environment" harassment that, while not affecting tangible economic benefits,
subjects the plaintiff to a hostile or offensive working environment.29 In
recognizing a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment, the
Court explained that:
[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can
be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.3"
Relying in part on guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, the Court stated that "Title VII affords employees the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult."31 Expounding on its definition of hostile environment harassment
several years later, the Court explained, "[w]hen the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
25. See Franke, supra note 11, at 699-701.
26. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 501
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
27. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
28. See id. at946.
29. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,65 (1986).
30. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1 lth Cir. 1982)).
31. Id. at 65. The relevant guidelines state in pertinent part: "Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of
... Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment." 29 C.F.RK § 1604.1 l(a) (1985).
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abusive working environment, Title VII is violated."32 The Supreme Court has,
since its decision in Meritor, clarified the parameters of a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim by holding that actionable harassment must be hostile
and abusive in both the subjective sense that the victim "subjectively
perceive[s] the environment to be abusive" and the objective sense that a
reasonable person would find the conduct hostile or abusive.33
The Supreme Court has, however, had little opportunity to expand upon the
meaning of the requirement that harassment be based on the plaintiffs "sex"
within the meaning of Title VII, and the lower courts have been similarly
reticent as to the precise meaning of this provision.34 Nonetheless, in the
opposite-sex context, courts have readily inferred the requisite sex-based causal
nexus from the nature of the harassment itself when the harassment invokes
gender-based stereotypes or entails sexualized interactions that reinforce and
perpetuate gender hierarchies.
B. Invocation of Gender Stereotypes
Many forms of sexual harassment that the courts have recognized as
actionable sex discrimination involve conduct based on gender stereotypes.
Ironically, women are often caught in what the Supreme Court has described as
the "catch-22" of sex discrimination based on gender stereotypes: they are
harassed both for possessing stereotypically feminine traits that are devalued in
the male-dominated workplace and for failing to conform to gender-defined
norms dictating that women should not exhibit the qualities of strength and
aggressiveness that are rewarded in the employment market.35 In either case, the
courts, implicitly recognizing that a person's gender is integrally related that
32. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In
contrast to quid pro quo harassment, where the harasser is deemed to be acting on behalf of the employer by
denying access to tangible employment benefits, in the context of hostile environment harassment, the harasser
generally is not acting on the employer's behalf. Accordingly, the plaintiff must establish the employer's liability
by demonstrating that the employer's policies or practices allowed the harassment to continue. See Henson, 682
F.2d at 909. The Supreme Court recently clarified standards of employer liability for hostile environment
harassment perpetrated by a supervisor against a subordinate employee. As the Supreme Court explained, the
employer can be held vicariously liable for such harassment, but may absolve itself of liability by establishing an
affirmative defense consisting of two necessary elements: (1) that the employer "exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) that the employee "unreasonably failed to
take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer" or to take other measures
to avoid harm. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2292 (1998).
33. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; see also Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1997)
("[P]laintiff must show both that the offending conduct created an objectively hostile environment and that she
subjectively perceived her working condition as abusive."); Smith v. Northwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d
1408, 1413 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that conduct must be both subjectively and objectively abusive).
34. See Franke, supra note 11, at 692-94 (noting the Supreme Court's silence as to the basis for its inference
that sexual harassment constituted a form of discrimination based on sex); id. at 718 (observing that "many courts
intone the 'because of sex' element and then never discuss it again").
35. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989). In Hopkins, the plaintiff was denied
partnership because her male colleagues viewed her as too aggressive, as evidenced by their admonitions that she
should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wearjewelry." Id. at 235 (citing Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
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person's sex as it is perceived by others, have characterized such gender-based
conduct as sex-based conduct within the purview of Title VII.
1. The Devaluation of Femininity:
Derision of Stereotypically Female Traits
A recurring trend in many cases involving sexual harassment directed at
women involves the harasser's attempt to portray the target as inadequate or
inferior based on stereotypical concepts of women. In some instances, harassers
simply express a general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace or
in certain jobs that have traditionally been reserved for men.36 In other cases,
particular women are singled out for harassment based on individual traits that
render them especially vulnerable to harassment founded on gender stereotypes.
Frequently, this harassment centers on stereotypical images of women as
physically weak and delicate and as nurturers or sex objects rather than as
competent workers.37 By invoking these traits in an insulting and demeaning
manner, the harasser expresses animus toward the presence of devalued,
stereotypically feminine characteristics in the workplace.
In Saum v. Widnall," for instance, an Air Force cadet whom fellow cadets
described as "too feminine" and "too pretty" to be an officer became the target
of a pattern of sexual harassment. This harassment included epithets such as
36. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff, the only
woman on the sales force at a car dealership, was told that "a woman has no place in a car dealership," and that the
only way she could sell cars was by "sleeping with the management" or "pulling up her skirt"); Cook v.
Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1237 (2d Cir. 1995) (general manager made hostile remarks about
female workers in general, and referred to female employees as "a bunch of dumb cunts"); Stacks v. Southwestern
Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1318 (8th Cir. 1994) (defendant repeatedly made comments such as "there
isn't a woman alive that can make it with Yellow Pages"); Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901, 909
(N.D. Ind. 1994) (plaintiff was told that women are "not cut out" to be salespeople). In instances where a woman's
clear qualifications for the job make it difficult for harassers to portray her as unfit for the work, harassers often
resort to imposing additional barriers to the woman's successful work performance in order to convey their belief
that those with feminine attributes are unsuited for the job. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1473 (3d Cir. 1990) (harassers stole policewoman's case files); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (harassers falsified records to create appearance that female surgery resident had
made an error); Thome v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff, a top-ranked
applicant for a police officer position based on oral and written tests as well as on physical agility, was held to
unequal job standards because of the assumption that her feminine attributes would not qualify her for the job).
For an excellent discussion of the techniques frequently used to convey the message that women are unwelcome
in the occupation and to undermine women's confidence and competence on the job, see Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1762-69 (1998).
37. These stereotypes have long been reflected in the law. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)
(upholding jury selection system excluding women on the theory that women are "still regarded as the center of
home and family life"); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420-21 (1908) (afning the state's right to limit the
working hours of women to no more than ten hours in one day on the grounds that "woman's physical structure
and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence," and thus
justifies restricting "the conditions under which she should be permitted to toil"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (arguing that the natural and proper timidity and delicacy that belongs to the female sex
makes women unfit for many of the occupations of civil life, including the legal profession) (Bradley, J.,
concurring); Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1949) (upholding jury selection system excluding women
on the theory that "[c]riminal court trials often involve testimony of the foulest kind, and they sometimes require
consideration of indecent conduct, the use of filthy and loathsome words, references to intimate sex relationships,
and other elements that would prove humiliating, embarrassing and degrading to a lady").
38. 912 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1996).
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"bitch" and "whore," taunts about the plaintiff's supposed sexual conduct and
preferences," incidents in which the plaintiff was required to "stand at attention
and stare at posters of offensive, nude or partially clothed women," and sexual
invasions and assaults.40 The court noted that although other female cadets were
harassed, "the frequency and severity of [the plaintiff's] ill-treatment was
accentuated because of her appearance" as a five-foot-three-inch-tall woman
weighing one hundred pounds.4' By finding that the harassers' characterization
of the plaintiff as "feminine" and "pretty" constituted part of a pattern of
invidious sex-based conduct, the court recognized the power of these adjectives,
in a military context where typically masculine attributes such as physical
strength and aggressiveness are valued while typically feminine traits are
devalued, to demean and deride individuals who possess female and feminine
traits. 42
In addition to singling out women based on their feminine physical
appearance, harassers often attempt to reinforce stereotyped images of women
in the traditional role of mothers and nurturers, thus implying that they do not
belong in the male-dominated workplace. 43 For example, in Hellebusch v. City
of Wentzville," the plaintiff, who was Chief of Communications and Director of
Support Services in the defendant's police department, was consistently
subjected to taunts that she should be "at home baking cookies and taking care
of her children" and should be "doing woman's work."45 In Zorn v. Helene
Curtis, Inc.,46 the harassers expressed a similar perception of women as
domestic nurturers by requiring a management-level female plaintiff to perform
tasks such as checking male colleagues into hotels, cleaning up after meetings,
and cleaning supply closets.47 In each of these instances, the female plaintiff's
perceived capability and value in her chosen occupation was undermined
39. Id. at 1388.
40. Id. The sexual invasions and assaults are discussed at greater length infra Part I.C.2.
41. Id. at 1389.
42. There are numerous cases of harassers' attempting to portray women as lacking the physical strength or
aggressiveness required in certain traditionally male occupations. See, e.g., Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n,
766 F. Supp. 1052, 1066 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (recounting harassers' belittling of women's physical ability to serve as
corrections officers); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (describing similar
conduct with respect to women firefighters), affid, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985). A similar tendency to devalue
stereotypically feminine traits is apparent in sex discrimination cases outside of the hostile environment
harassment context. For instance, in Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court recognized a cause of action for sex discrimination where the supervisors of a female police officer stated
that she was "too much like a woman," that "[atfter work she can become feminine again," and that she looked
"too much like a lady." Id. at 1165.
43. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1755-69 (arguing that harassment that demeans women based on gender
stereotypes is designed to perpetuate the idealized masculine image traditionally associated with certain jobs, thus
preserving male privilege with respect to such jobs).
44. No. 4:95CV1533 JCH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20828 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 1996).
45. Id. at *4-5.
46. 903 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. IlI. 1995).
47. See id. at 1237. There are many examples of harassers invoking stereotypes of women as domestic
nurturers. See, e.g., Sassaman v. Heart City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901,909 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (plaintiff was told that
she should be home with her children); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.RD. 657, 663 (D. Minn. 1991)
(female workers told they should be home with their children); Sones Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123,
126 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (female manager told that "a woman's place is in the kitchen"), affid sub noma. Sones-
Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 725 F.2d 1070 (6th Cir. 1984).
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through invocations of "gendered expectations of what types of work are
suitable for women to perform." '48
Another gender stereotype that harassers draw upon to demean women and
devalue them as workers centers on the image of women as sexual objects who
are available for men's sexual gratification.4 9 In Morris v. American National
Can Corp.,50 for instance, the plaintiff, the only female working in her
department at a manufacturing company, was subjected to constant comments
about her sex life, references to her performing oral sex, and jokes about her
weight, her "boobs," and her "big butt."5 On one occasion, she found a picture
of a nude woman sitting on the edge of a bathtub touching her breasts, with a
note saying "you should be doing this instead of a man's job.,5 2 At a staff
meeting, her supervisor told her that she "might as well sit underneath his desk
since that's where everybody says you do your best work."53 On numerous
occasions pornographic and offensive objects including a sausage with a note
saying "bite me baby," a clay replica of a penis, women's underwear with a
stained sanitary napkin, and "Playboy-type" pictures were placed on her desk.54
The courts have encountered numerous similar instances of harassment based
on stereotypes of women as sex objects."
In each of the cases discussed above, the plaintiffs experienced insult and
degradation based on gender stereotypes. In some instances, the harassment
sought to demean the target based on stereotypes of women as physically weak
or incompetent. In other instances, the harassment was intended to portray
women as more suited to stereotypically feminine roles as domestic nurturers or
sexual objects than to the workplace. However, regardless of the particular
gender stereotype invoked, in each instance the invocation of the gender
stereotype served to perpetuate workplace gender hierarchies predicated on the
traditional association between stereotypically masculine traits and historically
male-dominated occupations.56 In each instance, the harassment sought to"preserve the masculine image and male-dominated composition" of certain
sectors of the employment market by denigrating traditionally female
48. Schultz, supra note 36, at 1754.
49. See Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs & PuB.
POL'Y 335, 352-53 (1992) (describing a phenomenon whereby "women, more than men in the same work roles
are expected to be sex objects").
50. 730 F. Supp. 1489 (E.D. Mo. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 952 F.2d 200 (8th
Cir. 1991).
51. Id. at 1491.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 939-40 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding a hostile environment
where supervisors propositioned plaintiff, engaged in sexual conversations with her, and stated that "any man in
his right mind would want to rape you"); Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, No. CIV.A. 91-
1507, 1993 WL 235491, at *21 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1993) (holding that sexual conduct that "communicates to
women that the [harasser] views them as sexual objects rather than as skilled co-workers" amounts to hostile-
environment harassment), affd, 43 F.3d 1463 (3d Cir. 1994).
56. For a further discussion of the stereotypically male traits that have traditionally been valued in the
workplace in contradistinction to the stereotypically female traits that had traditionally been devalued in the
employment market, see infra notes 449-450 and accompanying text.
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attributes,57 thereby "marking and maintaining certain work as appropriate for
men only."58 Thus, harassment based on gender stereotypes plays an integral
role in preserving notions of male domination in certain occupations.59
Although few courts have explicitly articulated the significance of these forms
of harassment in perpetuating sex-based inequalities in the workplace, the
foregoing cases demonstrate that they have had little difficulty recognizing that
such harassment, which is laden with denigrating gender stereotypes, is a form
of employment discrimination based on sex.
2. Disciplining Divergence:
Penalizing Failure to Conform to Stereotypical Gender Roles
Another common characteristic of the sexual harassment directed at women
is the tendency to penalize women who fail to conform to gender-based
stereotypes and norms. Although it may seem paradoxical that women are
penalized both for exhibiting stereotypically feminine traits and for failing to
exhibit these traits, this paradox plays a central role in the workplace gender
hierarchies that associate certain jobs with maleness and masculinity.60 As the
cases below demonstrate, the courts have consistently recognized that
harassment of women based on failure to conform to stereotypical gender roles
constitutes a form of proscribed discrimination based on sex. In Sanchez v. City
of Miami Beach,6' for instance, the court upheld a jury verdict in favor of a
female police officer who was harassed by male co-workers for failing to
conform to their notions of appropriate femininity. She was confronted with
sexually explicit noises transmitted over the police radio, with sexually explicit
materials displayed in the workplace, and with objects including "a soiled
condom, a sanitary napkin, two vibrators, and a urinal device in her mailbox., 62
In addition, the harassers accused Sanchez of "being a lesbian, having male
genitalia, and challenging male co-workers to various physical competitions. 63
The police department contended that the conduct was not harassment based on
sex because it was based on the "[p]laintiff's involvement in bodybuilding and
her concurrent use of steroids" that had brought about a "change in physical
condition and character."'  The court rejected this argument and found that,
since the harassment and hostility was based in large part on the plaintiff's
57. Schultz, supra note 36, at 1762.
58. Id. at 1769. As Professor Schultz explains, harassment based on gender stereotypes is used "to reinforce
gender difference" in order to "claim work competence and authority as masculine preserves .... [HIarassment is a
central process through which the image of (certain) work as masculine is sustained." Id. at 1759.
59. See id. at 1761 ("[H]arassment is a central mechanism through which men preserve their work ... as
domains of masculine mastery.").
60. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (describing a "catch-22" in which women
are penalized in the workplace both for failing to conform to stereotypical notions of femininity and for exhibiting
traits associated with stereotypical notions of femininity that are devalued in the employment market); see also
Schultz, supra note 36, at 1735 (discussing harassers' attempts to create "masculine-identified turf').
61. 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
62. Id. at 977 (footnotes omitted).
63. Id. at 977 n.9.
64. Id. at 978.
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failure to adhere to gender-based stereotypes of appropriate appearance and
conduct, it constituted harassment based on sex within the scope of Title VII 5
In effect, the court recognized that the plaintiffs physical strength,
muscularity, and desire to display athletic prowess to others elicited the
harassers' hostility only because these traits, which are otherwise valued in
physically demanding occupations such as law enforcement,66 were displayed
by a woman. Thus, although the harassment did not evince hostility toward all
women based on traits inherent in their biological sex, the court recognized that
the plaintiff's sex played an integral role in motivating the harassers' reactions
to her. In doing so, the court recognized the sex-based nature of conduct that
penalizes a plaintiff for failing to conform to stereotypical gender roles.67
Other courts have also recognized the sex-based nature of harassment that
targets and penalizes individuals for diverging from prescribed notions of
appropriate female appearance and demeanor. For example, in Zorn v. Helene
Curtis, Inc.,6" the court found that repeated comments urging the plaintiff to act
more femininely, look sexier and less matronly, wear shorter skirts and dresses,
and show more emotion amounted to hostile environment harassment based on
the plaintiff's sex.69 Likewise, in Danna v. New York Telephone Co.,70 the court
upheld a female service technician's hostile environment claim based on
admonitions that she would fare better at work if she acted more "feminine and
cutesy."'" And in Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc.,72 the court
recognized the actionable, sex-based nature of harassment directed at a female
employee who wore pants and was taunted by male colleagues, who threatened,"we're going to take your pants off and put a skirt on you" and "we're going to
take your clothes off to see if you are real."73
In each of these cases, the harassment was not directed toward all women
based on their biological status as women, but rather was aimed at particular
women who diverged from gender-based norms by exhibiting certain traits
commonly associated with men. Nonetheless, the courts readily concluded that
this conduct was based on the target's sex because the traits elicited the
harassers' hostilities only when exhibited by women. In these cases analyzing
harassment directed at women, the courts have not construed the term "sex" as
a rigid, unidimensional concept referring only to membership in one of two
biological sexes. Rather, the courts have construed the notion of "sex" under
Title VII as a more complex, multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing not only
65. Seeid.at981.
66. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1766 (discussing the importance of "physical virility" in the image ofjobs
such as police and construction work).
67. See id.
68. 903 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
69. See id. at 1236-37.
70. 752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
71. Id. at 598. For another example of harassment based on failure to fulfill expectations of a stereotypically
feminine appearance, see EEOC Decision No. 84-1, 1983 WL 22487, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 28, 1983) (finding that
defendant harassed plaintiff based on lack of feminine appearance through comments such as "when are you
going to put some meat on your ass?" and "when are you going to get something to put in that sweater?").
72. 845 F.2d 900 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
73. Id. at 902.
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biological sex, but also the gender-based stereotypes, expectations, and norms
that are imposed upon and enforced against individuals because of their
biological sex.
C. Sexualized Conduct as a Means of Asserting Gender Dominance
Sexual harassment directed at women is also frequently characterized by
sexualized conduct that focuses intensively on the plaintiff's sex-related
physical attributes and entails unwelcome sexual interactions including sexual
epithets, comments, threats, and physical assaults. Although some such conduct
is the product of a genuine pursuit of sexual relations with the target, in many
instances the hostile, derogatory, and invasive character of the sexualized
conduct reveals that such conduct represents not an expression of sexual desire,
but rather an attempt to humiliate and degrade the plaintiff and to exert power
and domination over her by exploiting her sexual vulnerabilities.
Numerous commentators have explored the significance of sexual conduct
as a means of exerting power and enforcing patterns of gender dominance, both
in the workplace 4 and in other contexts.75 Recent scholarship has emphasized
the power of sexual vulgarity and sexualized interactions to reinforce gender
norms and gender hierarchies by feminizing and sexualizing female targets,
thus reducing their status to that of sexual objects. This behavior simultaneously
masculinizes and empowers male harassers by demonstrating, in deeply gender-
laden terms, their power to sexually subordinate others.76 Thus, sexualized
conduct, ranging from sexually vulgar epithets to sexual assaults, functions as a
regulatory, disciplinary practice that "inscribes, enforces, and polices a
particular view of who men and women should be. As such, it is a technology
of gender discrimination., 77 Most courts that have examined unwelcome sexual
conduct directed at women have offered only cursory analyses of whether such
conduct constitutes a form of discrimination based on sex.7" However, although
74. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) (identifying
sexual harassment as an exercise of power); Craig, supra note 11, at 110 (noting that many courts have observed
that sexual harassment serves the objective of"maintenance and abuse of power and dominance, rather than a real
desire for sex").
75. Many commentators have documented the ways in which rape, an extreme form of unwelcome sexual
conduct, serves as an expression of violence, power, and domination rather than sexual desire. See, e.g., SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (1975) (characterizing rape as a violent means of
asserting power over women's bodies); Peggy Miller & Nancy Biele, Twenty Years Later. The Unfinished
Revolution, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 47, 49 (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993) ("Rape in all its
forms
... is an act of violence, a violation of the victim's spirit and body, and a perversion of power."); Alexandra
Stiglmayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-
HERZEGOVINA 82, 84-85 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., 1994) (explaining that rape serves to demonstrate power and
to "humiliate and annihilate the enemy"); Jonathan Willens, Structure, Content, and the Exigencies of War:
American Prison Law After Twenty-Five Years, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 60 n.93 (1987) (arguing that prison rape is
an exertion of power rather than an expression of sexual desire).
76. See Franke, supra note 11, at 761-72.
77. Id. at 771.
78. See id. at 692-94, 718 (discussing courts' lack of explicit analysis of the "because of sex" requirement).
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their precise reasoning is often difficult to discern,79 their ultimate conclusions
are not, as most courts have readily recognized the sex-based and sex-
discriminatory nature of conduct that degrades women in deeply gendered
terms and intimidates and subordinates them based on their vulnerability to
sexual domination.
1. Humiliation and Ridicule Centered on Sex-Based Physical Attributes
and Stereotypical Sexuality
Sexual harassment jurisprudence is rife with instances in which the harasser
directs a barrage of gender-specific derogatory epithets at a plaintiff. These
epithets frequently involve derisive references to women's sexual organs and
invoke stereotypes of female sexuality. These epithets diminish the target's
status in the workplace by portraying her as a sexual entity rather than as a
capable co-worker.80 In many instances, harassers sexualize and demean their
targets by referring to them with derogatory allusions to female genitalia such
as "cunt" and "pussy,"'" thereby communicating to their targets that they are
being isolated and demeaned in a manner inextricably linked to their status as
women.82 In other cases, the harassers invoke stereotypical images of female
sexuality, such as "slut," "whore," "tramp," and "prostitute,"83 relegating their
79. Professor Franke identifies three theories that courts and commentators have implicitly or explicitly
relied upon to explain the sex-discriminatory nature of unwelcome sexual conduct in the workplace. The first, a
formal equality theory, emphasizes that the perpetrator would not have directed similar conduct toward a person of
the opposite sex from the plaintiff, making the plaintiff's sex a "but for" cause of the objectionable conduct. See
id. at 705-14. The second, a sexuality-centered theory, holds that sexual conduct, by its nature, is debilitating and
discriminatory in its effect on women because it reinforces perceptions of women as sexual objects. See id. at 714-
25. The third, a subordination theory, posits that the discriminatory aspect of sexual conduct in the workplace lies
in the fact that it is inevitably an exercise of power by a member of a dominant social group over a member of a
subordinate social group. See id. at 725-29. Franke, however, persuasively argues that all three of these theories
fail to recognize the sex-discriminatory nature of sexual harassment as a means of regulating and reinforcing
gender norms. See id. at 771.
80. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1766 & n.441; Franke, supra note 11, at 763-66.
81. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 998 (10th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff called "curb side
cunt" and "bitch"); Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1461 (9th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff called "dumb
fucking broad," "cunt," and "fucking cunt"); Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir.
1993) (plaintiff called "cunt" and "bitch"); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs
referred to as "flicking flag girls," "cavern cunt," and "blond bitch"); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist.,
929 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (plaintiff called "bitch," "skank," and "dumb cunt"); Needy v. Village
of Woodridge, No. 96C5188, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11813, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 1997) (plaintiffs called"cunts," "broads," and "bitches"); Perry-Baker v. Runyon, No. 94C4892, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15548, at *8
(N.D. ll. Oct. 17, 1996) (plaintiff called "walking pussy" and "cunt").
82. In some instances, the harasser does not invoke such crude, derogatory terms, but nonetheless
objectifies the plaintiff's intimate body parts. This conduct similarly imparts the harasser's power to objectify the
target and the target's concomitant powerlessness to enforce the boundaries of her interactions with the harasser,
resulting in a similar sense of helplessness and humiliation. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis.
Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1990) (recounting assistant dean's comments about assistant professor's body
and body parts); DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
supervisor's telling plaintiff that she had a "big chest" after openly comparing the breast sizes of his female
subordinates).
83. See, e.g., Winsor, 79 F.3d at 998 (plaintiff called "floor whore" and "curb side cunt"); EEOC v.
Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1507 (9th Cir. 1989) (female employee called "whore"); Huddleston v. Roger
Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 902 (11 th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff called "whore"); Brnneau v. South Korlright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (plaintiff called "prostitute"); Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at
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targets to stereotypical roles as sexual beings available for the sexual
gratification of men. Notably, the epithet "cunt" serves a dual role, defining the
target in terms of her female genitalia through its definition as "a female
pudenda," while also invoking stereotypical images of female sexuality through
its definition as a "prostitute" or a "woman regarded as a sexual object." "
Significantly, these epithets defining women in terms of their genitalia and
invoking stereotypical imagery of female sexuality are frequently combined
with the epithet "bitch,"85 another deeply gendered and sexualized term that has
been defined as "a lewd or promiscuous woman" or a "malicious, bad-
tempered, or aggressive woman." 6 The term "bitch" simultaneously reduces
the target's status to that of a sexual being characterized by her lewdness, and
chastises the target for being overly aggressive. It is not surprising, therefore,
that this combination of epithets is frequently directed at women who blur the
traditional gender boundaries of the workplace by occupying positions formerly
occupied by men and regarded as bastions of masculinity. 7 These epithets, by
defining their targets in sexualized terms and reducing them to sex objects, thus
serve as a means of preserving and perpetuating the traditional workplace
gender hierarchies that have reserved certain jobs for men. 8
The courts have consistently recognized the sex-based and sex-
discriminatory nature of this conduct that sexualizes the target through
references to the target's female genitalia and sexuality. Often, courts have
treated the sex-based and sex-discriminatory nature of this conduct as self-
evident, inferring the requisite nexus to the plaintiff's sex from the references to
the target's sexual organs and sexuality, with no additional analysis of whether
such conduct was, or could have been, directed at a target of the opposite sex.
For example, in Hellebusch v. City of Wentzville, 9 the court, without setting
forth an explicit analysis, found that epithets such as "fucking bitch," "fiicking
whore," "slut," and "fucking cunt"9 were gender-based and sexist, and thus
provided sufficient evidence of sex-based harassment to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.9 Likewise, in Perry-Baker v. Runyon,92 the defendant
1197 (plaintiff called "slut," "whore," "fuckin' tramp," and 'beerslut"); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.
Supp. 1560, 1565 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (plaintiff called "slut" and "hoe" [sic]); Perry-Baker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15548, at *8 (plaintiff called "slut" and "whore").
84. WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED DICIONARY 214 (2d ed. 1996) (defining "cunt" as a "female
pudenda," a "prostitute," and a "woman regarded as a sexual object"); see also Cozzi v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers,
Inc., No. 96C7228, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7979, at *13 (N.D. il. May 30, 1997) (citing 1993 unabridged edition
of Webster's Third New International Dictionary).
85. See, e.g., Winsor, 79 F.3d at 998; Burns, 989 F.2d at 965; Hall, 842 F.2d at 1012; Burrow, 929 F. Supp.
at 1197; Needy, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11813, at *3 (plaintiffs called "cunts," "broads," and "bitches"); Perry-
Baker, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15548, at *8 (plaintiff called "walking pussy" and "cunt").
86. WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY 143 (3d College ed. 1988).
87. See, e.g., Winsor, 79 F.3d at 998 (such epithets directed at a woman on an all-male sales force); Burns,
989 F.2d at 965 (such epithets directed at a woman in male-dominated electronic industry workplace); Hall, 842
F.2d at 1012 (such epithets directed at only female construction workers in the workplace).
88. See Franke, supra note 11, at 767; Schultz, supra note 36, at 1766-67.
89. No. 4:95CV1533 JCH, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20828 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 1996).
90. Id. at *5-6.
91. Seeid. at*17-18.
92. No. 94C4892, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15548 (N.D. 11. Oct. 17, 1996).
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continually made derogatory references to female genitalia and invoked
stereotypical images of female sexuality, calling the plaintiff a "walking pussy,""cunt," "bitch," "whore," and "slut. '93 The court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment without requiring any evidence beyond the content of
the harassment itself that the harassment was based on the plaintiff's sex.9" In
Needy v. Village of Woodridge,95 females were called "cunts," "broads," and
"bitches" by male officers in the Woodridge Police Department.96 Again, the
court found that the content of the harassment itself provided sufficient
evidence of the sex-based nature of the conduct to survive a motion for
summary judgment.97
Each of these courts apparently recognized that, as one court succinctly
stated, the sex-based nature of the conduct "speaks for itself' when the content
of the conduct is so intertwined with aspects of female biology and sexuality
that it demeans the target as a woman and could not rationally be directed at a
man.98 When the gender-laden content of the harassment reveals this
inextricable nexus between the conduct and the target's sex- and gender-based
attributes, these courts have found the sex-based nature of the harassment self-
evident, and thus have found no need to undertake a mechanistic analysis of
whether males were, or could have been, subjected to the same forms of
derogatory conduct.
2. Groping, Grabbing, and Other Actual and Threatened Invasions:
Exploitation of Vulnerability to Sexual Subordination and Abuse
Many forms of sexual harassment involve actual or threatened sexual
assaults or invasions that intimidate and demean the target by portraying her as
vulnerable to sexual domination by the harasser.99 In some instances, the
harassment consists of verbal allusions to unwanted sexual acts with the
plaintiff.100 In other cases, the harassing conduct goes beyond the verbal and
involves humiliating, sexually suggestive pranks and physical acts that portray
93. Id. at *8.
94. See id.
95. No. 96C5188, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11813 (N.D. Iil. Aug. 7, 1997).
96. Id. at *3.
97. See id.
98. Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 143 F.3d 1103, 1106-07 (8th Cir. 1998) (defendant made numerous
sexually suggestive comments to the plaintiff).
99. See RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS 134 (Anita
Faye Hill & Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995) ("The purpose of sexual harassment is to reduce women to objects
sexually vulnerable to men, and to reestablish the traditional power relationship between men and women.").
100. See, e.g., DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 310, 312 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (defendant
said that before plaintiffs wedding he should "give her a good screw"); EEOC Decision No. 84-1, 1983 WL
22487, at *3 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 28, 1983) (defendant constantly made specific comments and gestures evoking
images of sex and rape such as "[k]eep bending and I'll drive you home" and comments that he wanted to "cop a
feel" while gesturing with his hands as if he were feeling her breasts); EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 1981 EEOC
LEXIS 14, at * 13-14 (E.E.O.C. April 3, 1981) (defendant told employee that because of her curly hair she looked
like a sheep, and suggested that as a sheep, she could "get rammed").
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the target as an object available for the harasser's sexual gratification."0 ' And in
some cases, the harassment involves a component of sexual violence that
renders the target an unwilling victim of forcible acts of sexual conquest,
domination, and abuse, vividly illustrating the harasser's power over the target
and her sexuality.1"2 In each of these scenarios, the conduct imparts the message
that the harasser, for reasons inextricably linked to his maleness and masculine
sexuality, is in a position of power and control over the target's sexuality, thus
communicating the harasser's position of dominance and the target's position of
subordination.103
In analyzing these forms of unwanted sexual conduct directed at women,
courts have recognized that the conduct represented a form of humiliation and
intimidation used to relegate women to a subordinate position rather than an
expression of sexual desire."° In Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., °5 for
instance, the defendant slapped the plaintiffs buttocks, pushed her in a
threatening manner, forcefully placed his foot in her crotch and wiggled it, and
pulled on the waist of her pants to reveal her undergarments. 6 Similarly, in
Saum v. Widnall, °7 the plaintiff, an Air Force cadet, was forcibly confronted
with images of offensive, nude, or partially clothed women and was cast as the
101. See, e.g., Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d 230, 233 (7th Cir. 1994) (defendant slapped
plaintiff on the buttocks, approached her from behind while she was bending down, and placed his boot in her
crotch and wiggled it); Rufo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 96-6376, 1997 WL 169267, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
1997) (defendant touched plaintiffs breasts, used sexual gestures in front of her and fondled his genitalia in front
of her and others); Rivera v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 95-CV-0829, 1996 WL 637555, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.
21, 1996) (defendant gyrated his groin area against one plaintiff's arm, remarked about her breasts, leered at her,
and made offensive noises around her, and grabbed another plaintiffs buttocks, and told her how "horny" he was
while grabbing his penis); Hernandez v. Wangen, 938 F. Supp. 1052, 1055-56 (D.P.R 1996) (defendant spanked
plaintiff on the buttocks at an office social gathering and touched her neck "up and down" while making sexual
remarks); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (plaintiff received soiled condom,
sanitary napkin, vibrators, and a urinal device in her mailbox). Even where the sexual conduct does not involve an
explicit element of force or coercion, it tends to portray women as a passive sexual object of men's active desires
and advances, and thus operates to the detriment of the female target by casting her in a passive, submissive role
that is at odds with notions of what constitutes a competent worker. See Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the
Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2479, 2480 (1994) (arguing that sexual harassment characterizes
women "primarily as sexual objects, or as objects of sex-based derision, rather than as competent workers" and
that "women are likely to perceive sexualized conduct as more of a threat to their professional and personal
security than would their male counterparts").
102. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 60 (1986) (harasser "forcibly raped"
plaintiff on several occasions); Saum v. Widnall, 712 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1990) (plaintiff was forced to play
"victim" in a simulated rape scenario while a fellow Air Force cadet placed his groin in her face, made sexually
explicit comments, and inserted stick in her pants); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 231
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (female firefighter subjected to "extensive sexual abuse" and "physical sexual molestation"),
affid, 755 F.2d 913 (2d. Cir. 1985).
103. See ANDREA DwORKIN, INTERCOURSE 150 (1987) (discussing how the roles of men and women in
heterosexual intercourse, as articulated by society, "promote the power of men over women and ... keep women
sexually subjugated (accessible) to men"); SHERE HiTE, WOMEN AS REVOLurIONARY AGENTS OF CHANGE: THE
HiTE REPORTS AND BEYOND 40 (1993) (arguing that the sexual act [intercourse] symbolizes "the male's
dominance, manipulation, and control over the female"). Hite argues that the prevailing intercourse-centered
paradigm of sexual interactions casts women in a subordinate role. Id. at 40-41, 55.
104. See Franke, supra note 11, at 734 (arguing that "[t]o the extent that desire plays a role in actionable sex
harassment, it does so secondarily").
105. 40 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1994).
106. Seeid. at233.
107. 912 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo. 1996).
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"victim" in a simulated rape and exploitation scenario.108 In the course of this
simulation, she was forced to her knees while a male cadet put his crotch in her
face and made sexually explicit comments to her, soaked her fatigues with
urine, and put a stick in her pants that he called her "masturbation stick."' 09 She
was also subjected to a disproportionate number of sexually charged "beatings,"
"interrogations," and incidents of "torture," which left her unconscious on two
occasions and caused severe bruising and weight loss." 0 The violence, hostility,
and humiliation surrounding these sexual invasions plainly revealed the nature
of the acts as a means of establishing the male harassers' power and dominance
over the female targets.
However, even where the unwanted sexual acts are not suffused with such
violence, the courts have analyzed the conduct as a form of humiliation and
intimidation rather than as a product of sexual attraction. For example, in Pease
v. Alford Photo Industries, Inc.,"' the harasser was in the habit of regularly
touching and fondling his female employees on their shoulders, arms, necks,
breasts, and thighs." 2 The employees testified that this conduct made them feel
"terrible, humiliated, nervous and tense,""' 3 "embarrassed," "nervous," and
"low.'' 114 Many described the harasser as "domineering" and "intimidating..' 115
In light of this testimony, the court characterized the conduct as harassment
"based upon sex,"' 16 not because of any evidence that the harasser was
genuinely attracted to the employees, but rather because of the clear indication
that such conduct was "humiliating to his female employees.""' '
As the foregoing cases demonstrate, the courts have recognized the sex-
based and sex-discriminatory nature of varying forms of unwelcome sexual
conduct. This conduct has included the use of sexually explicit epithets,
threatened sexual invasions, humiliating, sexually suggestive pranks, depiction
of the plaintiff as a sexual object, and violent sexual assaults. In many of these
cases, the courts had no difficulty discerning the sex-based nature of the
conduct, even in the absence of any evidence of genuine sexual desire toward
the target. These courts have, at least implicitly, taken cognizance of the power
of sexualized interactions to evoke and perpetuate stereotypical images of men
as powerful and dominant and females as subordinate and submissive."H8 Just as
many courts have recognized that harassment that invokes gender stereotypes-
either by derogating compliance therewith" 9 or by punishing divergence
108. See id. at 1388.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1388-89.
111. 667 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. Term. 1987).
112. Seeid. at 1196-97.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1197-98
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1201.
117. Id. at 1202.
118. See supra notes 102-103 (discussing patterns of male domination and female subordination
symbolized and reinforced by heterosexual interactions).
119. See supra Part I.B.l.
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therefrom 2°--amounts to harassment based on sex, so too numerous courts
have recognized that harassment that invokes images of the target's sexuality to
reduce the target to a sexual object and sexual subordinate likewise constitutes
discrimination based on sex.'21
Accordingly, it is apparent that the cases analyzing sexual harassment
directed at women have not adhered to a rigid, simplistic conception of "sex" in
assessing whether the conduct could be characterized as conduct that occurred
"because of' the plaintiffs "sex" within the meaning of Title VII. Rather, the
courts have recognized that harassment based on gender stereotypes and
gender-subordinating sexual interactions plays an integral role in perpetuating
patterns of male domination and female subordination that characterize
workplace gender hierarchies.1 22 Consequently, the courts have developed an
understanding of sex-based discrimination that recognizes the interrelationships
between gender stereotypes, sexual interactions, and sex discrimination in the
employment market and have found that actionable, sex-based harassment was
afoot in a broad range of circumstances where the plaintiff was harassed based
on stereotypical notions of femininity or female sexuality.
Based on this approach, the courts have found Title VII's "because of...
sex" requirement to be satisfied whenever the nature of the harassment reveals
that it is based on aspects of the target's personality that are inextricably related
to her sex. They have not required any evidence that such conduct affected all
women uniformly; nor have they insisted on proof that men were treated
differently. As the following section demonstrates, however, the courts have
taken a markedly different approach to analyzing the sex-based nature of
conduct directed at men.
II. SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES:
DIVERGENT JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO SIMILAR SEX-BASED CONDUCT
This part examines the cases addressing harassment directed at men by men.
In the cases examining harassment directed at women,'23 the courts have
consistently acknowledged the sex-based nature of harassment involving
gender stereotypes and sexual subordination.'24 However, in the context of
harassment directed at men, the courts have examined similar conduct yet have
taken an array of different approaches to analyzing whether the conduct is
based on the target's sex. As this part demonstrates, the conduct directed at men
reveals striking parallels to the types of conduct directed at women. Male-on-
120. See supra Part I.B.2.
121. See supra notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
122. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1754-61 (discussing the gender-stratified and sex-segregated nature of
the workplace and analyzing methods by which men seek to perpetuate the associations between masculine
gender traits and certain sectors of the employment market that they have traditionally controlled).
123. Although the courts have, on rare occasions, considered allegations of sexual harassment perpetrated
by women against women, they have had virtually no opportunity to examine the "because of... sex"
requirement in this context. See supra note 5. Accordingly, this analysis is based on a comparison of male-on-
female versus male-on-male hostile environment sexual harassment.
124. See supra Part LB-C.
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male harassment frequently invokes gender stereotypes to demean the target for
possessing traditionally devalued feminine traits and to penalize the target for
failing to conform to expected gender roles. It also frequently uses sexualized
conduct to feminize the target and relegate him to subordinate status based on
his vulnerability to sexual domination by more masculine males.
Despite the similarities between the conduct in these cases and the conduct
in the opposite-sex sexual harassment cases, many courts have applied the
"because of . . . sex"'25 language far more strictly than in cases involving
harassment directed at women. These courts have implicitly relied on a
conception of the target's "sex" that is limited to the target's status as a member
of the male biological sex. This conception ignores the numerous aspects of an
individual's sex identity, including conformity vel non to gender-stereotyped
notions of masculinity, projected and perceived sexuality, and vulnerability to
sexual domination, that are inextricably intertwined with and affected by the
target's biological sex, and that the courts have acknowledged as relevant
aspects of sex in the context of harassment directed at women.
A. Divergent Judicial Responses
The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of same-sex sexual
harassment for the first time in its landmark decision Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc. 2 6 However, for nearly a decade before Oncale, the
lower courts had been grappling with the issue of same-sex sexual harassment,
producing what the Supreme Court described as a "bewildering variety of
stances" in response to such conduct. 27  These divergent responses are
discussed below. 28
1. The Categorical Rejection ofAll Same-Sex Harassment Claims
The most restrictive line of cases addressing same-sex sexual harassment
categorically precludes any claims challenging such conduct. One of the
125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
126. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
127. Id. at 1002.
128. The lower courts, in fact, had addressed two distinct categories of same-sex hostile environment sexual
harassment. The first involved openly gay male harassers targeting male colleagues or subordinates. See, e.g.,
Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99
F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Joyner v. AAA
Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 732 (1lth Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist
Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981). The second category addressed male-on-male sexual
harassment perpetrated by men who were not known to be gay. See, e.g., Gibson v. Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107
(M.D.N.C. 1996); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff'd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996);
Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F.
Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995). The first category of cases has been relatively unproblematic for the courts because
in such cases the harasser's known attraction to persons of the target's sex supports the inference of sex-based
causation in a manner that "closely parallel[s]" the inference in some opposite-sex cases. Franke, supra note 11, at
697. This Article, therefore, focuses on the second category of cases, which do not involve any inference of sexual
attraction. These cases have proven far more problematic and divisive on the question of whether the humiliation
and intimidation are based on the target's sex. See id.
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clearest examples of this categorical rejection of same-sex sexual harassment
claims is found in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in Garcia v. Elf
Atochem North America.129 In Garcia, the court addressed allegations that the
plaintiffs supervisor, the plant foreman, approached the plaintiff from behind,"reach[ed] around and grab[bed] [the plaintiffs] crotch area and ma[de] sexual
motions from behind," simulating an act of sodomy on the plaintiff.3 The
employer had received prior complaints reporting similar conduct on the part of
the foreman, but had viewed the conduct as "horseplay" and thus had not taken
any action beyond counseling him that this conduct was "not appropriate for a
supervisor."'' In a three-sentence paragraph addressing the same-sex sexual
harassment issue, the court concluded that:
[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not
state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual
overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination.... Thus, [the acts
complained of] could not in any event constitute sexual harassment
within the purview of Title VH.132
The court thus characterized the conduct as merely "sexual," and treated
harassment involving sexual conduct and conduct involving gender
discrimination as mutually exclusive categories without acknowledging the
potential ways in which sexual conduct can be used to perpetuate and enforce
gender stereotypes and gender-based hierarchies.'33
The court was correct that the mere presence of sexual overtones does not
render conduct actionable under Title VII. After all, the statutory language does
not reach all conduct that is related to "sex" in the sense of sexual activity, but
rather addresses conduct that is directed at an individual "because of such
individual's ... sex."'34 The statute thus requires that the conduct be based on
the plaintiffs sex as an individual characteristic and not merely on a depiction
of sex as a form of human activity, however graphic or offensive it might be.
129. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
130. Id. at448.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 451-52 (internal quotations omitted). In support of this analysis, the Garcia court cited only its
own prior unpublished opinion in Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993), and Goluszek v.
Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 1988). See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448. Although Goluszek presented a distinct
rationale for rejecting the same-sex harassment claim raised in that case, see infra Part H.A.2., Garcia appears to
have cited Goluszek only for its result and not for its reasoning, as Garcia does not discuss Goluszek's reasoning.
Subsequent cases have disputed whether the portion of Garcia addressing same-sex sexual harassment constituted
merely dictum rather than a holding of the case, given that the court had already found that entry of summary
judgment was appropriate based on the statutory definition of employer and on principles of employer liability.
See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Garcia, 28 F.3d at
451-52), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). However, regardless of whether its analysis of the issue is properly viewed
as a holding or as dictum, Garcia is instructive as an example of judicial responses to same-sex harassment.
133. See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451-52.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see also Franke, supra note 11, at 715-16 (asserting that it "is rather
disingenuous to [contend] that sexual harassment is harassment 'because of sex' by arguing that the 'sex' in Title
VII refers to a class of human activity and not the identity category" and urging that the more principled approach
is to develop an understanding of the role that sexual activity plays in sexual harassment).
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The fallacy of the Garcia court's logic lies in its assumption that conduct with
sexual overtones and conduct evincing a gender bias are two mutually exclusive
categories, and thus that the "sexual" nature of the conduct obviated the need
for further inquiry into whether the conduct was also based on the plaintiff's
sex. The court failed to acknowledge the possibility that when a harasser grabs
an unwilling plaintiff's genital area and makes "sexual motions from behind"
suggestive of penetrating the plaintiff, the conduct can impart a powerful
gender-based message about the harasser's sexual dominance and the target's
sexual vulnerability, thereby humiliating, intimidating, and demeaning the
target in ways that may be integrally related to his projected and perceived sex
and gender identity.
Garcia's cursory account of the challenged conduct and its lack of
discussion of the surrounding workplace dynamics make it difficult to assess
the significance of the conduct before the court. However, the court erroneously
assumed that because the sexual conduct occurred between two males it did not
implicate the target's sex- and gender-based individual characteristics. By
categorically presuming that interactions between two males could not be based
on aspects of the target's sex, the Garcia court failed to recognize the ways in
which sexuality and sexual aggression are frequently used to establish and
maintain workplace gender hierarchies that rely on idealized images of
masculinity.' Because acts of sexual aggression and domination are
stereotypically associated with males, masculinity, and male sexuality, while
sexual passivity and vulnerability to sexual domination are stereotypically
associated with females, femininity, and female sexuality, unwelcome sexual
conduct can serve as a powerful means of accentuating gender-based
differences between more masculine males and less masculine males. 136
The Garcia court, however, by treating all males monolithically and
presuming that one male could not target another based on factors related to the
target's sex, ignored the gender-based hierarchy that allocates power and
privilege based on masculinity. The Garcia court also ignored the ways in
which sexuality can be used to assert and maintain the superior masculinity of
the sexual aggressor in contraposition to the lesser masculinity associated with
the target. The court thus departed from the significant body of law in the
opposite-sex sexual harassment context that recognizes the power of actual,
threatened, and simulated sexual invasions to intimidate, humiliate, subordinate,
and demean the target in sex-defined terms for reasons related to the target's
gender identity. Instead of examining the notions of sex-based causation
emanating from the broader sexual harassment jurisprudence, the Garcia court
simply presumed that the conduct was necessarily devoid of sex- and gender-
based implications merely because it was perpetrated by one biological male
135. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1755-62.
136. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text (discussing associations between maleness,
masculinity, and sexual dominance and aggression); see also infra Part 11.B.2. (examining role of unwelcome
sexual conduct in asserting the dominance of masculinity and in subordinating less masculine males to more
masculine males).
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against another. Thus, the court categorically excluded such male-on-male
harassment from the purview of Title VII.137
2. Ignoring the Invocation of Gender Stereotypes and
Perpetuating the Myth of the Gender Monolith:
The Requirement of an Anti-Male Environment
In a distinct line of cases, courts confronting allegations of male-on-male
sexual harassment have held that such conduct cannot constitute actionable sex
harassment unless it occurs in the context of an "anti-male environment in the
workplace." '38 This line of cases originated with Goluszek v. Smith.139 In that
case the plaintiff, an electronic maintenance mechanic at a processing plant,
alleged that his co-workers had tormented him about the fact that he did not
have a wife or girlfriend, urged him to "get some of that soft pink smelly stuff
that's between the legs of a woman," questioned him about whether he had
gotten any "pussy" or had oral sex, accused him of being gay, confronted him
with pictures of nude women, poked him in the buttocks with a stick, and talked
to him about "butt flicking in the ass."' 40 The court acknowledged that the
harassment was pervasive throughout Goluszek's employment and
acknowledged that "a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that if Goluszek
were a woman [the employer] would have taken action to stop the
harassment."141
The court found, however, that the harassment directed at Goluszek was not
actionable under Title VII because it was directed at a male by other males. The
court reasoned that "[t]he discrimination Congress was concerned about when it
enacted Title VII is one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of
that imbalance by the powerful that results in discrimination against a discrete
and vulnerable group."' 42 The "sexual harassment that is actionable under Title
VII," the court continued, "'is the exploitation of a powerful position to impose
sexual demands or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person.' .. . In
effect, the offender is saying by words or actions that the victim is inferior
because of the victim's sex." '143 The court then stated that "Goluszek was a male
137. Other cases have categorically held that same-sex sexual harassment is not actionable under Title VII.
See Schoiber v. Emro MAtg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 738 (N.D. I11. 1996) ("Same-gender sexual harassment does
not and cannot occur as a matter of law 'because of' the victim's 'sex."'); Lany v. North Miss. Med. Ctr., 940 F.
Supp. 960, 963 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (rejecting same-sex sexual harassment claim based on Garcia's holding), aff'd
in part sub nom. Larry v. Grice, 156 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 1998); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (citing Garcia for the proposition that "same sex discrimination is not actionable under Title VII
because it does not amount to discrimination because of the plaintifts gender"), affd, 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996);
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) ("Title VII does not provide a cause
of action for an employee who claims to have been the victim of sexual harassment by a supervisor or co-worker
of the same gender."), aft'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
138. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 11. 1988).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1453-54.
141. Id. at 1455-56.
142. Id. at 1456.
143. Id. (quoting Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)).
[Vol. 11: 155
The Myth of the Gender Monolith
in a male-dominated environment and that "each and every one of the figures"
involved in the harassment "was a male."' " The court thus concluded that there
was no indication that the workplace environment treated males as inferior. 4
Accordingly, the court found that although "Goluszek may have been harassed
'because' he is a male ... that harassment [is] not of a kind which created an
anti-male environment in the workplace."'" The court therefore concluded that,
although Goluszek would have a cause of action under a "wooden application
of the verbal formulations created by the courts," his claim was not "consistent
with the underlying concerns of Congress" and thus should not be permitted to
proceed.'47 Thus, in the view of Goluszek court, harassment that occurs because
of one's status as a male is not actionable unless it occurs in the context of an
anti-male environment.
Likewise, in Ashworth v. Roundup Co.,148 the court confronted allegations
that the plaintiff's male supervisor had harassed him with sexually explicit
comments and had "goosed" him by sticking a steel object between his
buttocks. 49 The plaintiff's supervisor called the plaintiff "homo" or "faggot,"
repeatedly threatened to "butt fuck" him, and frequently made suggestive
comments such as "how come whenever I get around you, I quiver."'"5 On one
occasion the supervisor told the plaintiff that he had a "nice ass" and on another
the supervisor stated that he wanted to "touch pee-pees" with the plaintiff in the
bathroom.' 5' The court, citing Goluszek and Garcia, held that although the
plaintiff may have been harassed "because" he is a male, he was not entitled to
assert a cause of action under Title VII because he had not established "that his
workplace was other than predominantly male or that an anti-male environment
was created."' 52
In Vandeventer v. Wabash National Corp., ' the court relied on similar
reasoning to conclude that a showing of oppression by one dominant gender
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. This reasoning has been criticized extensively. As one court explained:
[mrhe Goluszek court built its understanding of Congressional intent upon a foundation of
quicksand. Its basis for determining that Title Vu did not allow claims for this type of same-sex
harassment was that "[tihe discrimination Congress was concerned about when it enacted Title
VII is one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful
which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group." For this proposition, the
court cited a note, "Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VIL"
97 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1451-52 (1984). Although this part of the note admirably examines
conceptual frameworks of sexual harassment, it does not explore Congress's intent in passing
Title VII. Thus, the Goluszek court had no basis for its gloss on Title VII's legislative history. Not
only is it inappropriate to delve into Congressional intent when the statute's language is clear,
Goluszek is simply not persuasive or reliable authority for interpreting Title VII's provisions on
sex discrimination. In general, its progeny are similarly flawed.
Miller v. Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 704 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (citations omitted).
148. 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
149. See id. at490.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 492-94.
153. 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994), af'd on reconsideration, 887 F. Supp. 1178 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
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was necessary in order to sustain a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. In
that case, although there was "no evidence or even allegation that either [the
harasser or the target] was homosexual or believed the other to be," '154 the
harasser made repeated references to the plaintiff's performing oral sex on
another man.155 According to the plaintiff, the harasser asked him to "drop
down," referred to him as "dick sucker," instructed him to "crawl under the
table," asked whether the plaintiff could perform fellatio without his false teeth,
and invited the plaintiff to accompany him to a gay bar.'56 Citing Goluszek's
holding that a finding of gender discrimination requires "an atmosphere of
oppression by a 'dominant' gender," the court rejected the plaintiffs claim on
the grounds that there was no showing of an "'anti-male' atmosphere" in the
workplace.'57 Thus, the court found, "[t]he record does not support a reasonable
inference that [the harasser] 'harassed' [the plaintiff] because he was a man.
This was not actionable sexual harassment."' 58
In affirming its decision on reconsideration, the court elaborated on several
aspects of its opinion.'59 The court explained that its holding did not preclude
actions for same-sex sexual harassment under all circumstances, but rather was
a "fact-specific" determination based on the record before it.'60 The court
reiterated that harassment based on homosexuality was not actionable, but
acknowledged that "being homosexual does not deprive someone of protection
from sexual harassment under Title VII, it is merely irrelevant to it. The issue is
and remains whether one is discriminated against because of one's gender."'' 6'
The court then countenanced the possibility of a male harassing another
male based on sex. As the court explained, "a man can state a claim under Title
VII for sexual harassment by another man only if he is being harassed because
he is a man; the relative genders are irrelevant."'' 62 Furthermore, implicitly
recognizing that sexual harassment may be based on hostility and need not be
based on attraction, and that gender-based hostilities may arise between
members of the same biological sex, the court stated that, "[t]here may or may
not be homosexual aspects to such harassment. There may or may not be a
prejudice against one's own gender involved."'163  The court further
acknowledged that although sexual behavior did not in itself amount to conduct
based on "sex" within the meaning of Title VII, such behavior was frequently
involved in sexual harassment proscribed by Title VII and could serve as a
means of expressing an actionable gender bias.' 64 In discussing this point, the
court noted that the words "sex" and "sexual" in this context "create
154. Vandeventer, 887 F. Supp. at 1181 n.2.
155. See Vandeventer, 867 F. Supp. at 796.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 n.2 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
160. Id. at 1180-81.
161. Id. at 1180.
162. Id. at 1181.
163. Id.
164. See id.
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definitional problems because they can mean either 'relating to gender' or'relating to sexual/reproductive behavior."' These concepts, the court accurately
noted,
are not the same, but are certainly related and easily confused. Title VII
only recognizes harassment based on the first meaning, although that
frequently involves the second meaning. However, harassment which
involves sexual behavior or has sexual behavior overtones ... but is not
based on gender bias does not state a claim under Title VII.'65
However, despite these insights into the possibility of gender-based biases
among members of the same biological sex and into the potential role of sexual
conduct in expressing these biases, the court failed to analyze whether the
plaintiff had been targeted for reasons related to his gender, such as his
nonconformity with gender stereotypes. The court also failed to examine
whether he had been intimidated and demeaned in a manner inextricably
intertwined with his status as a male, thus implicating the very definition of"sex" that the court had identified as protected under Title VII. Rather, the
court, adhering to the prior holding requiring an anti-male atmosphere, 166
rejected the plaintiff s claim on the grounds that there was "no evidence that the
abuse was based on the 'harasser's' disdain for the victim's gender. ' 167 Thus,
like the courts in Goluszek and Ashworth, the court in Vandeventer refused to
recognize a sexual harassment claim absent some indication of gender-based
hostility to males as a class rather than toward an individual male based on
aspects of his gender identity. 168
The analysis in these cases stands in stark contrast to the analysis in the
opposite-sex cases. In the context of sexual harassment directed at women by
men, the courts have not required any showing that the work environment was
hostile toward all females. Instead, the courts have recognized a cause of action
for sex-based harassment when the circumstances of the harassment revealed
that it was based on the target's individual sex- and gender-related traits such as
possession of stereotypically feminine attributes, divergence from prescribed
gender roles, and vulnerability to sexual domination. 69 Contrary to the
opposite-sex harassment jurisprudence recognizing that the rights conferred
under Title VII are individual rights, 7 ° these cases effectively mandate that the
165. See id.
166. See Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790,796 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
167. Vandeventer, 887 F. Supp. at 1181 n.2.
168. The facts in Vandeventer, as described by the court, are inconclusive as to whether the plaintiffwas, in
actuality, targeted for reasons related to his maleness or masculinity. What is significant is that the court did not
examine whether the harassment was based on the target's individual sex-based attributes, but rather examined
only whether there was evidence of animus toward males in general.
169. See supra Part LB-C.
170. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 458 (1982) (holding that Title VII provides a cause of action to
any individual who is subjected to adverse treatment based on a protected trait regardless of whether others were
treated adversely based on that trait).
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challenged conduct "operate, in some respect, against all members of the
protected group."171
This line of cases requiring a general hostility toward males as a
biologically defined class effectively views all males monolithically and denies
a cause of action to males who are targeted based on individual sex-related
traits such as deviance from stereotypes of appropriately masculine
demeanor. 72 In an approach that diverges dramatically from that of the cases
addressing sexual harassment directed at women, these courts fail to recognize
the numerous sex- and gender-based individual attributes that distinguish males
from one another, distributing them across a spectrum and defining their status
relative to one another on workplace gender hierarchies. 73 By construing the
notion of "sex" narrowly to refer only to the plaintiffs membership in one of
two opposing biologically defined sexes and not to the array of individual sex-
based attributes that affect each person's interactions with others, this line of
cases imposes rigid restrictions on Title VII's "because of sex" language that
have not been imposed in cases brought by female plaintiffs.
3. Missing the Significance of Sexualized Conduct: Misplaced Emphasis
on Sexual Desire and the Requirement of Homosexual Attraction
In yet another line of reasoning that has emerged from the lower courts'
same-sex harassment jurisprudence, the courts have focused on the harasser's
sexual orientation, thus implicitly requiring an element of potential sexual
attraction to support a finding of the requisite sex-based causation. By focusing
on the harasser's sexual orientation, these courts have construed Title VI's
"because of sex" requirement narrowly to denote only conduct prompted by
sexual attraction. They have thereby excluded numerous other forms of conduct
that are based on aspects of the target's projected and perceived "sex" and
gender identity, such as possession of traditionally devalued, stereotypically
feminine traits, divergence from gender-based stereotypes, and vulnerability to
sexual domination.
One of the clearest examples of this reasoning is found in the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals' opinion in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors. 74 In that case, the court examined a Title VII claim brought by a
male automotive mechanic alleging that his co-workers, who identified
themselves as the "lube boys," had subjected him to a campaign of sexually
humiliating and demeaning treatment. They teased him about his inability to
171. Abrams, supra note 101, at 2514; see also Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-3-94-182, 1995 WL
386793 at *3 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (dismissing same-sex harassment claim on the grounds that male-on-male
harassment "is not actionable under Title VII in the absence of an allegation that an anti-male environment was
created thereby"), aff'd, 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996).
172. For further discussion of the gender stereotypes at play in these cases, see infra notes 449-450 and
accompanying text.
173. For a discussion of workplace gender hierarchies based upon associations between certain occupations
and idealized notions of masculinity, and the resulting subordination of those who compromise the masculine
image, see supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
174. 72 F.3d 1191 (4thCir. 1996).
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"get" a woman; repeatedly tied his hands together, blindfolded him, forced him
to his knees; exposed themselves to him; and simulated oral and anal sexual
acts upon him by inserting a finger into his mouth and placing a broomstick
against his anus.'75 Moreover, these co-workers offered him money for sex and
flicked their tongues at him while saying "I love you."'76 One co-worker put a
condom in his food. 77
The McWilliams court rejected the plaintiffs assertion that this conduct
amounted to actionable sex harassment, reasoning that both the harassers and
the target were heterosexual males, and that harassment of one heterosexual
male by another cannot constitute harassment "because of ... sex." '178 As the
court explained, "to interpret Title VII to reach that conduct when only
heterosexual males are involved as harasser and victim would be to extend this
vital statute's protections beyond intentional discrimination 'because of the
offended worker's 'sex' to unmanageably broad protection of the sensibilities
of workers simply 'in matters of sex.'" 179 The court theorized that because none
of the harassers was attracted to persons of the target's biological sex, the
conduct must have been based on factors other than sex, such as the target's
"known or believed prudery, or shyness, or other form of vulnerability to
sexually-focused speech or conduct," or the harassers' "sexual perversion, or
obsession, or insecurity."'"8 Thus, the court effectively reduced sex-based
causation to a paradigm based on sexual desire. 8 '
Similarly, in Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co.,'82 the plaintiff, a
mechanical supervisor in a railway yard, was subjected to a campaign of
epithets and acts designed to humiliate and demean him as insufficiently
masculine. The harassers called his girlfriend "ugly," asked Martin "where he
was getting his [sex]," described him in feminizing terms such as "pretty" and"cute," and draped a piece of paper around his head as if it were a scarf.'83
175. Seeid. at 1193.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 1195-96.
179. Id. at 1196.
180. Id.
181. Numerous other cases exemplify the desire-centered paradigm explicated in McWilliams. Compare,
e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding claim against homosexual
supervisor); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster
Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1497 (E.D. Va. 1996) (sustaining sexual harassment claim where harasser's
homosexuality revealed that his sexual overtures "were in earnest"); and EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp.
1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (upholding claim against homosexual supervisor); with, e.g., Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist.,
940 F. Supp. 810, 811, 813 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citing McWilliams and granting summary judgment for defendant on
grounds that harassers were not shown to be homosexual, despite plaintiff s allegations that harasser had "exposed
his anus and genital area to [the plaintiff] and solicited general contact" based on the plaintiffs "less than
stereotypical manliness" and his "specific male attributes and qualities"), aff'd, 124 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1997); and
Gibson v. Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1008-09 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (citing McWilliams and granting defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, in case where plaintiff was subjected to sexual epithets and "poked and
grabbed... in the buttocks and genital area," on the grounds that both harasser and target were heterosexual
males). For an insightful critique of the flawed theoretical underpinnings of these cases predicated on sexual
attraction, see Franke, supra note 11, at 734-47.
182. 926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
183. Id. at 1046-47.
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Moreover, the harassers offered to expose their penises to him, asked to see his
penis, and grabbed his legs, genitals, and buttocks.'84 One of the harassers, who
was the plaintiffs immediate supervisor, told the plaintiff that he would like to
"bend him over a chair and have sex with him."'85 Subsequently, another
employee held the plaintiff in a bent-over position while the supervisor
"attempted to stick a broom handle into [the plaintiffs] anus."' 86 The court
found that "without the presumption of sexual gratification, there is no evidence
that the harasser intentionally singled out the victim for offensive treatment
because he was male. Thus there is no sex discrimination. . . .under Title
VII.''187
This focus on the harassers' sexual orientation diverges markedly from
established jurisprudence in the opposite-sex cases. In the context of opposite-
sex harassment, the courts have not required any showing that the harasser was
attracted to persons of the target's sex in order to support an inference that the
conduct was motivated by some aspect of her sex. Rather, in that context, the
courts have recognized that sex-based conduct need not arise from sexual
desire, but also may arise from hostilities related to aspects of the target's sex-
and/or gender-related attributes. 8 Moreover, unlike the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in McWilliams, the opposite sex cases have not sought to isolate other
traits of the target and to attribute the objectionable conduct to those traits rather
than to the target's sex. To the contrary, the opposite-sex jurisprudence has
recognized that frequently, because of gender norms that prescribe different
standards of appearance, demeanor, and sexual expression for men and women,
certain traits that are tolerated or even encouraged in members of one sex
become a basis for hostility, intimidation, and ridicule when exhibited by
members of the opposite sex. 89 Accordingly, the opposite-sex cases have
recognized the sex-based nature of harassment that is directed at a target based
on individual attributes that become grounds for hostility only when they are
exhibited by a person of the target's sex. This recognition of the sex-related
nature of individual attributes that assume their significance only in light of
gender norms imposed upon persons of the targets sex stands in stark
juxtaposition to the Fourth Circuit's approach of viewing those attributes as
wholly independent of the target's sex and of recognizing the relevance of the
target's sex only when it gives rise to a sexual attraction.
184. See id. at 1047.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1049-50.
188. See supra Part 1.B-C. (discussing cases recognizing sex-based nature of conduct that is not based on
sexual desire, but rather arises from adverse perceptions of stereotypically feminine taits, from hostility toward
individuals who transgress gender norms, or from an intent to humiliate, intimidate, and demean the target by
exploiting gender-based vulnerability to sexual domination).
189. See supra Part I.B. (analyzing cases finding actionable sex-based harassment where female plaintiffs
are penalized for exhibiting otherwise valued, stereotypically masculine traits).
[Vol. 11: 155
The Myth of the Gender Monolith
4. Acknowledging the Role of Gender Stereotypes and
Sexualized Conduct: Recognition of the Actionable Sex-Based
Nature of Same-Sex Sexual Harassment
In contrast to the cases discussed above that have restricted the cause of
action for same-sex harassment on various grounds, several cases have
analyzed same-sex harassment claims in a manner similar to that found in the
opposite-sex cases. These cases have focused only on whether factors related to
the plaintiff's sex played a causal role in bringing about the conduct directed at
him in the work environment. For instance, in Quick v. Donaldson Co.,'9" the
plaintiff, who worked as a welder in a male-dominated production plant, was
subjected to a continuing pattern of verbal and physical abuse in which at least
twelve different male co-workers intentionally grabbed and squeezed his
testicles on some one hundred occasions in a two-year period. The practice of
"intentional[ly] grabbing and squeezing ... another person's testicles" was a
relatively common occurrence in that workplace, and was referred to as
"bagging.' 191 On one occasion, one worker held the plaintiffs arms while
another grabbed and squeezed his left testicle hard enough to produce swelling
and bruising. 92 In addition to these physical assaults, the harassers subjected
the plaintiff to a pattern of verbal abuse centered on portraying the plaintiff as a
homosexual although there was no indication that he, in fact, was.'93 The
harassers affixed tags to the plaintiffs forklift and belt loop that referred to a
sexual act with a cucumber, described him as a "Pocket Lizard Licker,"
attached stickers to him reading "Gay and Proud," and wrote the word "queer"
on his work identification card. 94
The trial court, echoing the analysis in Goluszek and its progeny discussed
above,'95 held that the conduct did not give rise to a sexual harassment claim
under Title VII because the plaintiff had not proven the existence of an "anti-
male or predominantly female environment making males a disadvantaged or
vulnerable group in the workplace and treating female employees differently
and more favorably."' 96 In the absence of such proof, the trial court found, the
conduct could only be viewed as the product of personal animosities and could
not be viewed as conduct based on the plaintiff's sex.'97 The Court of Appeals
rejected this analysis and looked instead to the fundamental elements of a
hostile environment claim, which require that the plaintiff: (1) belong to a
protected group; (2) be subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; that is (3)
based on the plaintiffs sex; (4) affects a term or condition of employment; and
190. 90 F.3d 1372 (SthCir. 1996).
191. Id. at 1374.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See supra Part U.A.2.
196. Quick, 90 F.3dat 1375-76.
197. See id.
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(5) is or should be known of by the employer, who fails to take proper remedial
action. 9'
Applying this test, the court found that the plaintiff was a member of a
protected group because Title VII did not protect only women, but rather
"bar[s] workplace sexual harassment against women because they are women
and against men because they are men""' and "prohibits disparate treatment of
an individual, man or woman, based on that person's sex."" ° The court found
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct
constituted prohibited sexual harassment because "[i]ntimidation and hostility
may occur without explicit sexual advances or acts of an explicitly sexual
nature .... [P]hysical aggression, violence, or verbal abuse may amount to
sexual harassment. '20 ' Turning to the question of whether the conduct occurred
because of sex, the court found that the "[e]vidence that members of one sex
were the primary targets of the harassment" was sufficient to support the
inference that the conduct was based on the target's sex.202 The court thus
reversed the trial court's entry of summary judgment and permitted the plaintiff
to proceed to trial on the question of whether the conduct amounted to sexual
harassment under the totality of the circumstances.2 3
Similarly, in Doe v. City of Belleville,2" the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals confronted allegations that two sixteen-year-old twin brothers were
subjected to a hostile work environment when their co-workers regularly
taunted them and threatened them with rape. One of the brothers, J. Doe, was
overweight, and was nicknamed by his co-workers the "fat boy., 205 H. Doe, the
main target of the abuse, was called "fag" and "queer" because he wore an
earring.201 One co-worker, Jeff Dawe, who was described as a "former marine
of imposing stature," repeatedly called H. his "bitch" and threatened to take him"out to the woods" and "get [him] up the ass. '2 7 Other co-workers, including
the boys' supervisor, joined in the abuse, calling both boys names, encouraging
Dawe to take H. out and "get a piece of that young ass," and speculating
whether H. would be "tight or loose" and whether he "would scream or
what?' 20 The abuse escalated from the verbal to the physical when Dawe,
proclaiming, "I'm going to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy," proceeded
to back H. against a wall and grab his testicles.20'
The court found this evidence sufficient to support the inference that "the
workplace was made hostile" to H. Doe "because of his sex. "210 As the court
198. See id. at 1377.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1378.
201. Id. at 1379.
202. Id. at 1378.
203. See id. at 1379.
204. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118S. Ct. 1183(1998).
205. Id at 566.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 567.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 569.
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explained, the constant prospect of "having his gender questioned" through
invasions designed to test whether he was actually "a girl," combined with the
actual physical invasion of having his testicles grabbed and the threatened acts
of forcible anal sex created an atmosphere of sex-based hostility.2
1
Recognizing the parallels between this conduct and the forms of gender
stereotyping and sexual domination frequently directed at women, the court
found that:
[i]f H. were a woman, no court would have any difficulty construing
such abusive conduct as sexual harassment. And if the harassment were
triggered by that woman's decision to wear overalls and a flannel shirt
to work, for example-something her harassers might perceive to be
masculine just as they apparently perceived H.'s decision to wear an
earring to be feminine-the court would have all the confirmation that it
needed that the harassment indeed amounted to discrimination on the
basis of sex.212
Continuing its examination of the role of gender stereotypes, the court
stated:
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight,
his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers' idea of how men
are to appear and behave, is harassed "because of' his sex.213
Thus, the court held the sex-based nature of the harassment could be
inferred, if not because of "the sexual character of the harassment itself," then
because of "the harassers' evident belief that in wearing an earring, H. Doe did
not conform to male standards."2 4 Turning from the issue of gender stereotypes
to the issue of the significance of sexually explicit conduct, the court rejected
the analysis set forth in McWilliams."5 As the court explained:
We doubt that it would have mattered for H. Doe to know, when his
testicles were in Dawe's grasp, that Dawe was heterosexual or (as his
deposition reveals) that he lived with a woman, and thus that he may not
have been sexually interested in H. The experience was still humiliating
in a deeply personal way, as only sexual acts can be.216
211. Id. at 568-69. The court compared the attempt to test whether H. was male or female to the conduct in
Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 902 (11th Cir. 1988), in which the harassers taunted a
woman who wore pants rather than skirts that they were going "to take your clothes off to see if you are real."
Doe, 119 F.3d. at 569 n.2.
212. Doe, 119F.3dat568.
213. Id. at 581.
214. See id. at 575.
215. See id. at 583-90 (discussing McWilliams and rejecting the "fundamental misconception that sexual
harassment inevitably is a matter of sexual desire nun amok").
216. Id. at 580.
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In an analysis similar to that implicit in the opposite-sex jurisprudence, the
court thus recognized that sexual conduct need not be based on sexual desire to
be based on the plaintiff's sex.217 Moreover, continuing its examination of the
significance of the sexual threats and acts directed at H., the court stated that "in
view of the overt references to H.'s gender and the repeated allusions to sexual
assault, it would appear unnecessary to require any further proof that H.'s
gender had something to do with his harassment; the acts speak for themselves
in that regard. '218 In the court's view, the sexual nature of the conduct was
sufficient to provide the requisite nexus to the plaintiff's gender because, as
many courts had recognized in the context of harassment directed at women,
conduct that reduces the target to a "sexual object," renders the work
environment hostile in a way that is "inescapably and irrevocably linked to her
gender. ' 219 The court emphasized that "[f]rankly, we find it hard to think of a
situation in which someone intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons
entirely unrelated to that person's gender," making it difficult to imagine
circumstances in which "harassment of this kind would not be, in some
measure, 'because of' the harassee's sex. "220
Having expressed these views as to the significance of sexual conduct, the
court acknowledged that some courts had found that "the explicitly sexual
nature of the harassment is not enough to establish" that the harassment
occurred because of the plaintiffs sex within the meaning of Title VII. 22' The
court, however, found it unnecessary, in light of the other evidence of the
gender-based nature of the conduct before it, to decide whether the sexual
aspects of the harassment were sufficient to support a finding of sex-based
causation. As the court explained,
[a]ssuming arguendo that proof other than the explicit sexual character
of the harassment is indeed necessary to establish that same-sex
harassment qualifies as sex discrimination, the fact that H. Doe
apparently was singled out for this abuse because the way in which he
projected the sexual aspect of his personality (and by that we mean his
gender) did not conform to his coworker's view of appropriate
masculine behavior supplies that proof here.222
Analogizing the gender stereotyping enforced upon H. to that enforced upon the
female plaintiff in Hopkins who was told to walk, talk, and dress "more
femininely," the court found that the evidence of the harassers' deriding H. as a
217. See supra Part I.B-C. (analyzing opposite-sex harassment cases that recognize the sex-based and sex-
discriminatory nature of conduct that is not based on sexual desire, but rather arises from gender-based hostilities,
enforcement of gender stereotypes, or exploitation of gender-based sexual vulnerabilities).
218. Doe, 119F.3dat577.
219. Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 580.
221. Id.at577.
222. Id. at 580.
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"girl" and a "bitch" for wearing an earring provided "the link to the plaintiff's
sex that Title VII requires. 22
3
Thus, in contrast to McWilliams, which treated the plaintiff's individual
attributes as factors distinct from and unrelated to the plaintiffs sex, Doe
examined the significance of these attributes in light of the plaintiffs sex. In a
manner similar to the opposite-sex harassment cases, the Doe court recognized
that these attributes, although distinct from the plaintiff's biological sex,
became a basis for hostility and harassment only because of the gender-based
norms imposed on the plaintiff as a result of his male sex. Moreover, contrary to
McWilliams' assumption that sexual conduct was irrelevant in the absence of
sexual desire, the Doe court recognized the power of sexually explicit epithets,
threats, and acts to intimidate and subordinate the target in a manner so
intertwined with gender that it was clearly calculated to "humiliate him as a
man," and thus was causally related to the plaintiffs sex within the meaning of
Title VII.
224
The Doe court is not the only court that has recognized the potentially sex-
based nature of male-on-male sexual harassment calculated to diminish the
target's status as a man by maligning his masculinity, demonstrating his
vulnerability to sexual domination, and otherwise humiliating him through
invocations of his gender-related traits. In Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc. ,225
the court addressed allegations that the male plaintiffs male supervisors
persistently harassed him by repeatedly grabbing his genitals and buttocks
while calling him "babe" or "faggot," telling him he had a "nice ass," informing
him that one supervisor wanted to perform anal intercourse on him, and
taunting him about the size of his penis.226 The court rejected the defendant's
claim that, because this conduct was perpetrated by males, it could not have
been directed at the target because of his sex.227 As the court observed,
individuals may harass members of their own biological sex for an array of
reasons that are related to the target's sex; "[t]here may or may not be
homosexual aspects to such harassment. There may or may not be hatred of
one's own gender., 228 The court thus found that the gendered epithets, threats of
sexual domination, and derision of the plaintiffs masculinity directed at his
sex-based physical attributes would permit a reasonable trier of fact to infer that
the harassment had occurred because of the plaintiff s sex.
In stark contrast to cases that categorically preclude claims for same-sex
harassment, 2 9 cases that preclude such claims absent proof of an anti-male
environment, 230 and cases that preclude such claims absent a showing of
223. Id. at 580-81 (citing Price Waterhose v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,235 (1989)).
224. Id. at 580.
225. No. 94 Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 30, 1995).
226. Id. at * 1.
227. See id. at *4-6.
228. Id. at *6 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
229. See supra Part .A. I.
230. See supra Part ll.A.2.
1999]
192 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism [Vol. 11: 155
homosexual attraction,23 1 cases such as Doe and Sardinia have recognized that
conduct that invokes and enforces gender stereotypes and humiliates,
intimidates, and demeans the target through scenarios of sexual objectification,
exploitation, and domination can constitute discrimination based on sex.232 The
Doe and Sardinia courts have thus implicitly acknowledged the potentially sex-
based nature of these types of conduct in much the same manner as comparable
opposite-sex cases have.233 The following discussion elaborates upon the
common sex-based and sex-discriminatory nature of these forms of gender-
based derision, gender stereotyping, and sexually subordinating conduct in both
opposite-sex and same-sex harassment cases.234
B. The Common Sex-Based and Sex-Discriminatory Nature of
Opposite-Sex and Same-Sex Harassment
This part examines the numerous parallels between the forms of harassment
directed at women in the workplace and those directed at men. Upon
examination of the conduct at issue in each type of case, it becomes apparent
that opposite-sex and same-sex harassment both frequently serve to devalue
femininity, discipline divergence from prescribed gender roles, and assert the
dominance of the masculine over the feminine through scenarios of sexual
objectification, domination, and abuse. Thus, it is argued in this part, same-sex
and opposite-sex sexual harassment play virtually identical roles in
subordinating certain individuals based on their gender-related traits, and in
establishing and maintaining the workplace gender hierarchies that allocate
power and privilege on the basis of masculinity.
1. Devaluing Femininity and Disciplining Divergence: The
Invocation and Enforcement of Gender Stereotypes
One recurring pattern in both opposite-sex and same-sex harassment cases
is the derision of stereotypically feminine traits and the marginalization of
individuals who possess such traits. This form of harassment invokes gender
231. See supra Part II.A.3.
232. Other cases have also adopted a broad conception of sex-based causation that is capable of
encompassing the range of sex-based conduct deemed actionable in the opposite-sex context. See, e.g., Miller v.
Vesta, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 697, 704-06 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (emphasizing that the Supreme Court "has interpreted the
term 'sex' expansively," and rejecting Goluszek's requirement that the workplace be biased against all members of
the plaintiffs biological sex, as well as McWilliams' focus on sexual orientation, on the grounds that Title VII
"protects all employees from all sexual harassment on account of their sex"); Tanner v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc.,
919 F. Supp. 351, 354-55 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that harassment based on individual's sex is actionable
regardless of sexual attraction and regardless of whether hostility is directed toward all members of the plaintiff's
biological sex); Ladd v. Seratoma Handicapped Opportunity Program, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 766, 767 (N.D. Okla.
1995) (holding that "the plain language of Title VII dictates the inclusion of all harassment in which the victim's
sex is a factor"); Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131, 133-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (interpreting
state law based on Title VII principles and holding that male-on-male sexual harassment based on gender
stereotypes is actionable sex-based discrimination).
233. See supra Part LB-C. (discussing opposite-sex cases recognizing sex-based nature of such conduct).
234. See infra Part I.B.
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stereotypes that view stereotypically masculine traits as hallmarks of a
competent, successful worker and depict stereotypically feminine traits as more
appropriate to other, traditionally female roles centered around domesticity,
sexuality, and reproduction.23 In the context of harassment directed at women,
this conduct often takes the form of epithets and comments implying that
women are not welcome in the workplace and continue to be perceived as
domestic or sexual beings rather than as competent workers.236
In the context of harassment directed at men, the harassment often involves
words or actions that feminize the male target and associate him with devalued
images of femaleness and femininity. In Martin v. Norfolk Southern Railway,237
for instance, the harassers depicted their target in feminizing terms by
describing him as "cute" and "pretty" and by draping a piece of computer paper
around his head as if it were a scarf.238 By doing so, they endowed him with
feminine qualities that have been viewed as inconsistent with successful
performance in male-dominated occupations.2 39 Similarly, in Doe v. City of
Belleville,240 the harassers feminized the male target by explicitly questioning
235. See Abrams, supra note 101, at 2528-30 (discussing "devaluation" of women through "devaluative
imagery" based upon stereotypes of females as, inter alia, "overly emotional or irrational, as vessels for the
bearing of the next generation, [and] as moral mothers, unfit to withstand the insults of an ugly public world"); id.
at 2533 (observing that women are "sometimes stigmatized on the basis of their sex-that is, simply because they
are not men-but they may also be stigmatized for manifesting characteristics that are socially female"); Schultz,
supra note 36, at 1754-63 (analyzing phenomenon whereby men create and maintain associations between
masculine traits and images of institutional competence while depicting women and the qualities associated with
them as ill-suited to success in the workplace); see also ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION (1977) (describing conduct in which men seek to underscore gender differences as a means of
setting women apart in order to perpetuate males' privileged status in the workplace); supra notes 35-73 and
accompanying text (discussing stereotypes of women as weak, vulnerable, essentially maternal beings and the role
of these stereotypes in harassment directed at women).
236. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996,998-99 (10th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff, only woman
on sales force, told that women had "no place" there); Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d
1316, 1318 (8th Cir. 1994) (woman told she was unfit for the job because she was a woman); Sassaman v. Heart
City Toyota, 879 F. Supp. 901, 909 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (plaintiff admonished that she should be at home with
children); Sones Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 542 F. Supp. 123, 126 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (woman told her proper place
was in the kitchen), aff'd sub noma. Sones-Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 725 F.2d 1060 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Franke,
supra note 11, at 709 (describing forms of harassment "indicating that women shouldn't perform certain kinds of
work, that a woman's place [is] in the bedroom or the kitchen, [and] that hiring women was undesirable because
they would quit and get married [or because] they were taking jobs from men with families") (citations and
internal quotations omitted); Schultz, supra note 36, at 1754 (discussing harassment that forces "women to
perform stereotypically female tasks" based on "gendered expectations of what types of work are suitable for
women to perform"); id. at 1760 (analyzing the significance of harassment that "exaggerates gender differences to
remind [women] that they are out of place in a man's world").
In addition to these incidents of harassers' informing women of their unwelcomeness in the workplace and of
the continued perception of them as domestic beings, many forms of harassment employ epithets that graphically
define women in terms of their female sexuality, often through derogatory images of sexual subordination to
males. See, e.g., Winsor, 79 F.3d at 1000 (plaintiff described as "floor whore," "curb whore," and "fucking
tramp"); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (female employees called "whores");
Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 902 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1197 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (plaintiff called "bitch," "skank," and "dumb
cunt"); see also EEOC v. A. Sam & Sons Produce Co., 872 F. Supp. 29, 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing
gender-specific, derogatory, and offensive connotations of terms such as "whore").
237. 926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
238. Id. at 1047.
239. See, e.g., Saun v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (D. Colo. 1996) (recounting harassment in which
female Air Force cadet was described as "too feminine" and "too pretty" to be a successful officer).
240. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
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whether he was a "girl" and by describing him with the gender-specific epithet
"bitch," a term that invokes negative stereotypes associated with women."
These male plaintiffs, like many female targets of sexual harassment, were
ridiculed and demeaned for possessing traits perceived as feminine that have
been traditionally disparaged in the workplace.242 In this way, same-sex
harassment also serves to demean and marginalize certain individuals on the
basis of their traditionally devalued feminine traits, thereby perpetuating the"sexual hierarchy in which women are regarded as inferior to men, and
femininity is regarded as inferior to masculinity" in the workplace.243
A distinct, but related, pattern that pervades both opposite-sex and same-sex
harassment manifests itself through the invocation of gender-based stereotypes
to penalize those who diverge from prescribed gender roles.2" Whether directed
at women or at men, this gender-regulating form of harassment serves to
perpetuate patterns of male domination and gender-based exclusion in the
workplace by ensuring that women conform to stereotypical images of "who
and what type[s] of workers women are supposed to be" instead of encroaching
on traditionally male domain,245 while ensuring that men "project the desired
manliness" necessary to preserve the "masculinized image" of certain types of
work rather than blurring workplace gender boundaries. 246 Thus, this form of
harassment, in both the opposite-sex and the same-sex context, "perpetuates,
enforces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize women and
masculinize men. 247
241. Id. at 566; cf. Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993) (female plaintiff in
male-dominated occupation referred to as "bitch"); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988)
(same). For a discussion of the implications of the term "bitch" as a reference to female sexuality and excessive
female aggressiveness, and for examples of similar gender-specific derogatory terms, see supra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text.
242. Notably, in some same-sex sexual harassment cases, the record is silent as to the plaintiffs projected
and perceived gender attributes, making it difficult to discern whether the demeaning and sexually invasive
conduct was motivated by the target's gender non-conformity. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372 (8th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing, in a case where record was silent as to the plaintiffs appearance and demeanor, the
possibility of sex-based harassment where harassers repeatedly grabbed target's testicles and addressed him with
homosexual epithets although there was no indication that he was homosexual); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no actionable sexual harassment between males as a matter of law
without discussing relative gender identities of harassers and target), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); Garcia v. Elf
Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). The failure of litigants and courts to develop this critical
aspect of some same-sex sexual harassment cases may result in part from the courts' previous failure to
acknowledge the legal significance of gender distinctions between males, and may contribute to obscuring gender-
driven dynamics in the future. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra note 391 and accompanying text.
243. Franke, supra note 11, at 762 (citing Case, supra note 6, at 2-3); accord Abrams, supra note 101, at
2516 (describing harassment of men who "abandon[ ] the qualities associated with men for the more socially
stigmatized characteristics associated with women").
244. Gender stereotyping has been defined as the assignment of certain behavioral traits as appropriate for
one sex but not for the other. See Case, supra note 6, at 58-59.
245. Schultz, supra note 36, at 1754 (internal quotations omitted).
246. Id. at 1775 (explaining that "men have a lot at stake in assuring a tight linkage between their work and
their masculinity. It is crucial for many men to maintain control over the masculinized image of their work. If a
job is to confer masculinity, it must be held by those who project the desired manliness."); see also id. at 1775
n.472 (discussing ways in which men create and perpetuate idealized masculine images of their work).
247. Franke, supra note 11, at 696. For a discussion of gender-regulatory harassment directed at women,
see supra Part I.B.2.
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Often, these gender-regulatory forms of harassment focus on castigating
those who fail to adhere to gender-defined standards of appropriately feminine
or appropriately masculine appearance and demeanor. While women are often
maligned for exhibiting stereotypically male attributes, such as aggressiveness
and physical prowess, and penalized for failing to exhibit traditionally
devalued, stereotypically feminine traits, men are often denigrated for
exuding a stereotypically feminine appearance249  or for projecting
stereotypically feminine traits such as shyness and passivity.25° In both
opposite-sex and same-sex cases of this nature, harassers sometimes explicitly
question the target's sex, thereby expressing their disdain for persons who
diverge from appropriate standards of masculinity or femininity.251 Thus, both
male and female targets are ostracized and ridiculed by harassers who object to
their failure to conform, in appearance and demeanor, to prescribed gender
roles.252
In a particularly pernicious form of this gender-regulatory harassment, male
targets are harassed for failing to conform to gender-stereotyped images of
appropriate masculine sexual expression.253 This type of harassment invokes
sexist and heterosexist stereotypes of males as active, assertive sexual
aggressors who initiate and control sexual interactions with females, and of
248. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plaintiff evaluated unfavorably for
possessing traits such as aggressiveness that would have been valued if exhibited by a man in a highly competitive
accounting firm environment); Zom v. Helene Curtis, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1226, 1236-37 (N.D. 111. 1995) (plaintiff
harassed for failing to conform to stereotypical notions of appropriate appearance and demeanor through repeated
admonitions to act more femininely, look sexier and less matronly, wear shorter skirts and dresses, and show more
emotion); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 598 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (plaintiff told her co-workers
would be more cooperative if she acted "more feminine and cutesy"); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F.
Supp. 974, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (female police officer tormented with numerous hostile, offensive comments and
acts based on her "involvement in bodybuilding and her concurrent use of steroids" that would have been
encouraged in a male in the context of a law enforcement occupation requiring physical strength).
249. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Beleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing evidence that the
plaintiff was targeted because he wore an earring, "a fact that evidently suggested to his co-workers that he was a
'girl"' due to the fact that he "exhibit[ed] his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers idea of how
men are to appear and behave"), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.,
926 F. Supp. 1044, 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (noting that harassers described target as "cute" and "pretty"); Sardinia
v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1995) (harassers called
target "babe").
250. See., e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996)
(attributing harassment to the target's "prudery, or shyness"); see also Abrams, supra note 101, at 2533
(discussing instances of harassment in which men are "stigmatized if they combine biological masculinity with
socially female characteristics, such as emotionalism or sensitivity to sexual conduct").
251. Compare Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 902 (11th Cir. 1988) (analyzing
incident in which harassers threatened the female target, who wore pants rather than a skirt, that they were going
to "take your pants off and put a skirt on you" and "take your clothes off to see if you are real") with Doe, 119
F.3d at 567 (describing incident in which harasser grabbed target's testicles in professed attempt to "finally find
out" whether target, who wore an earring, was "a girl or a guy").
252. See Franke, supra note 11, at 696 (arguing that harassment is "used to keep gender nonconformists in
line"); Schultz, supra note 36, at 1801 (noting that men are frequently targeted for harassment that focuses on
"denigrating [their] manhood" when "something about them threatened the dominant workers' views about the
suitable masculine image for those who hold the job").
253. See Franke, supra note 11, at 758 (discussing patterns in which men who do not conform to
stereotypes of appropriate sexual comportment are disciplined for their gender nonconformity); Schultz, supra
note 36, at 1777, 1779 (analyzing harassment of men who are perceived as insufficiently "sexually robust" to
satisfy stereotypes of masculine sexuality).
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females as passive, submissive sexual objects.254 Based on these stereotypes,
men who fail to fulfill expectations of male sexual prowess and conquest are
targeted for humiliation and ridicule centered on the perceived inadequacies in
their male sexual expression and conduct.255 For instance, in McWilliams,256 the
harassers taunted the target that the only woman he could "get" would be a
woman who was "deaf, dumb, and blind. 25 7 In Goluszek,255 the harassers
similarly chided the target, who "blushed easily" and was "abnormally sensitive
to comments pertaining to sex," interrogating him in graphically sexual terms as
to whether he had "gotten any pussy or had oral sex," and admonishing him to"get some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the legs of a woman. '259
And similarly, in Zalewski v. Overlook Hospital,2 60 the plaintiff was taunted
based on his perceived sexual inexperience by harassers who, believing him "to
be a virgin," called him "whack'o" and "jerk-off," insinuating that he
masturbated instead of having sex with a woman. 261 The harassers also placed
in his desk and locker a picture of a kitten captioned "the only pussy Bill has
even gotten" and a drawing depicting him viewing pornography for the first
time and exclaiming "Wow! Is that what it looks like? ' 262
Notably, the derision directed at these males who project an insufficiently
masculine sexuality frequently includes epithets or comments insinuating that
254. See HIVE, supra note 103, at 92 (arguing that society glorifies the male "sex drive," defines the
"'normal' male as one who is 'hungry' for intercourse," defines "female sexuality as 'passive and receptive,' and
tells women to submit to the "aggressive male 'sex drive'); NAOMI WOLF, PROMISCUITIES: THE SECREr
STRUGGLE FOR WOMANHOOD 14, 26-27 (1997) (explaining that for girls "being sexual meant being immobile,"
"being sexy meant waiting and not doing, being watched rather than watching," and that they "must not seek and
initiate but must wait and yield"); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L.
REv. 187, 198 (discussing association between male power and male sexual assertiveness and observing that even
in ancient Greece, where homosexuality was widely tolerated, the "passive" role was appropriate only for "boys,
women, and slaves-in other words, for those people excluded from the political process" while the active sexual
role was associated with empowered adult men).
255. See Franke, supra note 11, at 758 (arguing that such harassment directed at men who do not project
stereotypically heterosexual, masculine sexuality serves "as a way of policing masculinity," and as a form of"gender discipline designed to punish them for their failure to live up to a hetero-masculine norm"); Schultz, supra
note 36, at 1777, 1779 (discussing harassment that includes "attacks on [the] sexual virility" of men who are not
sufficiently "sexually robust" to satisfy dominant notions of masculine sexuality).
256. 72F.3d 1191(4thCir. 1996).
257. Id. at 1193.
258. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D.Ill. 1988).
259. Id. at 1453. Other cases have involved harassment directed toward males who fail to exhibit
appropriately masculine sexuality. See Ward v. Riley School District, 940 F. Supp. 810, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(discussing harassment of the plaintiff who alleged he was targeted based on "his less than stereotypical manliness
... as well as his obvious dearth of sexual experience and knowledge"), aff'd, 124 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1997); Polly
v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (describing plaintiffwho became target
of harassment because he "wouldn't get in [other worker's] dirty conversations"). Some harassers have also
demeaned their targets' sexual prowess and masculinity by insinuating that they have small penises. See, e.g.,
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1995)
(recounting "comments about the size of the plaintiff's penis"); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F.
Supp. 822, 825 (D. Md. 1994) (harasser positioned magnifying glass above plaintiffs crotch and asked 'where is
it?"), aff'd, 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996).
260. 692 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
261. Id. at 131.
262. Id.
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the target is homosexual. 63 Many courts, citing the principle that Title VII does
not proscribe discrimination based on sexual orientation, have interpreted these
homosexuality-based epithets as instances of sexual orientation bias that fall
outside the ambit of statutory protection. 264  However, the nature and
circumstances of the harassment frequently belie this interpretation. In most
instances, the targets were, in fact, believed to be heterosexual, but were
maligned with homosexual epithets and insinuations for exhibiting inadequately
masculine sexual prowess in the pursuit and conquest of women.265 Just as men
who transgress gender norms by exhibiting insufficient masculinity are
maligned as gay, so women who challenge gender boundaries by entering
traditionally male occupations "are often branded as lesbians, without regard to
the accuracy of the label."2" This labeling is often an expression of hostility
that is prompted by the target's failure to adhere to stereotypical images of
263. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff called "fag" and
"queer"), vacated and remanded, 118 S. CL 1183 (1998); Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1375 (8th Cit.
1996) (harassers described the plaintiff as a "Pocket Lizard Licker," labeled him "Gay and Proud," and wrote the
word "queer" on his work identification card); Gerd v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Colo.
1996) (harasser taunted target with references to "all [his] boyfriends"); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp.
489, 490 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (supervisor called plaintiff "homo" and "faggot"); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l
Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (crew leader called plaintiff "dick sucker," told plaintiff to "drop
down," and asked plaintiffif he could perform fellatio without his false teeth); Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-CV-70799-
DT, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20096, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 16, 1990) (plaintiff harassed because co-workers
thought he was homosexual). In more unusual circumstances, women have invoked these gender stereotypes in a
similar manmer, directing homophobic epithets at males whom they perceive as insufficiently masculine. See, e.g.,
Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cit. 1998) (female manager suggested that plaintiff receive
counseling for his homosexuality, called him "fag" and "queer," and said she would make him a "real man").
264. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
discrimination because of effeminacy or homosexuality does not fall within the purview of Title VIU); Smith v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that Title VII's prohibition of "sex"
discrimination should not be judicially extended to include discrimination because of sexual preference); Mayo v.
Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 337 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that discrimination "'because of sexual
preference' . . . is afforded no protection by the very words of Title VII"), affid 94 F.3d 641 (4th Cit. 1996);
Dillon, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20096, at *16 (holding that Title VII's prohibition against "sex" discrimination
does not encompass discrimination based on sexual preference).
265. See, e.g., Doe, 119 F.3d at 566 (plaintiff, who was not believed to be gay but who wore an earring, was
called "gay" and "queer"); Quick, 90 F.3d at 1375 (harassers described plaintiff as "Pocket Lizard Licker,"
attached label to him that read "Gay and Proud" and inscribed the word "queer" on his work identification card,
although there was no basis for believing he was homosexual); Gerd, 934 F. Supp. at 358 (target taunted about his
"boyfriends" although harasser had no basis for believing he was gay); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp.
1044, 1047 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (recounting, in a case where there was "no evidence" that the plaintiff was
homosexual, insults describing the plaintiffs girlfriend as "ugly," questioning where he "was getting his [sex],"
and describing plaintiff as one of the "Three Musquequeers").
Even where a target is believed to be homosexual, the presence of anti-gay epithets does not preclude a
finding that the plaintiff was subjected to gender-based harassment based on perceived inadequacies in his
masculinity. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1786 (analyzing opinion in Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 766 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992) and criticizing its characterization of the harassment, which included
anti-gay epithets, as strictly based on sexual orientation, contrary to plaintiffs contentions that the harassment was
based on "[sex] stereotyping, in that he was not deemed 'macho' enough by his co-workers for a man"); see also
id. at 1777 ("Simply because ... harassment may include some antigay expression... does not mean that it is not
based on gender."); Pascal Mallet, et al., The Development of Gender Schemata About Heterosexual and
Homosexual Others During Adolescence, 124 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 91, 91, 93 (1997) (noting that many homosexual
men possess more characteristics typically associated with women and thus project a more feminine gender
identity than do most heterosexual men).
266. Schultz, supra note 36, at 1775 & n.73 (discussing examples of such conduct directed toward female
police officers and firefighters) (citations omitted).
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appropriately feminine endeavors and not by any aspect of her sexual
preferences or proclivities. 267
Thus, the homosexuality-centered epithets and insinuations that pervade so
many same-sex sexual harassment cases do not reflect animus toward
homosexuals per se, but rather reflect the harasser's aversion to males who fail
to conform to idealized notions of masculinity and male sexuality, and who
thereby disrupt the uniformity of the masculine image that the harassers seek to
associate with their occupation.268 These epithets serve to marginalize and
stigmatize the target by maligning his adequacy as a man according to gender-
stereotyped notions of masculine sexuality.269 In this manner, the harassment
functions "as a medium through which some men seek to defend their view of
masculine interests and identity against contesting visions proposed by other
men."27 Accordingly, these derisions of the target's sexuality are most
accurately understood as yet another means of enforcing gender stereotypes in
the workplace by punishing individuals-whether male or female-who
deviate from established gender norms.271
2. Scenarios of Sexual Objectification, Domination, and Abuse:
Sexualized Conduct and the Assertion of Gender Dominance
In addition to harassment that invokes gender stereotypes to demean and
marginalize male and female targets alike for projecting devalued traits and for
deviating from gender norms, a separate category of harassment involves
unwelcome, sexually explicit conduct between the harasser and the target. Such
overtly sexual forms of harassment draw upon stereotypes of masculine sexual
aggression and domination and of feminine sexual passivity and submission, to
exercise and demonstrate the harasser's power over the target in sex-based
terms. This harassment vividly portrays the harasser as a masculinized,
267. Id.
268. See Abrams, supra note 101, at 2512 (contending that certain men are targeted because they "fit
uneasily within established gender categories, by virtue of their aversion to sexualized talk or conduct in the
workplace").
269. These epithets also stigmatize the target by identifying him with an historically subordinated,
persecuted, and marginalized minority, thus depriving him of the privileged status reserved for appropriately
masculine, sexually assertive males. For an excellent discussion of the powerlessness and isolation traditionally
associated with homosexual identity, see Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened
Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1753 (1996).
Some commentators have argued that gender identity and sexual orientation are so inextricably intertwined
that discrimination based on sexual orientation must be construed as a form of discrimination based on gender. See
JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 55-79 (1994); see also Brief Amicus Curiae of the Nat'l Org. on Male
Sexual Victimization et al. in Support of Petitioner at *25, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 118 S. Ct.
998 (1997) (No. 96-568, 1997 WL 471814) (asserting that "[t]he gender of a person with whom one has sex, or is
thought to have sex, is a powerful constituent of whether one is considered a man or a woman in society" and thus
should be recognized as an aspect of an individual's sex). However, in many cases of same-sex harassment,
especially where there is no basis for believing that the target is in fact homosexual, the homophobic epithets and
insinuations are more accurately viewed as a form of gender discrimination that does not implicate the issue of
discrimination based on homosexuality.
270. Schultz, supra note 36, at 1755 n.387.
271. Cf supra Part I.B.2; supra notes 244-262 and accompanying text (discussing other forms of conduct
intended to penalize divergence from prescribed gender roles).
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dominant sexual aggressor while portraying the target as a feminized,
subordinate sexual object, thereby perpetuating workplace gender hierarchies
that equate masculinity with power and femininity with powerlessness and that
consign less masculine individuals to positions of inferiority.272
Regardless of whether these sexual humiliations and invasions are directed
at women or at men whose projected gender identity is perceived as less
masculine than the harasser's, these forms of sexual domination vividly evoke
the harasser's uniquely male biological capacity to penetrate and dominate
sexually. Thus, these forms of harassment become a powerful means by which
dominant, masculine males communicate their superior position in terms of a
gender-based hierarchy, perpetuate the masculinized image of power, and
marginalize and subordinate women and men who occupy lower strata on the
gender-driven hierarchy of power and privilege in the workplace.273
In both the opposite-sex context and the same-sex context, harassers employ
a broad range of verbal and physical sexual conduct to exert their power over
the target in profoundly gender-laden terms. 274 Although the precise nature of
the sexual conduct varies widely, such conduct consistently demonstrates the
harasser's sexual power to objectify, dominate, and humiliate the target,
reducing his or her status to that of the stereotypically feminine role of a sexual
object whose sexuality is at the harasser's disposal.275
272. See CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 114, 127 (1989). As
MacKinnon explains, "[Miale dominance is sexual. Meaning: men in particular, if not men alone, sexualize
hierarchy.... The male sexual role... centers on aggressive intrusion on those with less power." Id. (footnotes
omitted); Franke, supra note 11, at 745 (describing offensive workplace sexual conduct as "the expression, in
sexual terms, of power, privilege, and dominance").
273. See Franke, supra note 11, at 762 (discussing the body of scholarship documenting ways in which
sexual domination creates "a gendered hierarchy based upon the enforced inferiority of women to men" by
"reduc[ing] women to victimized, highly sexual, less competent sub-humans who do not enjoy full agency," and
arguing that these dynamics affect men as well as women through gendered patterns of subordination that define
the identity and status of less masculine men); see also Abrams, supra note 101, at 2480 (arguing that certain
forms of sexual conduct characterize women "primarily as sexual objects, or as objects of sex-based derision,
rather than as competent workers," causing women to "perceive sexualized conduct as more of a threat to their
professional and personal security than would their male counterparts); id. at 2516-17 (suggesting that men who
"manifest qualities socially designated as female" can be subjected to similar forms of devaluation and
subordination).
274. See generally MAcKINNON, supra note 74 (identifying sexual harassment as an exertion of power);
Craig, supra note 11, at 110 (discussing consensus among courts that "the objective" of same-sex sexual
harassment "is maintenance and abuse of power and dominance, rather than a real desire for sex"). For a
discussion of gender-subordinating sexual conduct directed at women, see supra Part I.C.
275. See Craig, supra note 11, at 110. While the cases addressing same-sex harassment are rife with
examples of these forms of sexually subordinating conduct, many cases have disposed of same-sex harassment
claims based on a categorical rule precluding such claims altogether, or precluding them absent a showing of an
anti-male environment or of a homosexual attraction. See supra Part H.A.1-3. Thus, the descriptions of the
sexually subordinating conduct that are presented in the same-sex harassment jurisprudence may omit many
significant aspects of the sexualized conduct and the surrounding gender-based power dynamics. Moreover, the
Supreme Court, in describing the same-sex sexual abuse in Oncale, reduced a protracted pattern of violent, vivid
imagery of anal penetration to several sentences in which the Court quickly summarized the facts "only
generally," in the "interests of both brevity and dignity." Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000; accord Schoiber v. Emro
Mktg. Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 731 (N.D. I. 1996) (describing the conduct as "despicable and abhorrent" but
providing only a "terse rendition of the relevant facts" in light of the court's conclusion that same-sex harassment
claims were barred as a matter of law). Despite these factors suggesting that the case law may not convey the
precise nature or full severity of the types of sexually explicit conduct often directed at men, the numerous
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In many instances, the harasser confronts the target with unwelcome,
sexually suggestive objects and innuendoes depicting the target in a sexual
light.276 Such conduct establishes the harasser's status as the sexual initiator,
asserting his power to define the target in sexual terms, while simultaneously
subordinating and humiliating the target by depriving the target of the power
and autonomy to control expressions of his or her own sexuality.277
examples of male-on-male sexual humiliation, abuse, and intimidation recounted in the case law nonetheless
present a striking portrayal of this powerful form of gender subordination.
276. Such conduct is often directed at womer. See, e.g., Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No.
600, No. CIV.A. 91-1507, 1993 WL 235491, at *21 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1993) (recounting pattern of conduct that
revealed that harassers viewed targets as "sexual objects rather than as skilled co-workers"); Morris v. American
Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (describing pattern of harassment in which harassers
continually made comments about plaintiff's sex life, references to her performing oral sex, and allusions to her
"boobs" and "big butt;" presented her with a picture of a nude woman touching her breasts, captioned "you should
be doing this instead of a man's job;" and confronted her with sexually suggestive objects including a sausage
with a note "bite me baby," a clay replica of a penis, a stained sanitary napkin, and pornographic pictures), affid in
part and rev 'd in part on other grounds, 952 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1991); Sanchez v. City of Miami Beach, 720 F.
Supp. 974, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (female police officer subjected to kissing, moaning, sighing, and other sexually
suggestive noises over police radio, depicted in sexually offensive pictures and graffiti displayed around police
department, and presented with "a soiled condom, a sanitary napkin, two vibrators, and a urinal device in her
mailbox"); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that female firefighter
had "prophylactic devices and a wet vibrator placed in her bed"), aft'd, 755 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985). Similar
conduct is also directed at men. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374 (8th Cir. 1996) (harassers affixed
tags to plaintiff's forklift and belt loop alluding to sexual acts with a cucumber and labelling him "Pocket Lizard
Licker"); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir. 1996) (harasser
placed condom in target's food).
277. Notably, in the opposite-sex context, many courts have inferred the requisite sex-based causal nexus
from the mere fact that the conduct is sexual, often with little analysis of how sexual conduct operates as a form of
sex discrimination. See, e.g., Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that sexualized conduct directed at a woman was "unquestionably based on gender"); Hopkins v.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir. 1996) (Niemeyer, J., concurring) ("[W]hen someone
sexually harasses an individual of the opposite gender, a presumption arises that the harassment is 'because of' the
victim's gender.'); Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[S]exual behavior
directed at a woman raises the inference that the harassment is based on her sex."); Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding, in opposite-sex context, that "the intent to
discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or
sexually-derogatory language is implicit and thus should be recognized as a matter of course"); Held v. Gulf Oil
Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982) (inferring a hostile environment based on sex from "sex-based
opprobrium" and "constant lectures pertaining to her sex life" directed at female plaintiff); see also Doe v. City of
Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting and discussing cases inferring sex-based causation based
upon fact of sexual conduct directed at a female by a male), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998). See
generally Franke, supra note 11. However, these presumptions of sex-based causation in the opposite-sex context
are frequently based on the premise that the harassment resulted from the harasser's presumed (hetero)sexual
attraction to persons of the target's biological sex, when in reality the harassment more frequently reflects an
expression of gender-based hostilities and an intent to enforce gender stereotypes of masculine domination and
feminine subordination through sexual domination of females and less masculine males. See id. at 745.
In the words of Professor Katherine Franke:
it would be both a theoretical and a descriptive mistake to characterize offensive workplace conduct
primarily as the expression of sexual desire. Rather, sexual harassment is best understood as the
expression, in sexual terms, of power, privilege, and dominance. What makes it sex discrimination
... is not the fact that the conduct is sexual, but that the sexual conduct is being used to enforce or
perpetuate gender nonns and stereotypes.
Id. In emphasizing the common sex-based nature of opposite-sex and same-sex harassment, this Article does not
intend to urge courts addressing same-sex harassment to replicate the conceptual flaws of the opposite-sex
jurisprudence in order to reach the same results based on the same questionable theoretical grounds. To the
contrary, this Article urges courts in both the same-sex and the opposite-sex sexual harassment contexts to refine
their analyses of the forms of gender stereotyping and sexual subordination that are reflected and replicated so
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In numerous cases, the harasser evokes vivid images of sexual interactions
between himself and the target that cast the harasser in the stereotypically male
role as the dominant sexual aggressor while casting the target in the
stereotypically female role as a sexual object." 8 Moreover, both opposite-sex
and same-sex harassers often impose their sexuality upon the target by exposing
or threatening to expose their genitals to the target,27 9 by forcing the target into
unwelcome contact with the harasser's genitals,80 and by groping, grabbing, or
fondling the target's sexually intimate anatomy in unwelcome affronts to the
target's sexual dignity and autonomy that demonstrate the harasser's power to
transgress the target's sexual boundaries at will.2"'
powerfully by means of the sexual conduct, and to draw upon these analyses to recognize that the same gender-
discriminatory dynamics frequently undergird unwelcome sexual conduct directed at women and unwelcome
sexual conduct directed at men.
278. See, e.g., Rivera v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 95-CV-0829, 1996 WL 637555 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
21, 1996) (harasser gyrated groin against one female plaintiffs arm, made sexually suggestive noises toward her,
grabbed another female plaintiffs buttocks, and told her how "horny" he was while grabbing his penis);
Hernandez v. Wangen, 938 F. Supp. 1052, 1055-56 (D.P.R. 1996) (harasser grabbed plaintiffs buttocks and made
sexually explicit comments while robbing his hands up and down her neck at an office social gathering); EEOC
Decision No. 84-1, 1983 WL 22487, at *I (E.E.O.C. Nov. 28, 1983) (harasser made repeated gestures evocative
of sexual invasions and rape and told plaintiff "keep bending and I'll drive you home"); EEOC Decision No. 81-
18, 1981 EEOC LEXIS 14, at *14 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 3, 1981) (harasser gestured as if fondling plaintiffs breasts,
stating his desire to "cop a feel," and told plaintiff she resembled a sheep and suggested that she was, therefore,
likely to "get rammed").
Harassers have similarly directed such conduct at male targets. See, e.g., Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941 F.
Supp. 730, 732 (N.D. 111. 1996) (harasser subjected target to "sexually explicit and degrading remarks"); Gerd v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 934 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Colo. 1996) (harasser "rubbed his hands up and down"
target's thighs while thrusting his pelvis in the target's direction); Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335, 336
(E.D. Va. 1995) (harasser "made sexually explicit and vulgar comments to" plaintiff and "grabbed him in a sexual
manner"), affid, 94 F. 3d 641 (4th Cir. 1996); Ashworth v. Roundup, 897 F. Supp. 489, 490 (W.D. Wash. 1995)
(harasser told worker that he had to "form a picture of [the plaintiff] in [his] mind and he was going to go home
and jack off'). In some instances, the harasser explicitly feminizes his male target, compounding the subordination
implicit in his objectification of the target's sexuality. In one particularly striking example of sexualized conduct
calculated to feminize as well as sexually objectify the target, one of the harassers who subjected the target to a
campaign of sexual humiliation and abuse "flick[ed] his tongue" at the plaintiff while stating "I love you, I love
you," in a clear simulation of cunnilingus that, biologically, can only be performed on a woman. McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193 (4th Cir. 1996). Because the harassers routinely sexually
objectified women by displaying pornography and depictions of "scantily clad women" in the work area, see id at
1193, this gesture both feminized and objectified the plaintif vividly demonstrating his position of subordination
relative to his male co-workers.
279. See, e.g., Rufo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 96-6376, 1997 WL 164267, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
1997) (harasser made sexual gestures and fondled his genitalia in front of female plaintiff); Tones v. National
Precision Blanking, 943 F. Supp. 952, 953 (N.D. I1. 1996) (harasser walked around the workplace holding his
penis and asking male employees whether they wanted a piece of it); Sehoiber, 941 F. Supp. at 731 (harassers
exposed their genitals to male plaintiff); Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 810, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (male
co-worker exposed his genitals and anus to male plaintiff), affid, 124 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1997); Martin v. Norfolk S.
Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (harassers "offer[ed] to expose their penises to [male]
plaintiff'); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-3-94-182, 1995 WL 386793, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1995)
(harasser "exposed his penis and testicles" to male plaintiff), a ffd 81 F.3d 48 (6th Cir. 1996); Polly v. Houston
Lighting & Power Co., 825 F. Supp. 135, 136 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (harassers exposed their genitals to male plaintiff).
280. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996) (one harasser
physically restrained male plaintiff on two occasions while other placed his penis on plaintiffs head and arm),
rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 524 (D.S.C. 1995) (harasser placed his
genitals against male plaintiffs backside); Moore v. Northland Evergreens, Inc., No. 1:90-CV-440, 1992 WL
295068, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 1992) (harasser rubbed his penis against male plaintiffs leg on five different
occasions).
281. This conduct is often perpetrated against women. See, e.g., Bonenberger v. Plymouth Township, 132
F.3d 20, 22 (3d Cir. 1997) (defendant grabbed plaintiffs breasts); Dombeck v. Milwaukee Valve Co., 40 F.3d
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These invasions are often accompanied by threats of more violent forms of
sexual invasion and abuse that invoke images of forcible penetration of the
target. In many cases, just as male harassers use the threat of rape and actual
acts of sexual violence to intimidate and subordinate women in the
workplace,282 so they invoke the quintessentially male imagery of forcible
penetration through threats of rape and scenarios of simulated oral and anal
sodomy in a manner that expressly depicts the harasser's manhood and superior
masculinity as the source of his power to dominate the target.283 Andrea
230, 233 (7th Cir. 1994) (harasser slapped plaintiffs buttocks and placed his boot in her crotch); Parkins v. Civil
Constructors of Illinois, Inc., No. 97C50142, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3805, at *3 (N.D. 11. Feb. 26, 1998)
(defendant grabbed plaintiff's breast and attempted to grab her crotch); Rufo, 1997 WL 164267 at *2 (defendant
touched plaintiff's breasts); Bnmeau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(males snapped the plaintiffs' bras, ran their fingers down the plaintiffs' backs, stuffed paper down the plaintiffi'
blouses, and grabbed the plaintiffs' breasts); DiLaurenzio v. Atlantic Paratrans, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 310, 312
(E.D.N.Y. 1996) (harasser fondled employees' breasts); Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1190
(W.D. Tenn. 1987) (defendant fondled plaintiffs breasts); Soto v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 942 S.W.2d 671, 675
(Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (supervisor placed his hand on female employee's breast).
Men are also sometimes victimized by this conduct. See, e.g., Doe, 119 F.3d at 566 (describing incident in
which the harasser backed target against a wall and grabbed his testicles in a professed attempt to determine
whether the target was male or female); Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1996)
(observing that co-workers grabbed and squeezed plaintiff's testicles hard enough to produce bruising and
swelling); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193 (one of target's harassers entered area where target was working and
"fondled him"); Ward, 940 F. Supp. at 811 (noting that harasser "solicited genital contact" with target); Gibson v.
Tanks, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107, 1108 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (harasser "poked and grabbed" plaintiff "in the buttocks
and genital area"); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1046 (harassers "grabbed at and pinched [target] in and around his legs
and posterior" and "grabbed at or swatted towards [plaintiffs] genitals"); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., No.
95C 3565, 1996 WL 5322, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1996) (manager repeatedly clutched plaintiffs crotch and
buttocks); Benekn'tis, 882 F. Supp. at 524 (co-worker placed hand on plaintiff's genitals); Sardinia v. Dellwood
Foods, Inc., No. 94 Civ. 5458 (LAP), 1995 WL 640502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 1995) (harassers frequently
grabbed plaintiff's buttocks and genitals).
282. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs supervisor, upon learning
of pattern of offensive sexual propositions directed at plaintiff, told her "any man in his right mind would want to
rape you"); DiLaurenzio, 926 F. Supp. at 312 (harasser stated he should "give [plaintiff] a good screw" before her
wedding); Saum v. Widnall, 912 F. Supp. 1384, 1388-89 (D. Colo. 1996) (plaintiff forced to play "victim" in a
simulated rape scenario, in the course of which fellow Air Force cadet made her kneel down, shoved his crotch in
plaintiffs face and inserted a stick in her pants); Berkman v. City of New York, 580 F. Supp. 226, 231 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (recounting incidents of "extensive sexual abuse" and "physical sexual molestation" of plaintiff), aftd, 755
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC Decision No. 84-1, 1983 WL 22487, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 28, 1983) (harasser
made repeated gestures evocative of sexual invasions and rape, and told plaintiff "keep bending and I'll drive you
home"); EEOC Decision No. 81-18, 1981 EEOC LEXIS 14, at * 14 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 3, 1981) (harasser told plaintiff
she resembled a sheep and suggested that she was, therefore, likely to "get rammed").
283. See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (harassers repeatedly threatened plaintiff with rape, and penetrated
his anus with a bar of soap while restraining and threatening to rape him); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408,
410 n.l (7th Cir. 1997) (co-worker frequently told employee "I am going to make you suck my dick," while
gesturing as if masturbating and coming to within inches of the plaintiffs face); Doe, 119 F.3d at 567 (harasser
told plaintiff that he was going to take him "out to the woods" and get him "up the ass," and speculated whether
plaintiff was "tight or loose" and whether he would "scream" upon his doing so); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193
(co-workers tied plaintiffs hands together, blindfolded him, forced him to his knees, and perpetrated acts of
simulated sodomy on him by inserting a finger in his mouth and putting a broomstick between his buttocks);
Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1994) (supervisor approached plaintiff from behind,
reached around and grabbed plaintiffs crotch while making sexual motions fiom behind him); Bacon v. Art Inst.
of Chicago, 6 F. Supp. 2d 762, 765 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (co-worker twice grabbed plaintiff from behind by his hips and
feigned act of anal intercourse by proceeding to thrust his penis against plaintiffs buttocks); Rasmusson v.
Copeland Lumber Yards, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1294, 1295-96 (D. Nev. 1997) (co-worker pulled employee's head
towards his crotch as employee was bending over to retrieve a toolbox, and in a separate incident restrained him
and "started humping [him] like a dog"); Torres, 943 F. Supp. at 953 (harasser inserted finger into plaintiffs
rectum); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1047 (describing incident in which one harasser bent the plaintiff over a chair,
while another harasser "attempted to stick a broom handle into his anus"); Messina v. Araserve, Inc., 906 F. Supp.
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Dworkin, in her analysis of the gender dynamics underlying male sexual abuse
of other males, has aptly explained that, "[t]he abomination is to do to men
what is normally done to women in the fuck: the penetration; the possession;
the contempt because she is less... the right to use her, which is, inevitably, a
right over her."2 4 Numerous other commentators have recognized that the
sexual domination, intimidation, and abuse of men by other men reflects,
exploits, and perpetuates deeply rooted patterns of gender inequality by
asserting the dominance of the masculine over the feminine.2"' Thus, just as
opposite-sex sexual harassment disempowers and marginalizes women in the
workplace by casting them in the inferior role of sexual subservience to male
sexual aggressors, so same-sex sexual harassment replicates these powerfully
gendered and gender-discriminatory dynamics between members of the male
biological sex, establishing and enforcing the harasser's and the target's relative
positions according to a gender-driven hierarchy.2 6
These cases, in which harassers direct an array of unwelcome sexual acts at
both female and male targets, reveal the common ways in which harassers in
both same-sex and opposite-sex contexts employ sexual interactions to
subordinate their targets in profoundly gender-laden terms that are inextricably
intertwined with the harasser's uniquely male capacity to dominate others
through sexual penetration. When male harassers invoke this gendered form of
domination over their targets to subordinate women and less masculine men,
they forcefully assert forms of power that derive directly from their maleness
and masculinity, thereby relegating less masculine individuals to positions of
inferiority and perpetuating the associations between masculinity and power in
the workplace.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that same-sex harassment and
opposite-sex harassment play strikingly similar roles in establishing and
maintaining workplace gender hierarchies founded on the hegemony and
dominance of the masculine over the feminine. In both contexts, harassers
invoke gender-based stereotypes and employ humiliating, abusive sexual
34, 35 (D. Mass. 1995) (harasser grabbed plaintiff's head and pulled it toward his crotch); Ashworth v. Roundup
Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 492-94 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (harasser, who threatened to "butt fluck" the plaintiff, "goosed"
him by jabbing a steel object between his buttocks); Polly, 825 F. Supp. at 136 (harassers forced a broom handle
against plaintiff's rectum); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1454 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (harasser poked plaintiff
in the buttocks with a stick); Sardinia, 1995 WL 640502, at *1 (supervisors would "frequently grab plaintiff's
genitals or his buttocks" and state that they wanted "to perform anal intercourse on hin"); Fleenor, 1995 WL
386793, at *1 (harasser "threatened to force plaintiffto engage in oral sex and stuck a ruler up plaintiff's buttocks
without his consent"); Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 419-20 (Minn. 1997) (supervisor placed his
hands on employee's hips, simulating anal sex, while stating "[h]ere, let me show you how a real man takes it").
284. DWORKIN, supra note 103, at 155; see also Koppelman, supra note 8, at 235 ("The central outrage of
male sodomy is that a man is reduced to the status of a women, which is understood to be degrading.").
285. See SCARCE, supra note 6, at 11-35; see also Case, supra note 6, at 7 (discussing harassment of less
masculine males by more masculine males and characterizing such harassment as "a form of gender
discrimination" perpetrated by "certain 'active' masculine males to drive out of the workplace those they see as
contaminating it with the taint of feminine passivity"); Kramer, supra note 6, at 308 (describing the "feminization"
of men who are forced into roles of sexual passivity, which results in their diminution to "the object of prejudice[s]
... normally reserved... for women"); Levit, supra note 6, at 1068 (arguing that harassment and sexual abuse
target and disempower "men who do not conform to conventional notions of maleness").
286. See supra Part I.C (analyzing the gender-subordinating implications of sexually explicit conduct
directed at women).
1999]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
conduct to marginalize, intimidate, and subordinate individuals, both male and
female, based on their gender-related traits and their degree of conformity to
prescribed gender norms. It is important to emphasize that in the same-sex
context as well as the opposite-sex context, these gender-subordinating acts
generally do not occur as isolated incidents. Rather, they often form part of a
concerted campaign of relentless torment and persecution that becomes the
predominant, defining aspect of the target's existence in the workplace,
disrupting his ability to perform his work, supplanting any normal interactions
with his peers, and in many cases forcing him from the job.287 Justice O'Connor
has observed that "a discriminatorily abusive work environment ... can and
often will detract from [an] employee's job performance, discourage employees
from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers."28 In
the context of the relentless and debilitating campaigns of abuse perpetrated
against many same-sex sexual harassment plaintiffs, this observation becomes
an understatement.
Significantly, in the same-sex context, the forms of gender-subordinating
conduct discussed above highlight and exploit gender-based differences among
men, demonstrating that the dominance of masculinity can be asserted to
establish power relationships among males, much as it is frequently asserted to
establish the power of males over females.289 Recognition of these sex-
discriminatory dynamics that subordinate certain men to other men based on
their sex- and gender-related traits clearly impugns the logic of cases holding
that same-sex sexual harassment cannot, as a matter of law, be viewed as a form
of sex discrimination.29" This recognition also calls into question the logic of
cases recognizing the existence of sex-based discrimination only when the
objectionable conduct reflects an antipathy or an attraction toward males as a
biological sex.29 Each of these lines of cases implicitly views the notion of"sex" monolithically, obscuring gender-based patterns of subordination within
the male biological sex, and consequently recognizing sex-based conduct only
287. See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000-01 (plaintiff quit his job on an all-male oil rig crew following a
series of repeated threats of rape culminating in an incident in which several coworkers, acting together, restrained
him and inserted an object into his anus, convincing him that he would be raped if he did not leave his job); Doe,
119 F.3d at 566 (plaintiffs quit their jobs following campaign of gender-based epithets, threats of anal rape, and
assault involving grabbing of the plaintiffs testicles that convinced plaintiff that harasser was capable of carrying
out his threats); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1194 (automotive mechanic developed "severe emotional problems" that
required him to leave his job following a campaign of sexual epithets, insults, and threats culminating in incidents
in which several coworkers participated in blindfolding and restraining him while others inserted a finger in his
mouth and a broomstick between his buttocks); Quick, 90 F.3d at 1375 (plaintiff sought medical and
psychological treatment following constant epithets, humiliating pranks, and "bagging" incidents involving
grabbing of his testicles hard enough to produce bruising and swelling); Martin, 926 F. Supp. at 1048 (plaintiff left
job on medical leave and never returned following constant gender-related insults, sexually invasive touching, and
threats of anal rape culminating in incident in which one co-worker bent him over a chair while another attempted
to penetrate his anus with a broom handle).
288. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,22 (1993).
289. See Abrams, supra note 101, at 2516-17 (contending that "dynamics within a privileged group," and
"dynamics within [a] disadvantaged group" can be "marked by the same hierarchical inflections" that characterize"relations between privileged and non-privileged groups") (citations omitted).
290. See supra Part l.A.1.
291. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing cases requiring a showing of antipathy toward males in general);
supra Part II.A.3 (examining cases requiring a homosexual attraction toward members of the male sex).
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where it implicates all males uniformly as a biological sex.292 Accordingly, this
recognition of the ways in which same-sex sexual harassment, like opposite-sex
sexual harassment, perpetuates powerful sex-based and sex-discriminatory
dynamics in the workplace exposes the conceptual flaws in the lower courts'
deeply divided same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence. The following part
examines the impact of the Supreme Court's first pronouncement in this
problematic and, fragmented area of the law.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ONCALE: A PYRRHIC VICTORY FOR
SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT PLAINTIFFS?
Last year, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of same-sex
sexual harassment for the first time in its unanimous opinion in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.293 This part examines the implications of
Oncale and argues that, although its recognition of a cause of action for same-
sex sexual harassment represents an important advance in the evolution of the
same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence, its dicta on the issue of sex-based
causation fail to dispel some of the myths and misperceptions that pervade the
lower courts' pre-Oncale decisions. Because of its resounding silence on issues
of sex and sex-based causation in the context of interactions among males, the
opinion does little to enhance judicial understandings of these concepts as they
apply to same-sex sexual harassment claims. The opinion thus fails to ensure
that subsequent adjudications of same-sex sexual harassment issues will
transcend the conceptual limitations that have characterized the prior
jurisprudence, and poses the risk that the post-Oncale jurisprudence will
replicate the pre-Oncale tendencies to rely on unduly constrained, monolithic
conceptions of sex that disregard gender-based dynamics among biological
males.
A. Addressing the "Bewildering" Divergence Among Lower Courts:
Recognizing the Cause ofAction, Overruling the Categorical
Preclusion, and Rejecting the Requirement of Homosexual Attraction
The Supreme Court's holding in Oncale significantly advances the
development of the legal doctrine governing same-sex sexual harassment
claims, resolving many of the inconsistencies among the divergent lower court
opinions and reconciling this body of law, in some important respects, with
broader Title VII principles. In a concise opinion, the Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which had held as a matter of
law that same-sex sexual harassment was not actionable. In a clear, decisive
rejection of this categorical rule precluding all same-sex harassment claims, the
Court explained:
292. See supra Part Il.A.1-2.; see also Abrams, supra note 101, at 2516.
293. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
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[w]e see no justification in the statutory language or our precedents for a
categorical nile excluding same-sex harassment claims from the coverage
of Title VII. As some courts have observed, male-on-male sexual
harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather
than the principal concems of our legislators by which we are governed.
Title VII prohibits "discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex" in the
"terms" or "conditions" of employment. Our holding that this includes
sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that
meets the statutory requirements.294
In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited precedents extending men the
same degree of protection under Title VII as women,295 as well as precedents
recognizing that actionable discrimination can be perpetrated by members of
the same protected class as the plaintiff.296 As the Court observed, it had
previously recognized a viable claim brought by a male employee alleging that
a male superior had "discriminated against him because of his sex when it
preferred a female employee for promotion," and the Court had not"consider[ed] it significant that the supervisor who made that decision was also
a man." '297 Thus, the Court concluded, "if our precedents leave any doubt on the
question, we hold today that nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination 'because of . . . sex' merely because the plaintiff and the
defendant . . . are of the same sex."'2 98 The Court accordingly reversed the
decision below that, relying on the rule announced in Garcia, had held that
same-sex harassment claims are not cognizable under Title VII.29 9
The Court then discussed the lower courts' "bewildering variety of stances"
on the issue of same-sex sexual harassment. The Court noted that some cases
had held that "same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under
Title VII,"300 while others had held that such conduct is actionable "only if the
294. Id. at 1002.
295. See id. at 1001 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682
(1983) for the proposition that Title VIl's proscription against discrimination "'because of... sex' protects men as
well as women").
296. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977), as authority
"reject[ing] any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race"
because "it would be unwise to presume that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against
other members of that group").
297. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616,624-25 (1987)).
298. Oncale, 118S.Ct.at1003.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 1002. As examples of cases adopting this position, the Court cited the opinion below, Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), which had followed the categorical preclusion rule
enunciated in Garcia v. ElfAtochem North America, 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994). The Court, however, also cited
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I11. 1988), as an additional adherent to this categorical preclusion rule,
in a highly contestable characterization of that opinion. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing Goluszek's holding that
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plaintiff can prove that the harasser is homosexual (and thus presumably
motivated by sexual desire).""3 1 Still others, the Court continued, had suggested
that "workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable,
regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. 302
Further explicating the scope of its holding that "nothing in Title VII
necessarily" precluded same-sex sexual harassment claims, the Court rejected
both the restrictive precedents requiring a showing of homosexual attraction to
support a finding of the requisite sex-based causation, and the expansive view
that all sexual conduct is, ipso facto, a form of actionable sex-based conduct.
Addressing the cases that had focused on sexual attraction, the Court
emphasized that although an inference of sex-based causation would be easy to
draw in such circumstances, "harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex. 303
Thus, the Court effectively overruled the line of cases that had required a
showing of homosexual attraction as a predicate to a same-sex sexual
harassment claim. °"
Turning to the proposition that the sexual nature of the conduct is in itself
sufficient to supply the necessary inference of sex-based discrimination, the
Court decisively rejected this expansive construction of Title VII's "because of
... sex" language. As the Court emphasized, its precedents defining a cause of
action for sexual harassment had,
never held that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and
women, is automatically discrimination because of sex merely because
the words used have sexual content or connotations. 'The critical issue,
Title VII's text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed.' 305
Accordingly, the Court clearly established that the same-sex sexual
harassment claim it had recognized was neither so narrow as to arise only upon
a showing of sexual attraction, nor so broad as to encompass every interaction
same-sex sexual harassment claims were not actionable absent a showing of an anti-male environment). The
Court's failure to examine the problematic implications of Goluszek is discussed more fully below. See infra notes
316-323 and accompanying text.
301. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Rd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191
(4th Cir. 1996)).
302. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. The Court cited Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997),
vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998), as an example of such a case. As discussed at greater length
below, this construction of Doe, like the Court's characterization of Goluszek, is controversial. See infra notes
344-376 and accompanying text.
303. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
304. See id. In Scott v. Norfolk Southern Corp., No. 97-1490, 1998 WL 387192 (4th Cir. June 24, 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999), the court, citing this portion of Oncale, recognized that Oncale "overrules
previous precedent in this Circuit," as it had been established in McWilliams, and thus vacated an order that had
relied on McWilliam§ to dismiss a same-sex sexual harassment claim. Scott, 1998 WL 387192, at *2.
305. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
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with sexual overtones. It emphasized that the critical inquiry turned on whether
the conduct constituted a form of discrimination based on sex within the
meaning of Title VII. The Court focused intensively on this statutory
requirement that the conduct occur "because of' the plaintiffs sex, reiterating
that "Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the
workplace; it is directed only at discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex," 306 and
that a Title VII plaintiff "must always prove that the conduct at issue was not
merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted
'discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex.
'' 30 7
Oncale, therefore, made significant strides toward resolving some of the
tensions and inconsistencies that had pervaded the same-sex sexual harassment
jurisprudence. The Court recognized that sex-based harassment, like other
forms of sex-based discrimination, is actionable irrespective of the sex of the
plaintiff or the sex of the perpetrator, and acknowledged that conduct need not
be based on sexual desire to be based on sex. In doing so, the Court, in these
important respects, reconciled same-sex sexual harassment doctrine with
established standards for adjudicating sexual harassment claims.3"8 Having thus
redirected the focus in same-sex sexual harassment cases away from the
extraneous sexual orientation issues that had preoccupied some of the lower
courts and back to the central "because of... sex" requirement,3" the Court set
forth a brief exposition of some of the "evidentiary route[s]" that plaintiffs
might follow in attempting to establish the requisite sex-based causal nexus.310
As discussed below, however, this portion of Oncale did little to elucidate the
factual issues surrounding sex and gender dynamics in the context of male-on-
male harassment, leaving the courts largely unguided in their determinations of
the sex-based causation issues that frequently arise in same-sex harassment
claims.
B. The Dilemma ofOncale's Dicta: Perpetuating Problematic
Tendencies in the Lower Courts'Jurisprudence
Oncale's holding affords numerous plaintiffs whose claims would have
been foreclosed under the prior case law an opportunity to challenge same-sex
sexual harassment as a form of sex-based discrimination prohibited by Title
VII. Its dicta, however, reflect rigid, constrained conceptions of "sex" and sex-
based causation that uncritically incorporate, and thus hold the potential to
306. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
307. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. In a separate, one-sentence concurrence, Justice Thomas further
emphasized this point, stating, "I concur because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the
plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title Vl's statutory requirement that there be discrimination "because of
... sex." Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
308. See supra Part l.B-C. (analyzing opposite-sex harassment cases that consistently recognize the sex-
based nature of conduct that is based on aspects of the plaintiffs sex, without requiring a showing of sexual
attraction or hostility toward women in general).
309. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing same-sex harassment cases that had required a showing of
homosexual attraction).
310. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
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perpetuate, many of the myths and misperceptions underlying the pre-Oncale
jurisprudence. Specifically, these dicta implicitly conceive of "sex" primarily in
terms of a biologically defined male-female dichotomy that emphasizes
distinctions between males as a class and females as a class and in doing so
obscures the numerous sex-based distinctions and potent, sex-based power
dynamics that occur within each biological sex. Thus, these dicta, like many of
the earlier analyses of same-sex sexual harassment, view each biological sex in
an unrealistically monolithic manner and accordingly fail to acknowledge the
significance of the individual sex- and gender-related attributes that distinguish
members of one biological sex from one another and that are central to analyses
of sex-based causation in the opposite-sex context.
Moreover, Oncale's dicta echo and implicitly reinforce the tendency of
some lower courts to view sexualized conduct, at least in the absence of
genuine sexual desire, as a phenomenon that is distinct from sex-based conduct
and that is devoid of sex-based and sex-discriminatory implications. These dicta
thus obscure the integral role of certain forms of sexualized conduct in
exploiting gender-based power differentials and perpetuating workplace gender
hierarchies. Oncale therefore fails, in these critical respects, to advance
jurisprudential understandings of the sex- and gender-based dynamics that
operate in the same-sex harassment context.
1. "General Hostility" and "Direct Comparative Evidence:"
Adherence to the Myth of the Gender Monolith
After acknowledging the elementary proposition that sex-based motivations
are more complex and diverse than sexual attraction,31" ' the Court endeavored to
expound on other means by which a plaintiff could raise an inference that he
had been singled out for harassment based on his sex. Its exposition, however,
reflects the same tendency that had emerged from the lower courts to conceive
of "sex" as a simple function of biological "maleness" or "femaleness," and
thus to view male sex identity as monolithic. This monolithic view ignores the
complex sex-based distinctions among males that invoke gender stereotypes
and paradigms of masculine sexual domination to define each individual male's
projected and perceived sex identity and status in terms of workplace gender
hierarchies. The Court's constrained construction of "sex" is apparent
throughout its discussion of the "evidentiary route[s]" by which a plaintiff may
establish that "the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual
connotations, but actually constituted discrimination ... because of... sex." 312
The Court proposed, as examples, two evidentiary routes that would support
an inference that the conduct occurred because of sex. First, the Court stated, a
trier of fact might reasonably infer the requisite sex-based causal nexus "if a
female victim is harassed in such sex-specific and derogatory terms by another
311. See id.
312. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to
the presence of women in the workplace. 3 13 Notably, the Court's allusion to"sex-specific and derogatory" conduct could encompass a broad range of
gender-stereotyping and gender-subordinating conduct of the type that
frequently occurs in same-sex as well as opposite-sex harassment cases, and
that is based on the target's individual sex- and gender-related attributes that
may or may not be shared uniformly by all members of the target's biological
sex.314 However, the Court then proceeded to restrict this language significantly
by adding the qualification that the sex-specific, derogatory conduct arise from
a "general hostility to the presence of' members of the target's biological sex.315
By alluding to a "general hostility" toward an entire biological sex, the
Court reverted to a biologically centered definition of "sex" as a construct
denoting all males or all females by virtue of their membership in one of two
biologically distinct classes, rather than as a concept alluding to aspects of an
individual's projected and perceived sex or gender identity. In doing so, the
Court echoed the conception of sex and sex-based causation implicit in
Goluszek and its progeny, which required a showing of an "anti-male
environment" in order to raise an inference that harassment, however sex-
specific and derogatory toward sex-related aspects of the individual target, was
based on the target's "sex."' 3 16 The Court thus perpetuated the tendency that had
arisen in some prior same-sex harassment cases to view each biological sex
monolithically and to recognize as relevant to Title VII's sex-based causation
inquiry only those aspects of "sex" that are shared uniformly by all members of
the target's biological sex. This departure from the broader Title VII
jurisprudence disregards the significance of the sex- and gender-defined aspects
of an individual's identity that distinguish him from other members of his
biological sex."'
The second "evidentiary route" offered by the Court as a basis for inferring
sex-based causation similarly formulates sex in terms of a dichotomy between
two opposing, mutually distinct, but internally monolithic, biological
categories. As the Court explained in this second example, "[a] same-sex
harassment plaintiff may also, of course, offer direct comparative evidence
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace., 3 8 The Court thus conceived of conduct based on sex as conduct
that affects males in one manner and females in another, giving rise to a direct
comparison across the biologically-defined divide. This conception of sex-
based conduct, like the Court's "general hostility" language, similarly envisions
an individual's sex in terms of two opposing biological groups, each of which is
313. Id.
314. See supra Part 11.B (discussing common gender-discriminatory nature of forms of conduct that occur
in same-sex as well as opposite-sex cases).
315. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
316. See supra Part H.A.2. (discussing reasoning behind Goluszek and its progeny).
317. See supra Part I.B-C. (analyzing cases outside same-sex sexual harassment context recognizing sex-
based nature of conduct that is based on an individual's sex- or gender-related traits).
318. Oncale, 118S. Ct. at 1002.
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presumed to be monolithically composed of individuals who, by virtue of their
shared biological traits, are assumed to be uniformly affected by the conduct in
question.
Accordingly, these evidentiary examples-both of which are strikingly
irrelevant to the conduct before the Court involving harassment of a male in a
male-dominated workplace--evince the Court's view of an individual's sex as a
function of his or her membership in a class defined by biological sex, rather
than as a protected aspect of the individual's identity arising from his or her
projected and perceived sex- and gender-related traits. The Court thus, in effect,
constructed its examples of sex-based conduct around a conception equating
Title VII's "because of . . sex" language with the biologically-centered
construct "because he was a male." '319 By framing its exposition of sex-based
conduct around forms of conduct affecting males or females uniformly, as a
monolithic biological sex, the Court did nothing to dispel the tendency of some
prior same-sex sexual harassment cases to conceptualize sex in a biologically
dichotomous, gender-monolithic manner as coterminous with biological sex.
By its silence, the Court thus perpetuated this tendency to obscure the numerous
sex- and gender-based distinctions among biological males that are exploited to
subordinate certain individual males for reasons and through methods that are
inextricably intertwined with their sex and gender identities.3 2
The Court's dicta offering examples of sex-based conduct do not purport to
require the forms of evidence discussed therein, or to preclude plaintiffs from
raising an inference of sex-based causation by other means. However, these
dicta reverted to the constrained notions of sex that had been implicit in earlier
cases that had, in fact, explicitly required evidence that the conduct had sex-
based implications for an entire biological class rather than merely for an
individual.32" ' The Court thus invoked, yet failed to comment on or reject, the
reasoning that had led these cases to recognize sex-based conduct only where it
affects all males uniformly as a monolithic biological sex.
This passive iteration of the logic underlying these same-sex sexual
harassment precedents stands in stark contrast to the Court's clear rejection of
the cases that had required a showing of homosexual attraction as a predicate to
a same-sex sexual harassment claim.32 2 The Court thus failed to correct one of
319. This was the construct proposed by amici urging affirmance of the Court of Appeals' rejection of
Oncale's claim. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Respondent
at * 17, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568, 1997 WL 634312).
320. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing ways in which same-sex sexual harassment invokes gender
stereotypes and exploits gender-based power differentials to subordinate some men to others on the basis of sex-
and gender-related attributes); infra notes 453-457 and accompanying text (same).
321. See, e.g., Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (requiring showing of an
anti-male environment in order to state a claim for same-sex sexual harassment); Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l
Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (same); Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. 111. 1988) (same);
see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing "anti-male environment" cases).
322. See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text (discussing Court's overruling of McWilliams and its
progeny).
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the most significant analytical flaws in the lower courts' jurisprudence.323 This
failure introduces the risk that subsequent courts, although recognizing that
allegations of same-sex sexual harassment state a claim as a matter of law, will
approach the factual question of whether the conduct was based on the target's
sex with the same problematic biologically-centered, gender-monolithic
conceptions of sex characteristic of much of the prior jurisprudence. The
unspoken assumptions underlying Oncale's dicta, if uncritically adopted by
subsequent courts, hold the potential to impede many targets of same-sex sexual
harassment in their efforts to prove the sex-based nature of conduct that is
directed at them not simply because of their biological maleness, but because of
aspects of their projected and perceived sex and gender identities that expose
them to gender-stereotyping derision and gender-subordinating abuse.
2. "Explicit or Implicit Proposals of Sexual Activity:"
Obscuring the Significance of Gender-Subordinating
Sexualized Conduct
The Court's dicta concerning the relevance of sexualized conduct similarly
fail to dispel myths and misconceptions underlying the pre-Oncale
jurisprudence. As discussed above, the Oncale Court confirned that conduct
need not be based on sexual desire to be based on "sex" within the meaning of
Title VII.324 However, the allusions to sexual conduct in its dicta reveal a
continued failure to acknowledge the integral role that sexualized conduct often
plays in patterns of harassment that exploit gender-based power differentials
and perpetuate workplace gender hierarchies. This conception thus reinforces
the tendency apparent in some pre-Oncale decisions to disregard the
significance of sexualized conduct as a powerful instrument of gender-based
subordination.
Apart from its statements that sexually suggestive conduct is not in itself
sufficient to support an inference of sex discrimination,325 and that sexual
attraction is not the only basis for inferring a sex-based causal nexus,326 the
Court's only reference to the subject of sexually explicit conduct consisted of
the following observation:
323. Indeed, the Court failed to identify the Goluszek anti-male environment cases as a distinct line of
reasoning in the lower courts' jurisprudence, but rather characterized Goluszek, along with Garcia, as holding that
same-sex sexual harassment claims are "never cognizable." Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
324. See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
325. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
326. See id.
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[c]ourts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the
challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of
sexual activity; it is reasonable to assume these proposals would not have
been made to someone of the same sex. The same chain of inference
would be available to a plaintiff alleging that the harasser was
homosexual.327
This observation, which views sexual overtures as a product of presumed sexual
desire, simply confirms what virtually all courts addressing the issue had
recognized: that harassment is based on sex when it is based on a genuine
attraction to persons of the target's biological sex.328
The Court did not, however, acknowledge that harassment often represents
an effort to intimidate, humiliate, degrade, and demean the target rather than an
attempt to initiate sexual relations or seek sexual gratification. In these
instances, the conduct cannot accurately be characterized as a "proposal[ ] of
sexual activity," regardless of whether the harasser is generally attracted to
members of the target's biological sex, making the issue of the target's sexual
preferences irrelevant.32 9 In failing to acknowledge forms of sexually explicit
harassment that seek to intimidate, humiliate, degrade, and demean the target
rather than to express sexual desire, the Court omitted any reference to the type
of sexualized conduct on the record before it, which involved threats and acts of
forcible sexual domination and abuse that could hardly be characterized as
genuine proposals of sexual activity.33°
By analyzing sexualized conduct separately from other forms of sex-based
discrimination, and by implicitly characterizing such conduct as a product of
presumed sexual attraction, the Court replicated the tendency of some prior
cases to view sexual conduct in the absence of sexual desire as wholly unrelated
to the target's protected sex- or gender-related traits.33' In doing so, the Court
327. Id. at 1002. This inference assumes, of course, that the harasser is not bisexual to any degree.
328. See supra note 128 (collecting cases consistently recognizing that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable where the harasser is genuinely attracted to persons of the target's biological sex and observing that this
aspect of same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence has been far less controversial than harassment that is not
based on attraction).
329. See supra notes 99-117 and accompanying text (discussing cases recognizing the sex-based nature of
abusive, humiliating, intimidating, and degrading sexual conduct directed at women where there was no evidence
of genuine sexual desire).
330. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (stating that the plaintiff was "forcibly subjected to sex-related,
humiliating actions" in which he was "physically assaulted... in a sexual manner" by multiple harassers and was
repeatedly "threatened... with rape").
331. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193-96 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that absent sexual attraction, pattern of sexual derision, threats, and assaults cannot be deemed to have
occurred because of target's sex within the meaning of Title VII); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,
451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (characterizing conduct as having "sexual overtones" and concluding without further
analysis that such conduct was not based on "sex" within the meaning of Title VII because harasser and target
were both male); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1049, 1050-51 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that
"without the presumption of sexual gratification .. there is no sex discrimination" and that the sexual conduct at
issue constituted "mere locker room antics, joking, or horseplay") The Court's dismissive characterization of Doe
as holding that sexual conduct is "always actionable," which ignores Doe's insightful analysis of the gender-
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failed to appreciate or examine the gender-based and gender-discriminatory
nature, purpose, and effect of the sexual humiliation, intimidation, and abuse
that operates in many same-sex as well as many opposite-sex sexual harassment
cases as a potent means of asserting gender dominance.332 It thus left
unexamined one the problematic assumptions that had unduly constrained the
"because of... sex" analysis in some prior same-sex sexual harassment cases,
posing the risk that courts analyzing same-sex sexual harassment issues in the
future will replicate the same analytical errors of the past, and will continue to
overlook the sex-based and sex-discriminatory implications of abusive,
degrading sexual conduct.
C. Oncale's Resounding Silence: The Court's Failure to
Countenance the Sex-Discriminatory Implications of Same-
Sex Gender Stereotyping and Same-Sex Sexual Subordination
As explained above, Oncale's dicta reflect a constrained conception of sex
that fails to redress the lower courts' tendencies to obscure gender-based
distinctions among members of the same biological sex and to disregard the
significance of sexualized, sexually subordinating conduct that exploits these
gender-based differences. The following discussion examines Oncale's glaring
omission of any analysis of the gender-based and gender-discriminatory
dynamics that had been squarely presented on the record before it, that had been
recognized in some prior same-sex sexual harassment cases, and that resonate
most powerfully in all-male or male-dominated work environments.
In an opinion focused so intensively on emphasizing the central importance
of the "because of . . . sex" requirement,333 the lack of guidance as to the
application of this requirement in the context of the all-male work environment
involved in the case before the Court, as in so many other same-sex harassment
cases, is remarkable.334 The Court's dicta on sex-based causation remained
silent as to male-on-male conduct, focusing instead on scenarios of "general
hostility to the presence of women in the workplace" and "direct comparative
evidence" as to the relative treatment of "both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace."
The Court's reluctance to address the issue of male-on-male sexual
subordination is even more conspicuous in light of the powerful articulations of
the sex-based and sex-discriminatory nature of the conduct that were presented
to the Court. Oncale argued that his harassers "targeted [him] for harassing
treatment and selected their method and manner of sexual harassment because
subordinating effect of certain forms of sexualized conduct, further obscures the sex-discriminatory significance of
some expressions of sexuality. See infra notes 344-376 and accompanying text.
332. See supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing gender-discriminatory dynamics of same-sex sexual subordination);
see also infra notes 346-356 and accompanying text (discussing Doe's analysis of sexual conduct as a form of
gender-derogatory subordination).
333. See supra notes 305-307 and accompanying text (discussing Court's emphasis on this statutory
requirement).
334. See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (all-male oil rig crew); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,
566-67 (7th Cir. 1997) (all-male maintenance crew), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998); Mc Williams,
72 F.3d at 1193 (all-male mechanical team self-identified as "lube boys").
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he was a male and because of his sexual identity as a man." '335 Amici curiae
elaborated upon this assertion, explaining to the Court that Oncale was targeted
for a campaign of verbal and sexual abuse because he "did not conform to
traditional norms of masculinity" in that he did not participate in the
"hypermasculine environment" that defined the standard of appropriate and
tolerated conduct for a male in Oncale's workplace.336
Moreover, in addition to setting forth the sex- and gender-based reasons
why Oncale was targeted for the harassment, amici elucidated the gender-based
power dynamics underlying the sexually explicit conduct through which the
harassment was carried out. As amici explained, "[m]en are discriminated
against based on their sex when sexually aggressed against by other men. They
are targeted as men-usually as certain kinds of men-to be victimized through
their masculinity ...as individual members of their gender, as gender is
socially defined." '337 Amici then endeavored to dispel the "common myths" that
"when a man sexually abuses another man, the actions are not sexual and not
gender-based" because "[m]asculinity is assumed to be uniform." '338
Contrary to this myth, amici explained, men commonly identify other males"as inferior men" and subject them to sexual exploitation and domination on
that basis.339 Through this conduct, amici continued, harassers ensure that their
targets are "stripped of their social status as men. They are feminized: made to
serve the function and play the role customarily assigned to women as men's
social inferiors."34 This process "lowers the victim's status, making him
inferior as a man by social standards," thereby "demean[ing] his masculinity...
. What he loses, he loses through gender, as a man" in a divestiture of gender-
defined power that women cannot and do not experience."'
The Court's reticence in the face of this incisive articulation of the gender-
based distinctions among males and of the sex- and gender-discriminatory
implications of the types of male-on-male sexual domination perpetrated
against Oncale reveals a profound reluctance to grapple with the more complex
aspects of sex identity, gender identity, and gender-based power dynamics.
Instead of addressing amici's assertions controverting the myths that
masculinity is monolithic and that male sexual domination of other males is
gender-neutral, and instead of countenancing the possibility of males
subordinating males for reasons inextricably related to their maleness,
335. Petitioner's Brief at *19, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-
568, 1997 WL 458826). In making this argument, Oncale asserted that there could be "no type of conduct more
repulsive to the nonconsenting heterosexual male" than the forced contact with another man's penis and threats
and simulations of sodomy. Id.
336. Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors in Support of Petitioner at *2, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568, 1997 WL 531305).
337. Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization et al. in Support of
Petitioner at *7, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568, 1997 WL
471814).
338. Id. at *8-9.339. Id. at *10.
340. Id.
341. Id. (citing Jim Struve, Dancing With the Patriarchy: The Politics of Sexual Abuse, in THE SEXUALLY
ABUSED MALE 3 (Mic Hunter ed., 1990)).
1999]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
masculinity, and gender-based power relations, the Court reverted to simplistic
formulations of sex and gender that acknowledge only those gender issues that
affect the two biological sexes differentially while affecting members of the
same biological sex uniformly. 42
The Court thus became complicit in the tendency of many same-sex sexual
harassment cases to overlook the gender-based distinctions among members of
the same sex and thus to disregard the powerful patterns of gender-based
discrimination founded on the enforcement of gender stereotypes and the
exploitation of masculinity-based sexual vulnerabilities among males. By doing
so, the Court perpetuated the biologically dichotomous, gender-monolithic
assumptions underlying some of the lower courts' most restrictive analyses of
same-sex sexual harassment claims and further obscured the significance of the
projected and perceived gender attributes that the courts have recognized as
centrally relevant to the sex-based causation inquiry in the opposite-sex
context.343
Oncale's treatment of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion in
Doe344 further demonstrates Oncale's retrogressive adherence to the flawed
assumptions of some of earlier same-sex harassment cases and its failure to
recognize the complexities embodied in the term "sex" in a manner consistent
with the meanings ascribed to the term in the opposite-sex context. In its only
allusion to Doe, the Court described the decision as "suggest[ing] that
workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless
of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or motivations. 345 This description,
however, mischaracterizes important aspects of the analysis set forth in Doe.
The Doe court did, to be sure, indicate that it viewed the sexual conduct before
it as sufficient to provide the required causal connection to the target's sex.3" It
did not, however, do so simply by construing Title VII's "because of ... sex"
language to mean because of sexuality or sexual activity, rather than because of
the plaintiffs sex-based identity or traits.3 47 To the contrary, the court
thoughtfully articulated the connections between a target's subjection to
unwelcome sexual conduct and his or her sex- and gender-based identity. As
the court explained, numerous courts had implicitly recognized, in the opposite-
sex context, that unwelcome sexual conduct often "reduces the target to a
sexual object," thus subordinating her in a manner that is "inescapably and
irrevocably linked to her gender. '3 48
342. See supra notes 311-323 and accompanying text (discussing biologically dichotomous, gender-
monolithic assumptions implicit in Oncale 's dicta).
343. See supra Part LB-C. (analyzing opposite-sex harassment cases that recognize the significance of
plaintiff's individual gender-related attributes and identity as a basis for sex-discriminatory harassment based on
gender stereotyping).
344. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (citing Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 563 (7th Cir. 1997),
vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998)).
345. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (citing Doe, 119 F.3d at 563).
346. Doe, 119 F.3d at 579.
347. See id.; see also supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the alternate meanings of the word"sex").
348. Doe, 119 F.3d at 579; see also supra notes 277, 305 and accompanying text (discussing debate as to
whether sexual conduct is inherently sex-discrminatory).
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The court then emphasized that it would be difficult to envision
circumstances in which someone "intentionally grabs another's testicles," as the
harasser had done in that case, "for reasons entirely unrelated to that person's
gender."349 Nonetheless, the court did not base its finding of the requisite sex-
based causal nexus solely on the sexual nature of the conduct, or on the
presumption that the unwelcomeness of the conduct reduces the target's status
to that of a sexual object. Rather, the court proceeded to analyze the sexual
conduct as a component of a broader pattern of gender stereotyping and gender
subordination founded on gender-based distinctions between the target and the
more powerful, masculine harassers. The court held that, even if the inference
of sex-based causation did not arise from the "sexual character of the
harassment itself," it could be "inferred from the harassers' evident belief that in
wearing an earring, H. Doe did not conform to male standards, thus the repeated
inquiries as to whether he was 'a guy or a girl,' for example."35
Accordingly, while the court noted that a strong inference of a sex-based
motivation can arise from the sexual nature of the conduct,35' it based its
holding on additional factors beyond sexual content that denoted a sex- and
gender-based motivating factor behind the harassment in the case before it. The
court noted that the conduct did not merely involve general sexual overtones or
innuendoes, but rather was "targeted specifically" at Doe and "revolved around
his gender.""35 The court also noted that Doe was referred to as his harasser's
"bitch," and subjected to overt threats of rape and an actual physical assault in
which the harasser grabbed his testicles to "finally find out" whether he was "a
girl or a guy." '353 The court found that these "overt references to [Doe's] gender
and the repeated allusions to sexual assault" in which Doe was portrayed as the
victim of violent penetration by the harasser supported the inference that Doe's"gender had something to do with this harassment."' ' The court therefore
concluded that, if additional proof of sex-based causation were necessary, the
record before the court contained ample evidence that Doe was "singled out for
this abuse because the way in which he projected the sexual aspect of his
personality (and by that we mean his gender) did not conform to his coworkers'
view of appropriate masculine behavior." '355 Thus, according to the Doe court,
the sexual conduct, in the context of the other forms of gender-based derision,
reflected an intent to ridicule, humiliate, and demean a less masculine male
based on his status as a male and thus on his sex. As the court explained, the
conduct:
349. Doe, 119 F.3d at 580.
350. Id. at 575.
351. See id. at 576.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 576-77.
354. Id. at 577.
355. Id.
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was a grave intrusion upon [Doe's] sexual privacy and, given the remarks
that accompanied the assault, an explicit comment upon his gender....
[T]he overall context of the harassment alleged in this case-the name-
calling, the references to sexual assault, and the intrusive, intimate
touching, all of which expressly invoked [Doe's] gender-certainly
makes it reasonable to infer that the workplace was made hostile to him
because of his gender. And to the extent that their mindset is pertinent, we
also think that one can reasonably infer that [the harasser] and his cohorts
chose to harass [Doe] in the way that they did with just this likelihood in
mind-that is, that their intent was to humiliate him as a man.356
Thus, contrary to the Oncale Court's dismissive reference to Doe as a case
simply suggesting that harassment that is "sexual in content is always
actionable," '357 Doe presents a cogent analysis of the ways in which
subordinating sexual conduct can reduce a target's status to that of a "sexual
object" in a manner "inescapably and irrevocably linked to [the target's]
gender,' 358 in order to impugn his masculinity and "humiliate him as a man. 359
Just as the Court declined to countenance the arguments presented to it
regarding the gender-based power dynamics through which dominant males
brand other biological males as "inferior men" and subject them to sexual
exploitation and domination on that basis, 36° so the Court declined to engage
with Doe's analysis of the interrelationships between gender stereotypes,
sexually abusive conduct, and the subordination of some men to others based
on a hierarchy of masculinity.361' Accordingly, the Court relinquished the
opportunity presented in Oncale to elucidate the relevance of sexual conduct in
the sex-based causation inquiry and to dispel the monolithic misconceptions of
sex that obfuscate patterns of gender-based subordination among males.
The Court's failure to acknowledge Doe's potential to illuminate the
interrelationships between sex, sexuality, and sex-based causation in the same-
sex sexual harassment context becomes even more striking upon examination
of the Seventh Circuit's subsequent treatment of its own opinion in Doe. In
Johnson v. Hondo, Inc. ,362 which was decided well before Oncale, the Court of
Appeals, after discussing Doe, concluded that the sexually explicit nature of the
harassing conduct before it was not sufficient, under the circumstances, to
support a finding that the harassment was based on sex within the meaning of
356. Id. at 580.
357. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
358. Doe, 119 F.3d at 579.
359. Id. at 580. In contrast to the Supreme Court's suggestion that Doe would forbid all forms of sexually
suggestive conduct, this analysis would appear to proscribe only those that sexually objectify, humiliate, degrade,
subordinate, or disempower a particular individual in a gender-specific manner.
360. See supra notes 335-341 and accompanying text (recounting arguments presented to the Court).
361. See Doe, 119 F.3d at 580 (concluding that plaintiff was "singled out for [sexual] abuse because the
way in which he projected the sexual aspect of his personality (and by that we mean his gender) did not conform
to his coworkers' view of appropriate masculine behavior").
362. 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Title VI.1363 The harasser in Johnson made repeated vulgar comments, while
gesturing with and manipulating his crotch, to the effect that he was going to
make the target "suck [his] dick."3"
The court affirmed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
on the grounds that "[b]esides the sexual content of [the harasser's] remarks
there is absolutely nothing in this record that supports a reasonable inference
that the remarks were directed at [the plaintiff] on account of his gender. 365
The court explained that, "[a]lthough explicit sexual content or vulgarity may
often take a factfinder a long way toward concluding that harassing comments
were in fact based on gender.., this need not necessarily be the case. '"366
The court proceeded to analyze the significance of the harasser's sexually
explicit and offensive conduct in light of Doe. The court found "marked factual
distinctions" between the forms of harassment directed at the plaintiff in each
case.367 As the Johnson court explained, the circumstances of the harassment in
Doe "converged to support the conclusion that the remarks and conduct
involved in that case truly were gender-based. 3 68 The court observed that the
conduct involved Doe's "having his gender questioned," repeated threats of
sexual assault, and a physical assault on his testicles in a "proclaimed effort to
determine once and for all whether he was male or female. 369 Moreover, the
court emphasized, the sexual conduct in Doe reflected the harassers' "expressed
and exhibited hostility to the way in which [Doe] exhibited his sexuality" and to
Doe's "failure to conform to stereotypical male standards., 370
The Johnson court found this pattern of gender-based conduct with sexual
overtones distinguishable from the conduct at issue in the case before it, in
which the vulgar sexual comments did not make "any reference, direct or
indirect, to [the plaintiffs] gender," and did not escalate to physical assaults of
a sexual nature.37 1 Consequently, the court found, the sexually explicit conduct
directed at the plaintiff did not constitute the type of gender-based derision,
intimidation, and subordination that was present in Doe.372 The court noted
Doe's dictum suggesting that "arguably" the sexual nature of the conduct "in
363. See id. at 414.
364. Id. at 410 & n.1.
365. Id. at 412.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 413.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 413-14.
371. Id. at 414.
372. Notably, the district court in Johnson found that "the evidence did not indicate that [the target] was at
all intimidated by the harasser," as the target, in contrast to Doe, who had left his job in fear, had "responded in
kind" to the vulgar sexual comments, and had agreed to meet his harasser off company premises to engage in a
physical altercation that resulted in the harasser's being taken to the hospital. Id. at 411, 412 & n.4. The targets'
contrasting responses to the harassment reveal starkly contrasting circumstances as to the power differentials
between the harasser and the target, supporting the Johnson court's conclusion that the facts before it did not
represent the type of gender-based subordination that was present in Doe, but rather reflected a "personal grudge
match between two workers." Id. at 412. In Raum v. Laidlaw, Ltd., No. 97-CV-1 11 (FJS), 1998 WL 357325
(N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1998), the court reached a similar conclusion that "obscene gestures and epithets" such as "fluck
off' and "go fuck yourself' did not give rise to an inference that the plaintiff was targeted or subordinated because
of his sex. Id. at *1-2 & n.1.
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and of itself demonstrates the nexus to the plaintiffs gender that Title VII
requires." '73 The court emphasized, however, that Doe "did not ultimately rely
on" this dictum because it "found sufficient additional evidence linking the
conduct at issue to the plaintiff s gender." '374
Thus, it is apparent from the Seventh Circuit's construction of its own
precedent in Doe that sexualized conduct did not, ipso facto, amount to
actionable sex harassment, but rather supported an inference of actionable sex-
based conduct when the "'overall context of harassment"' reflected a pattern of
gender-based intimidation and ridicule.375 This subsequent treatment of Doe
from within the same jurisdiction reveals the subtle, complex, and illuminating
analysis of gender stereotyping and sexualized conduct in the same-sex context
that the Oncale Court omitted by citing Doe for the proposition that conduct
that is "sexual in content is always actionable." '376
By ignoring the Seventh Circuit's insightful analysis of the circumstances in
which sexualized conduct operates as a form of gender subordination intended
to intimidate and demean an individual because of his sex- and gender-related
traits, the Oncale Court evaded the critically important issue addressed in Doe
regarding the powerful role of certain forms of sexualized conduct in
subordinating an individual based on his gender identity. The Oncale Court
thus declined the opportunity to elucidate the gender-based dynamics that are
most centrally relevant to applying the "because of... sex" requirement in the
same-sex sexual harassment context.377
Oncale, although emphasizing the critical nature of the sex-based causation
inquiry3 7t and setting forth some methods of proving sex-based causation,
confined its analysis of this issue to examples of sex-based conduct implicating
an entire biological sex uniformly, omitting any reference to the sex-based
dynamics that operate among males to create and enforce a gender-defined
hierarchy on the basis of their projected and perceived masculinity.379 The Court
thus remained strikingly silent regarding the asserted sex-based nature of the
conduct before it, although powerful arguments articulating the sex-based and
sex-discriminatory nature of male-on-male sexual domination were presented to
the Court both in the briefs in Oncale and in lower court precedents that the
Court cited for far simpler and less illuminating propositions.
By remaining conspicuously silent as to the asserted gender-based dynamics
of the male-on-male conduct before the Court, Oncale left unexamined the
biologically dualistic, gender-monolithic misconceptions that had pervaded the
373. Johnson, 125 F.3d at 414 n.7.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 415 n.7 (quoting Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 596 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and
remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998)).
376. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002. This characterization of Doe also diverges from the treatment of Doe in the
briefs before the Court, which acknowledged that Doe "did not rest its holding entirely" on the sexual content of
the conduct but "also relied on evidence of gender-stereotyping comments." Respondent's Brief at *30, Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct 998 (1998) (No. 96-568, 1997 WL 634147).
377. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
378. See supra notes 305-307 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 311-323 and accompanying text.
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prior same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence, and thus failed to attune the
lower courts to the powerful patterns of male-on-male gender-based
subordination that had evaded judicial recognition in the past. The Court's
reticence in response to the clearly asserted sex-based and sex-discriminatory
nature of gender stereotyping and sexual domination among males has
prompted speculation that the Oncale Court, far from decisively recognizing the
sex-based and sex-discriminatory nature of such conduct, merely acknowledged
in a hesitant, almost skeptical manner, that-in the Court's guarded words-"nothing in Title VII necessarily" precludes recognition of theories of sex
discrimination arising from such conduct.38° The following discussion examines
the implications of Oncale in subsequent adjudications of same-sex sexual
harassment issues.
D. The Ramifications ofOncale in the Lower Courts:
The Continued Challenge of Distinguishing Actionable
Sex-Based Harassment from Heterosexual "Horseplay"
The Oncale Court, in recognizing a cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment, vigorously emphasized the central importance of the "because of..
. sex" requirement as a means of distinguishing between innocuous "male-on-
male horseplay" and "discriminatory conditions of employment. ' 381 Yet, as
discussed above, the Court offered little guidance as to the application of this
requirement in the context of male-on-male harassment, and did little to ensure
that subsequent same-sex sexual harassment adjudications look beyond the
monolithic formulations of sex implicit in many prior same-sex cases to the
more sophisticated understandings of sex that have emerged in the broader Title
VII jurisprudence.382
Developments in the wake of Oncale reveal continued ambiguities on issues
of sex-based causation in the same-sex sexual harassment context, and a
continued jurisprudential failure to recognize the sex-based and sex-
discriminatory implications of gender-based distinctions among males and of
sexual conduct used to subordinate certain males on the basis of projected and
perceived masculinity. Although the Supreme Court remanded Oncale for
further proceedings that might have elucidated Oncale's claim that he was
sexually subordinated based on his gender-related attributes,383 the parties
380. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001. One commentator has observed that the terseness and brevity of Oncale,
particularly when viewed in light of the opinion's emphasis on the restrictions imposed upon the newly-
recognized cause of action "may disguise disagreement" within the Court as to the application of Title VII in the
same-sex sexual harassment context and may presage an intent to "expand[ ] the coverage but restrict[ ] the
liability" under Title VII. David G. Savage, Signs of Disagreement: Scalia May Have Sown Seeds of Dissent in
Same-Sex Ruling, A.B.A. J., May 1988, at 50-51.
381. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (internal quotations omitted).
382. See supra Part III.B. (discussing Oncale's failure to dispel biologically dichotomous, gender-
monolithic conceptions of sex); see also supra Part I.B-C. (examining formulations of "sex" implicit in opposite-
sex sexual harassment cases).
383. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (remanding case for further proceedings); see also supra notes 335-341
and accompanying text (discussing theories of sex-based discrimination argued in Oncale).
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subsequently settled the case on the eve of trial," 4 thus precluding further
development of the factual and legal theories presented in that case.
Further compounding the lack of clarity regarding the application of sex-
based causation principles to conduct among males is the Supreme Court's
subsequent treatment of Doe, which the Court vacated and remanded for
reconsideration without setting forth its reasons.3 5 Oncale's holding that same-
sex sexual harassment is actionable upon proof of the requisite sex-based
causation is not, on its face, inconsistent with Doe's holding that the requisite
sex-based causation could be inferred in that case from the pattern of gender-
specific derision and sexual abuse intended to demean the target "as a man. "386
The absence of a direct conflict between the holdings of the two cases makes
the precise significance of the Supreme Court's vacatur of Doe difficult to
discern.
One plausible construction is, of course, an intent to highlight the Court's
clear rejection of Doe's dictum suggesting that sexual conduct is in itself
sufficient to supply the inference of sex-based discrimination.3"7 Nonetheless,
some observers have construed the Court's vacatur of Doe as a rejection of
Doe's finding that an inference of sex-based causation could arise from gender
stereotyping and sexually abusive, degrading conduct.388 Regardless of the
Court's intent in vacating Doe, its vacatur has the effect of casting doubt on the
precedential value of Doe's reasoning, thereby limiting the influence of this
opinion, which represents one of the few judicial attempts to conduct a careful
examination of the sex-discriminatory significance of gender stereotyping and
sexually degrading conduct among males.
Accordingly, in the aftermath of Oncale, the same-sex sexual harassment
jurisprudence remains virtually as devoid as ever of any consistent guiding
principles for conceptualizing "sex" and sex-based causation in a manner that
adequately captures the significance of each individual's sex- and gender-based
identity and that comports with the more nuanced understandings of these
concepts implicit in other areas of Title VII jurisprudence.389 Thus, these
384. See Nation: American Scene, WASH. TIMES Oct. 26, 1998, at A9.
385. See City ofBelleville v. Doe, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
386. See supra notes 344-377 and accompanying text (discussing Doe's holding and Supreme Court's
characterization thereof).
387. Compare Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 ("we have never held that ... harassment... is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations") with Doe v.
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997) (questioning need for additional proof of sex-based causation
where the "harassment has explicit sexual overtones"), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
388. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 76 (D. Me. 1998) (suggesting
that vacatur of Doe may represent an expression of disfavor toward Doe's reliance on gender stereotypes as
evidence of sex discrimination); see also Storrow, supra note 11, at 715 (theorizing that Court's vacatur of Doe
reflects "unwillingness to allow instances of sex stereotyping to form the basis of sexual harassment claims").
389. There is, however, at least one notable exception to this jurisprudential void regarding the sex-based
dynamics at play in the same-sex sexual harassment context. See Zalewski v. Overlook Hosp., 692 A.2d 131, 134,
136 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (holding that "[aibsent extenuating circumstances, it would seem difficult to
prove that sexually explicit words or conduct between men" would constitute sex discrimination, but finding that
the requisite extenuating circumstances existed where sexually explicit conduct was targeted at plaintiff"because
he was a male who did not behave as they perceived a male should behave" with regard to sex and sexuality, thus
raising the inference that the target was harassed in a sexually explicit manner as a form of"gender stereotyping").
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complex issues of sex and sex-based causation are likely to remain highly
contested and divisive, and may precipitate inconsistencies in the post-Oncale
jurisprudence as "bewildering" as those that the Supreme Court confronted in
Oncale.390
Moreover, as a result of Oncale's silence regarding concepts of sex-based
causation in the context of male-on-male harassment, the gender-based
distinctions among men and the forms of sexual conduct that are used to assert
power and dominance based on these distinctions are likely to remain hidden
from judicial view. In part because of Oncale's failure to articulate an"evidentiary route" for raising an inference of sex discrimination based on
gender distinctions among men, same-sex sexual harassment cases in the wake
of Oncale continue to be framed in a manner that fails to accentuate the
projected and perceived gender identities and gender-based power relations of
the parties involved in the harassment.3 91 The resulting omission of these
critically important gender dynamics further impedes courts' abilities to detect
the sex-discriminatory implications of the forms of male-on-male harassment
presented to them. In this respect, Oncale not only fails to dispel, but also
contributes to perpetuating, the myth of the gender monolith.
One final aspect of Oncale bears emphasis. In addition to focusing
intensively on the "because of ... sex" requirement, Oncale emphasized that
the Court's sexual harassment precedents recognized a cause of action only
where the conduct was severe, pervasive, and "so objectively offensive as to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment. Conduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview." '392 The Court described these
requirements as "crucial ...to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake
ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or
intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory conditions of employment," '393 and as
essential to "prevent Title VII from expanding into a general civility code., 394
390. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (describing "bewildering" inconsistencies in lower courts' jurisprudence).
Several commentators have noted the unresolved ambiguities that remain in the wake of Oncale and the likelihood
of resulting inconsistencies arising in the future. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Defining Sexual Harassment, 34 J.
ASS'N TRIAL LAW. AM. 86 (May 1998) (noting that Oncale "did nothing to define" the "because of sex"
requirement); Christine Cesare & Lisa Lemer, Same-Sex Harassment Leaves Employers to Grapple with
Distinction, EMPLOYMENT LAW STRATEGIST, Apr. 1998, at 1, 1 (noting that the jurisprudence is "likely to remain
unsettled for quite a while" as Oncale offers "little guidance on where to draw the line between a permissible
fraternal atmosphere in the workplace and one that is tinged with unlawful discrimination by members of the same
sex"); Sidney R. Steinberg, Supreme Court Decision in Oncale Answers Some Questions-Raises Others,
ANDREWS EMPLOYMENT LMG. REP., Apr. 14, 1998, at 3, 3 (contending that Oncale "raises, or at least leaves
unresolved, a number of issues in this area of the law" with which "the lower courts will grapple for some time").
391. See, e.g., Schermer v. Illinois Dep't of Transp., No. 96-3427, 1999 WL 148034, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar.
19, 1999) (emphasizing that record contained "no evidence" as to plaintiffs gender-related attributes, harasser's
perceptions thereof, or harasser's "idea of a stereotypical male" from which court might infer a gender-
discriminatory motivation behind the sexually offensive conduct); Higgins, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (discussing dearth
of "gender-related facts before the Court" from which to infer causal nexus between harassment and target's
gender identity).
392. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
393. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
394. Id. at 1002.
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The Court's emphasis on preventing Title VII from expanding into a"civility code" proscribing innocuous "horseplay" is remarkable in a case such
as Oncale that did not involve mild insults, distasteful jokes, or sporadic
incidents of questionable offensiveness." 5 Rather, Oncale involved a relentless
pattern of explicit threats of rape, culminating in physical assaults in which
multiple harassers restrained Oncale, forced him into contact with another
man's penis, and subjected him to forcible anal penetration with a foreign
object amidst threats of anal rape.396 Nor is Oncale an anomaly. Numerous other
same-sex sexual harassment cases have involved closely analogous examples of
physical sexual assault and forcible simulations of oral or anal sodomy that
were perpetrated by one or more harassers as part of a pattern of incessant
verbal and physical abuse that would not be not easily confused with "ordinary
socializing" or "horseplay." '397
Thus, just as the Oncale Court framed its analysis of sex-based causation
issues in a manner suggesting a reluctance to countenance the gender-based
dynamics at play in the context of male-on-male sexual domination and abuse,
so the Court framed its discussion of the severity, pervasiveness and
offensiveness requirements in a manner that, to some extent, obscured the
profound impact of the conduct at issue and trivialized acts of forcible sexual
assault as something difficult to distinguish from mere "horseplay.""39 Many of
the lower courts that have cited Oncale for its insistence that harassment be
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive have proceeded to apply these
requirements more strictly than ever.399 The lower courts' construction of
395. Cf., e.g., Smith v. Oakland Scavenger Co., Nos. 96-15601,96-15797, 1997 WL 661335, at *2 (9th Cir.
Oct. 16, 1997) (holding that incidents such as confronting plaintiff with pornographic magazine in her work area
and placing a rodent among her tools were not sufficiently severe to give rise to hostile work environment); Vigil
v. City of Las Cruces, No. 96-2059, 1997 WL 265095, at *2 (10th Cir. May 20, 1997) (holding that plaintiffs
exposure to pornographic, sexually explicit pictures and sexual jokes did not rise to the level of actionable sexual
harassment); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that handful of
offensive remarks without any physical touching, overt propositions, or exposure to sexually graphic material did
not constitute actionable harassment); Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming directed
verdict for defendant despite evidence that female police officer was subjected to pornographic material placed in
her station mailbox and to fellow officers' sexually explicit conversations); Devaughn v. City of Clanton, 992 F.
Supp. 1318, 1324 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (holding that comments by employer in which he asked employee if she"needed any help with the paperwork" while she was in the bathroom, while inappropriate, were not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment); Kantar v. Baldwin Cooke Co., No. 93C9239, 1995 WL
692022, at *4 (N.D. fI1. Nov. 20, 1995) (holding that occasional inquiries about plaintiffs sexual activities were
not sufficiently severe or pervasive to give rise to a hostile environment claim).
396. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct.
998 (1998).
397. See supra notes 276-286 and accompanying text (recounting and analyzing patterns of unwelcome
sexual conduct perpetrated in same-sex sexual harassment cases).
398. Oncale, of course, did not suggest that the conduct directed at Joseph Oncale was not sufficiently
severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive to satisfy the requirements of the sexual harassment jurisprudence.
However, its emphatic recitations of these requirements as "crucial" to distinguishing between actionable conduct
and mere horseplay suggests that the severely degrading impact of unwelcome sexual conduct directed at males
was perhaps not as self-evident to the Court as it might have been if similar conduct had, for instance, been
directed at a woman.
399. See, e.g., Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing
Oncale and holding that "only extreme conduct can be said to discriminatorily alter the terms and conditions of
employment"); Raum v. Laidlaw, Ltd., No. 97-CV-1 1 (FJS), 1998 WL 357325, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 1, 1998)
(citing Oncale and discussing plaintiffs' "heavy burden" of establishing that the conduct in issue was "not merely
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Oncale as inviting particularly rigorous scrutiny of sexual harassment claims
suggests that the courts may have detected, beneath Oncale's overt holding
recognizing same-sex sexual harassment claims as a matter of law, an
underlying skepticism toward such claims as a matter of fact. Although Oncale
provides targets of same-sex sexual harassment a cause of action challenging
such conduct, its dicta discussing the parameters of same-sex sexual harassment
claims reveal a reluctance to recognize fully the potent sex-based dynamics and
severely debilitating impact of many forms of male-on-male sexual harassment,
and a reversion to some of the restrictive assumptions underlying the prior
same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence.
These tendencies, if replicated in the lower courts, would significantly
impede same-sex harassment plaintiffs in their efforts to prove the sex-based
causal nexus and the severity, pervasiveness, and offensiveness that they must
establish in order to prevail on their claims. Under this constrained approach to
adjudicating same-sex harassment issues, remedies for many forms of male-on-
male sexual harassment would, as a practical matter, remain nearly as elusive as
they had been under many of the pre-Oncale precedents. This restrictive
analysis of same-sex harassment issues thus threatens to eviscerate the
significance of Oncale's recognition of a same-sex harassment cause of action,
reducing it to a largely Pyrrhic victory for many targets of such conduct.
However, as discussed below, nothing in Oncale compels the lower courts to
adhere to the same unexamined assumptions or to replicate the same analytical
flaws in their determinations of the factual questions central to same-sex sexual
harassment claims. Thus, the following part urges the lower courts to look
beyond the myths and misconceptions implicit in the interstices of Oncale's
dicta and to undertake their own analyses of the concepts of sex, sex-based
causation, and severity, pervasiveness and offensiveness in their adjudications
of same-sex sexual harassment issues.
IV. PLACING ONCALE IN ITS PROPER CONTEXT:
TOWARD A SEX-BASED CAUSATION ANALYSIS THAT COMPORTS
WITH CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS OF "SEX"
Part III of this Article demonstrates that, although the Oncale Court was
confronted with allegations of male-on-male sexually subordinating conduct
perpetrated on the grounds of masculinity-based distinctions among biological
males, it remained conspicuously silent regarding the asserted sex-based and
sex-discriminatory implications of such conduct. In doing so, it adhered to
biologically centered, gender-monolithic conceptions of sex and sex-based
causation that obscure gender-based distinctions among members of the same
tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted sexual discrimination"); Chrouser v. DePaul
Univ., No. 95-C-7363, 1998 WL 299426, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 20, 1998) (citing Oncale for the proposition that the
plaintiff's burden was "to demonstrate that her workplace was 'hellish,' not merely tinged with offensive sexual
connotations and vulgarity").
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biological sex. °° While some observers have construed Oncale's constrained
analysis as an implicit rejection of broader theories of sex-based causation
founded on an individual's projected and perceived gender-related attributes, 40 1
this part contends that such a construction is unjustified. Because Oncale does
not endeavor to alter fundamental precepts elucidating notions of "sex" and
sex-based causation under Title VII, lower courts should neither uncritically
adopt, nor draw unwarranted inferences from, the constrained formulation of"sex" implicit in Oncale's dicta.
Rather, the courts should conduct independent analyses of whether the
conduct before them satisfies statutory standards pertaining to sex-based
causation. A principled adjudication of this issue, this part argues, must rest on
the same broad formulations of "sex" that have emerged from both the
established Title VII jurisprudence and the contemporary scholarship
illuminating the nature of sex and sexual identity. These formulations of "sex"
properly recognize the integral role of gender stereotypes and sexual
interactions in defining a person's projected and perceived sex and gender
identity, and thus emphasize the aspects of "sex" that are most relevant to the
workplace interactions and power dynamics with which Title VII is primarily
concerned. Accordingly, it is these conceptions of sex and sex-based causation,
rather than the narrow dicta in Oncale, that should inform adjudications of sex-
based causation issues in the context of same-sex sexual harassment claims.
A. Legal Formulations of "Sex: " Recognizing the Broad Array of
Sex-Based Motivations
As discussed above, Oncale's dicta on the issue of sex-based causation
reflect a narrowly circumscribed, biologically defined conception of "sex. ' 402
These dicta, however, do not purport to supplant the significant body of
precedent construing Title VII's "because of ... sex" requirement. Therefore
courts must not confine themselves to the constrained, biologically dualistic
notions of sex and sex-based causation underlying Oncale's dicta. Rather, they
must conduct their own rigorous, principled analyses of the sex-based and sex-
discriminatory implications of the conduct before them in accordance with
established legal doctrines of sex-based causation. By eschewing a simplistic
focus on an individual's biological sex and by emphasizing instead the diverse
400. See supra Part II.B.
401. See supra note 388 and accompanying text (citing cases and commentary questioning viability of
gender-stereotyping theory of sex-based causation in the wake of Oncale and the vacatur of Doe); see also Klein
v. McGowan, No. Civ. 97-1915 DWF/AJB, 1999 WL 88828, at *4-6 (D. Minn. Feb. 16, 1999) (citing Oncale and
rejecting plaintiff's claim that he was targeted based on his "masculinity" because "the workplace at issue here
was almost entirely male, and there is no allegation that anyone other than plaintiff was subjected to the allegedly
harassing conduct"); Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915 (N.D. Ind. 1998) (citing Oncale as requiring
proof of disparate treatment directed toward "members of one sex," and thus rejecting sexual harassment claims of
male and female plaintiffs who were each subjected to gender-specific degradation that "would not have occurred
'but for' the sex of each plaintiff," and that demeaned each plaintiff in a gender-specific manner based on each
plaintiff's individual gender-related traits).
402. See supra Part IlI.B (discussing concepts of sex and sex-based causation implicit in Oncale's dicta).
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aspects of an individual's projected and perceived sex- and gender-based
identity, these doctrines recognize the sex-based nature of a broad range of
interactions that are influenced in various ways by aspects of a person's sex.
1. Doctrines of Sex-Based Causation
The notions of sex and sex-based conduct that have emerged in Title VII
cases brought by women reflect a broader, more flexible construction of the
"because of. . .sex" requirement than the biologically centered formulation
implicit in much of the same-sex jurisprudence. This broader construction
transcends the focus on the plaintiff's status as a biological male or biological
female to recognize the sex-based nature of diverse forms of conduct that are
based on any aspect of the plaintiffs projected and perceived sex or gender
identity or on gender-stereotyped expectations imposed upon the plaintiff. The
broader Title VII jurisprudence has conceived of "sex" expansively as a
complex, multifaceted notion embracing an array of individual sex- or gender-
related attributes that, alone or in conjunction with other factors, defme the
identity and image that the plaintiff projects in the workplace. Based on this
broader, more flexible conception of an individual's "sex" and the myriad ways
in which it affects his or her status in relation to others, the courts have
recognized the actionable sex-based nature of a broad range of actions that are
motivated in some respect by these aspects of an individual's sex-related
identity. In these cases, the acts have been held to constitute actionable sex-
based conduct regardless of whether they implicate only the plaintiff as an
individual, a distinct subset of the plaintiffs biological sex, or the plaintiffs
entire biological sex.
Courts have long recognized that Title VII's reference to conduct based on
an individual's "sex" is, in essence, a reference to conduct based on the
individual's gender identity, because gender identity encompasses the socially
constructed and socially relevant aspects of an individual's sex.4"3 Accordingly,
the courts have recognized that conduct based on gender-stereotyped
perceptions of the plaintiff is, in effect, conduct based on the plaintiffs sex
within the meaning of Title VII. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,4" for
instance, the Supreme Court found that the employer had impermissibly
discriminated on the basis of "sex" when it "acted on the basis of gender" by
penalizing the plaintiff for failing to walk, talk, dress and groom herself "more
femininely."4 5 And in the context of sexual harassment, no less than in other
403. Many courts have, in fact, used the word "gender" interchangeably with the word "sex" in their
analyses under Title VII. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 n.1 (4th Cir. 1996)
(citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-41 (1989), and noting that the Supreme Court has used
the terms "sex" and "gender" interchangeably); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir.
1979); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977); Schoiber v. Emro Mktg. Co., 941
F. Supp. 730, 734 (N.D. flU. 1996); Dobre v. National RR. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 286 (E.D. Pa.
1993). For a discussion of the distinctions between sex and gender, see infra notes 446-448 and accompanying
text.
404. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
405. Id. at 235,240.
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areas of Title VII jurisprudence, the courts have consistently recognized that
harassment based on gender-stereotyped notions of how an individual should
appear and behave constitutes harassment based on that individual's sex."
Moreover, because Title VII's expansive "because of. . . sex" language
contains no restrictions as to the precise causal role a person's sex must play in
prompting the challenged conduct, courts have construed this requirement
broadly to encompass any conduct treating the plaintiff "in a manner that but
for that person's sex would be different."4°7 Under this broad, "but for"
conception of sex-based causation, which is well entrenched in the Title VII
jurisprudence, the target's sex need not be the sole, exclusive, or even
predominant motivating factor, as long as the challenged conduct was, in some
respect, founded "upon sex-based considerations. '40 8 In the context of sexual
harassment, courts have applied these principles to recognize the sex-based
nature of conduct that invokes gender stereotypes, gender-based epithets, and
gender-laden images of sexual subordination to demean the target in a gender-
specific manner.0 9 Significantly, courts have found these indicia of the gender-
based nature of the conduct sufficient to satisfy Title VII's sex-based causation
requirement, even where other, facially gender-neutral factors, such as
interpersonal conflicts4t0 or bias against other aspects of the target's identity
also play a significant causal role in prompting the harassment.41'
The courts' response to discrimination claims brought by women of color is
particularly instructive. Some courts initially rejected discrimination claims
brought by black women on the grounds that the challenged conduct was not
actionable sex discrimination because it was not directed at white women, and
yet was not actionable race discrimination because it was not directed at black
406. See supra Part I.B.2 (analyzing cases recognizing actionable sex-based nature of harassment that is
directed at individuals based on their failure to conform to gender stereotypes).
407. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978); accord Andrews
v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that requisite sex-based causation is
established where: (1) gender was a substantial factor in motivating the conduct; and (2) the conduct would not
have occurred if the plaintiff were a man); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that
"[b]ut for her womanhood" the conduct "would never have" occurred).
408. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,242 (1989).
409. See supra Part I.B-C.
410. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 999 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing actionable
sex-based harassment based on gender-specific epithets, despite motivation of "jealousy, dislike of plaintiff, and
anger at the perceived preferential treatment plaintiff received" from management); Allen v. Miami County, No.
95-1149-JTM, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15648, at *16-17 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 1997) (finding hostile work
environment based on gender-laden nature of the conduct despite harrasser's gender-neutral hostility toward
plaintiff for having lied to him); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1196 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (applying Title VII analysis under Title IX and holding that gender-laden derogatory epithets and references
to plaintiff's sexuality created issue of fact as to sex-based causation although harassment was prompted by
plaintiff's decision to report harassers' misconduct to authorities); Sedillos v. O'Leary, App. No. 01951256, 1996
WL 562492, at *9 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 26, 1996) (recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment claim where
defendant targeted plaintiffs for sexual harassment based on their economic class and education level).
411. See, e.g., Shull v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8552, 1997 WL 289460, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1997)
(recognizing proscribed sex-based nature of conduct alleged to be based on sex, religion, and age discrimination);
Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., 923 F. Supp. 720, 720 (D. Md. 1996) (analyzing allegations of sex
and disability discrimination); Newman v. Crowell, App. No. 01941973, 1996 WL 421985, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July
19, 1996) (addressing claims of sex and age discrimination).
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men.4 2 Subsequently, however, the courts began to recognize the fallacy of this
reasoning predicating a plaintiffs right to challenge sex- or race-based conduct
on the irrelevant fact of whether the conduct also affected other members of the
plaintiffs sex or race. Accordingly, these courts acknowledged that the
plaintiffs sex, albeit in conjunction with other factors, played a causal role in
prompting the conduct, bringing the conduct within the purview of Title VII's
"because of... sex" language regardless of whether the plaintiffs female sex
was the sole cause of the conduct, regardless of whether her sex became a basis
for hostility only when combined with other aspects of her identity, and
regardless of whether the conduct was directed at any other members of the
female sex.413
In a similar line of cases, the courts have recognized a "sex-plus" theory of
sex discrimination, which acknowledges the sex-based nature of conduct that is
directed only at certain individual members of one sex, based on an individual
attribute that would not elicit the same negative perceptions when exhibited by
members of the other sex. These cases thus recognize the sex-based nature of
conduct that affects a sub-class within the male or female biological sex based
upon factors that are distinct from the plaintiffs biological sex, but that become
a basis for adverse treatment in light of the plaintiffs biological sex.414 In
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., for instance, the Supreme Court found that
an employer's refusal to hire women with young children while hiring men with
young children constituted sex discrimination. Although the employer had no
bias against women in general, as evidenced by the fact that over seventy-five
percent of the employees hired for the position in question were women, the
Court recognized that the adverse treatment was nonetheless based on sex,
because it affected particular women by virtue of gender-based expectations
and assumptions regarding the role of women in childrearing that were not
imposed upon similarly situated men.4"5 Thus, although the policy did not affect
412. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (rejecting sex and
race discrimination claims brought under Title VII by five black women on grounds that conduct was not
actionable because it was not directed against all women or all blacks), aff'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d
480 (8th Cir. 1977); see generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CH.
LEGAL F. 139 (discussing DeGraffenreid as an example of the need to address the intersection of race and sex
discrimination).
413. See, e.g., Lam v. University of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing a viable Title
VII claim challenging conduct based in part on sex and in part on race); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d
1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (recognizing hostile environment claim based on "aggregate evidence of racial
hostility with evidence of sexual hostility"); Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025
(5th Cir. 1980) (upholding sex discrimination claim where harassment was based in part on race); Arnett v. Aspin,
846 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-39 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (recognizing Title VII claim for "sex-plus-age" discrimination); see
generally Rosalio Castro & Lucia Corral, Comment, Women of Color and Employment Discrimination: Race and
Gender Combined in Tie VII Claims, 6 LA RAZA LJ. 159, 169 (1993) (advocating relief for women of color who
are discriminated against because of their sex and race, even though "employer[s] treat[ ] other members of [their]
larger class more favorably"); Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1467, 1472 (1992) (discussing "the intersections of racism and sexism" in defining treatment of women of color).
414. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
415. See id. at 543. The Court, after finding that the employer's policy gave rise to aprimafacie case of sex
discrimnation, remanded the case for further proceedings as to whether the policy was legally justified in
distinguishing between men and women based on their differing family obligations. See id. at 544. In a separate
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women in general, as a biological sex, it nonetheless fell within Title VII's
"because of. . . sex" language because it affected particular women for reasons
related to their gender and others' gender-based perceptions of them.
Likewise, in subsequent cases, the courts have recognized numerous forms
of actionable sex-based discrimination where the adverse actions affected only
certain women who were singled out based on separate, additional attributes
such as pregnancy, 416 fertility,4 17 or marital status.418 In each of these instances,
the challenged conduct was not directed at women in general, and was not
directed toward particular women because of their biological status as females
per se, but rather was directed only at a subset of women who exhibited
particular attributes. Although the conduct was prompted most directly by
attributes that were distinct from the plaintiffs' status as women, the courts
nonetheless recognized that the conduct was based on the women's sex,
because the other attributes assumed their significance to the employer and
became a basis for adverse treatment in the workplace only in light of gender-
based norms regarding women's maternal and domestic roles. Similarly, in the
specific context of hostile environment sexual harassment, the courts have not
required evidence of hostility toward women as a biological sex, but rather have
recognized the actionable sex-based nature of conduct that was targeted at a
distinct subset of women, such as those who "were vulnerable because of
marital problems and financial dependency on their jobs." 9
Thus, outside of the same-sex sexual harassment context, the "because of
sex" analysis does not turn on a rigid or mechanistic inquiry into whether the
conduct is targeted at "males" or "females" as a distinct biological sex, or
whether the conduct is targeted at an individual solely because of his or her
biological identity as a male or female. Rather, the sex-based causation analysis
entails a more complex, individualized inquiry into whether the challenged
conduct is directed at an individual for reasons arising from his or her sex or
gender identity and the gender stereotypes and expectations associated
therewith. Implicit in this significant body of Title VII jurisprudence is a notion
of sex, not as a function of the plaintiffs membership in one of two biological
classes, but rather as an attribute of the plaintiff as an individual that, like the
plaintiffs other individual attributes, affects his or her interactions with others.
Under this conception of a plaintiffs sex, the plaintiff is subjected to improper
conduct "because of sex" whenever this aspect of the plaintiffs identity,
whether alone or in conjunction with other attributes, plays a causal role in
prompting the adverse treatment.
concurrence, Justice Marshall criticized the majority for reverting to such "ancient canards about the proper role of
women." Id. at 545 (Marshall J., concurring).
416. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
417. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
418. See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1433-34 (2d Cir. 1995), reh 'g en banc granted on
other grounds, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997), and cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 851 (1998); Bryant v. International Schs.
Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 573 n.18 (3d Cir. 1982); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1197-98 (7th
Cir. 1971).
419. Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599,602 (7th Cir. 1985).
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In accordance with these broad, flexible doctrines of sex-based causation,
the gender-stereotyping and sexually subordinating harassment that
characterizes so many same-sex sexual harassment cases constitutes actionable
conduct that occurs "because of' the target's "sex." Such conduct penalizes
certain males for failing to conform to gender-based norms of appropriate
appearance, demeanor, and sexual expression,"2 and for exhibiting traits such
as sexual inexperience,42" ' shyness, prudery, or distaste for sexual vulgarity that
do not elicit the same adverse reactions when exhibited by women.422 Because
these traits assume their significance to the perpetrators only in light of the
target's sex and the gender-based expectations that flow therefrom, the target's
sex plays a but-for causal role in prompting the adverse treatment and in
determining its gender-specific content.
Under this well-established sex-based causation analysis, the "but for"
causal role of the plaintiffs sex establishes the requisite sex-based causal nexus
and ends the inquiry, regardless of whether other factors, such as the plaintiffs
mental impairments,"' social unpopularity, or sexual orientation, also
played a concurrent causal role, and regardless of whether the conduct affects
other members of the plaintiffs biological sex.426 Because Oncale does not set
aside any of these doctrines guiding the sex-based causation analysis, a proper
adjudication of sex-based causation issues in the context of same-sex sexual
harassment claims must be founded on a rigorous application of these doctrines
to the facts of the case. Although Oncale's dicta uncritically revert to the more
constrained conceptions of sex-based causation implicit in many same-sex
sexual harassment cases,"' courts must resist the tendency to do the same, 42 8
and must ensure that they adjudicate such claims in a manner that comports
with established standards under Title VII.
420. See supra Part I.B.
421. See, e.g., Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1453 (N.D. I. 1988) (plaintiff was sexually
inexperienced); Zalewski v. Overlook Hasp., 692 A.2d 131, 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (plaintiff was
harassed in part because he was believed to be a virgin).
422. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1193-96 (4th Cir. 1996)
(plaintiff was perceived as shy and prudish and had a learning disability); Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.,
825 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (plaintiff was harassed by co-workers because he wouldn't "engage in
their dirty conversations" and "complained of [their] use of profanity" as well as because co-workers were jealous
of the plaintiff's union status and resentful of his complaints).
423. See, e.g., Ward v. Ridley Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 810, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1996), af'd, 124 F.3d 189 (3d
Cir. 1997); McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193.
424. See, e.g., Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d 1372, 1374-75 (8th Cir. 1996); Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001;
Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,566-67 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
425. See, e.g., Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Dillon v.
Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992).
426. See supra notes 408-419 and accompanying text (discussing principles of sex-based causation that
recognize sex-based nature of conduct based on sex-related traits or gender-based perceptions either alone or in
combination with other factors).
427. See supra Part H.A.1-3. (discussing pre-Oncale cases rejecting same-sex sexual harassment claims on
various grounds even where aspects of the target's sex played a but-for causal role in bringing about the
harassment); supra Part II.B (discussing biologically centered, gender-monolithic conceptions of sex and sex-
based causation implicit in Oncale's dicta).
428. Cf supra notes 388, 401 (discussing post-Oncale cases applying unduly constrained conceptions of
sex-based causation).
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2. Principles of Consistent Application
While the foregoing Title VII doctrines establish broad, flexible standards
for assessing the sex-based nature of challenged conduct, equally well-
established Title VII principles mandate that the same broad, flexible standards
that have emerged in cases brought by women must be applied in the same-sex
sexual harassment context. According to these principles, the standards for
adjudicating Title VII issues must be applied consistently, and must not be
altered in light of the fact that the plaintiff is male or that the harasser and the
target share the same biological sex. The courts have been strident in ensuring
that Title VII's protections extend not only to members of groups traditionally
victimized by employment discrimination, but also to members of groups that
have traditionally dominated the employment market. Thus, the courts have
afforded male plaintiffs the same protection under Title VII as female plaintiffs,
much as they have afforded white plaintiffs the same rights under Title VII as
members of minority races.42 9 In accordance with these precepts, sexual
harassment doctrines have developed in a gender-neutral manner to ensure that
male targets of such conduct receive the same statutory protection as female
targets of comparable conduct.430 The Oncale Court acknowledged these
429. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983) (holding that
Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination protects men as well as women); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) (stating that Title VII's coverage is "not limited to discrimination against
members of any particular race"); Notari v. Denver Water Dep't, 971 F.2d 585, 588 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Title V's
protection is not limited to those individuals who are members of historically or socially disfavored groups.");
Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Title VII prohibits discrimination against white
males upon the same standards that it prohibits discrimination against members of a racial minority."). The
legislative history of Title VII, although sparse on issues of gender, reflects this intent to protect men to the same
extent as women, and to afford all persons, including men and women of all races, equal opportunities in the
employment market. When asked whether the proposed legislation would protect men as well as women and
whites as well as members of minority races, the chairman of the judiciary committee responded that the statute
would cover "white men and white women and all Americans" in addition to members of historically
disadvantaged groups. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964).
430. The EEOC Compliance Manual instructs "[a] man as well as a woman may be the victim of sexual
harassment," and that "a woman as well as a man may be the harasser." EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 615.2(bX1)
(1981). The Supreme Court has recognized that sexual harassment can be debilitating to men as well as women in
its gender-neutral pronouncement that, "[s]urely, a requirement that a man or a woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets." Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986) (citing
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)). Numerous other courts have noted these principles of
gender-neutrality in their analyses of sexual harassment doctrine. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112
F.3d 1503, 1505 (11 th Cir. 1997) (holding, in sexual harassment case, that "[t]he obvious Congressional focus on
discrimination against women has not precluded the courts from extending the protections of Title VII to men.");
Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1409 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (stating, in context of sexual harassment
claims, that "[t]he statutory language of Title VII is non-exclusive and protects all employees from gender
discrimination inflicted by an 'employer"), aftd, 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997); Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick,
GMC, Inc., 930 F. Supp. 393, 400 (D. Minn. 1996) ("Mhe language [of Title VII] is gender neutral."); Peric v.
Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., No. 96 C 2354, 1996 WL 515175, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1996) ("The statute is
clearly worded in gender neutral terms, and no legislative history exists to contradict a gender neutral reading.").
The standards for analyzing the offensiveness of sexually harassing conduct are also framed in gender-neutral
terms. See Hams v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (holding that hostile environment sexual harassment
is actionable only when it renders the environment hostile or abusive from the perspective of a "reasonable
person"); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that "where male employees allege
that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment, the appropriate victim's perspective
would be that of a reasonable man").
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principles as a basis for recognizing a cause of action for male targets of sexual
harassment. 3 ' The same principles dictate that male plaintiffs be afforded the
same opportunity as their female counterparts not only to state a claim
challenging hostile or abusive conduct, but also to prove the requisite sex-based
nature of that conduct under the same statutory standards of sex-based
causation. It is firmly established that harassment directed at women that is
based on gender stereotypes and that exploits gender-based vulnerabilities to
sexual domination constitutes actionable harassment "because of sex., 43 2
Accordingly, in order to achieve the parity of protection that Title VII seeks to
guarantee to male and female plaintiffs, such forms of gender subordination
must be recognized as actionable sex-based harassment when directed at males
as well as when directed at females.
Moreover, a distinct set of Title VII principles dictates that, just as the male
identity of the plaintiff does not alter the broad definitions of sex-based
causation, nor does the male identity of the perpetrator. The courts have refused
to restrict a plaintiff's right of action under Title VII based on the identity of the
perpetrator or the fact that the perpetrator and the plaintiff belong to the same
protected class.433 Rather, the courts have recognized that, "[b]ecause of the
many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume that human
beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of
that group. 434 While the Oncale Court recited this principle as a basis for
concluding that male targets of sexual harassment should not be denied a cause
of action simply because the perpetrator was also male,4 35 the same logic
dictates that male plaintiffs should not be denied the opportunity to prove the
sex-based nature of the conduct, in accordance with established statutory
standards, simply because the perpetrator was also male. Pursuant to this logic,
conduct that invokes gender-based stereotypes and exploits gender-based
vulnerabilities is no less likely to be motivated by some aspect of the target's"sex" when it is perpetrated by someone of the same biological sex than when it
431. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 669).
432. See supra Part LB-C.
433. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (analyzing sex discrimination claim
brought by male plaintiff contending that his sex played a role in his male supervisor's decision to favor a female
candidate).
434. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977). Based on its recognition that people are fully capable
of discriminating against others based on traits which they might in some respects share, the Castaneda court
rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race. See
also Hill v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that black persons
can discriminate on the basis of race against other black persons); Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks &
Recreation Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 199, 206 (N.D. hid. 1992) (recognizing a cause of action for intra-race
discrimination and instructing that the trier of fact must focus not on physiognomic characteristics, but rather on
whether the perpetrator discriminated against the plaintiff based on a protected identity trait); Veatch v.
Northwestern Mem'l Hosp., 730 F. Supp. 809, 817 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that "[t]he fact that a woman fired a
woman or a black fired another black does not demonstrate that the supervisor's decision was free of the racial and
gender stereotyping that federal law attempts to remove from employers' decision making"); Walker v. Secretary
of Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (recognizing cause of action for race-based discrimination
perpetrated against member of plaintiff's own race); Jordan v. Wilson, 649 F. Supp. 1038, 1059 n.15 (M.D. Ala.
1986) ("This court would have to be truly naive to assume that women cannot sexually discriminate against
women and that many women do not harbor stereotypical, limited views of themselves.").
435. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03 (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 616, and Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 499).
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is perpetrated by someone of the opposite biological sex. Thus, these Title VII
principles compel recognition of the fact that males are fully capable of
harboring and acting upon gender-based preconceptions about other males, and
preclude courts from properly imposing stricter standards of proof for sex-based
causation than they would in opposite-sex cases either because the target is
male or because the challenged conduct occurred between members of the same
biological sex.
3. Purposes of Title VII
The statutory language and legislative history of Title VII lend further
support to a construction of Title VII's "because of... sex" requirement that
will encompass all patterns of subordination and exclusion that are based on an
individual's sex- and gender-related traits. The statutory language proscribing
discrimination based on an individual's sex contains no restrictions, and thus,
on its face, embraces any conduct that is based, to any degree, on any aspect of
the plaintiffs sex. Moreover, established rules of statutory construction
command that remedial statutes such as Title VII are to be construed broadly.436
These rules support the application, in the same-sex sexual harassment context,
of the broad formulations of sex and sex-based causation that have developed in
other contexts.
Although there is little legislative history to guide the courts in adjudicating
issues of sex-based discrimination under Title VII,4 37 the sparse legislative
history that does exist reveals an intent to redress patterns of sex segregation in
the employment market.4 3' As discussed above, the forms of gender
stereotyping and sexual subordination at issue in many male-on-male sexual
harassment cases perpetuate workplace gender hierarchies and preserve the
masculinization of certain sectors of employment.439 Thus, such conduct, which
requires individuals to conform to certain gender-defined expectations in order
to be accepted as an equal in certain jobs, implicates this central concern
undergirding Title VIl's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.
Likewise, in a more general sense, the legislative history of Title VII
reflects an intent to remove arbitrary barriers and ensure that all individuals are
afforded an opportunity to compete in the employment market based on their
436. See Miller v. Vesta, 946 F. Supp. 697, 702 (E.D. Wis. 1996) ("It is not the court's role to limit the
protections Congress conferred by selecting broad and general language."); accord EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982); Quijano v. University Fed. Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129, 131
(5th Cir. 1980); Hart v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979); Craig v. Department of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, 581 F.2d 189, 193 (8th Cir. 1978); Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Davis v.
Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975); Hauck v. Xerox Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1340, 1349 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aft'd, 649 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1981).
437. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
438. See 110 CONG. REC. 2579-81 (1964) (statements of Reps. Griffith and St. George); see also Schultz,
supra note 36, at 1758-59 & n.403 (discussing legislative history expressing an intent to remedy problem of sex
segregation in labor market).
439. See supra Part II.B.
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competence as workers rather than on their protected identity traits.440 The
practice of same-sex sexual harassment consistently targets individuals for
adverse treatment based on their protected gender-related traits rather than on
their performance as employees, often driving the target out of the workplace
because of the harassers' conceptions of the appropriate gender identity of
persons in that occupation." Same-sex sexual harassment, therefore, by
reinforcing the gendered character of certain sectors of the employment market,
undermines the merit-based equal employment opportunity objectives that Title
VII seeks to advance." 2 Accordingly, the statutory language and legislative
history lend further support to a broad construction of Title VII's sex-based
causation requirement that encompasses all forms of adverse conduct directed
at individuals because of the sex- and gender-related aspects of their individual
identities.
Because Oncale's dicta reflect a rigid, biologically dualistic notion of sex
that fails to countenance the powerful patterns of gender-based stereotyping and
subordination that occur among members of the same biological sex, some
observers have inferred from Oncale's conspicuous silence regarding such
conduct an implicit rejection of broader theories of sex-based causation founded
on gender-stereotyping and gender-subordinating conduct." 3 However, nothing
in Oncale's dicta purports to abrogate or supplant the significant body of
jurisprudential and legislative authority for a broad, flexible definition of sex
and sex-based causation that would encompass patterns of gender-based
subordination among individuals of the same biological sex. Accordingly,
courts addressing claims of same-sex sexual harassment must ensure that they
do not uncritically revert to the unduly constrained conceptions of sex that have
emerged in the prior same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence and persisted in
Oncale. Instead, they must adjudicate questions of sex-based causation in
accordance with established Title VII principles that recognize the sex-based
nature of a range of conduct that is motivated in whole or in part by an
individual's sex- and gender-related attributes.
440. See Schultz, supra note 36, at 1796 ("From the beginning, the central purpose of [Title VIl's]
prohibition on sex discrimination has been to enable everyone-regardless of their identities as men or women, or
their personae as masculine or feminine--to pursue their chosen endeavors on equal... terms.").441. As Justice O'Connor observed in Harris v. Forkli Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993), a
"discriminatorily abusive work environment... can and often will detract from employees' job performance,
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing their careers." A striking number
of same-sex sexual harassment cases bear out this observation. See, e.g., Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002 (plaintiff quit
his job following constant threats of rape and incidents of sexual assault); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563,
566 (7th Cir. 1997) (plaintiffs quit jobs at which they were subjected to campaign of gender-based epithets,
threatened rape, and physical assault), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998); McWilliams v. Fairfax
County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff developed "severe emotional problems"
that required him to leave his job following campaign of sexual epithets, threats, and assaults); Martin v. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044, 1048 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (plaintiff left job on medical leave and never returned
following constant taunting and sexual threats and assaults including attempt to penetrate his anus with a broom
handle).
442. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1987) (describing Title VII's objective of
"break[ing] down old patterns of [workplace] segregation and hierarchy"); see also supra Part II.B (discussing role
of same-sex sexual harassment in perpetuating workplace gender segregation and hierarchies).
443. See supra notes 388, 401 and accompanying text.
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B. Contemporary Understandings of "Sex: "Recognizing the
Limits of Biological Determinism
As discussed above, Title VII is drafted broadly to proscribe all adverse
employment actions that occur "because of' the plaintiff's "sex." As is
appropriate in the context of a remedial statute, the courts have construed these
terms expansively to encompass all forms of conduct that are based on any
aspect of the plaintiff's sex or gender identity. 4 The following discussion turns
from the judicial and legislative formulations of sex to the social and
sociological significance of "sex," and demonstrates that the term is widely
understood to encompass numerous distinct but interrelated aspects of an
individual's identity. These aspects include chromosomal composition, genital
configuration, secondary physical sex characteristics and projected and
perceived gender traits derived from gendered standards of appearance,
comportment and demeanor, as well as aspects of the individual's projected
sexuality and sexual expression. The multi-dimensional nature of the
phenomenon of sex and the complex ways in which it affects an individual's
identity and interactions with others further underscore the inadequacy of the
constrained, biologically-centered conception of sex implicit in many same-sex
harassment cases and reflected uncritically in Oncale.
The concept of "sex" is complex, multi-faceted, and in many respects
ambiguous, encompassing notions of an individual's biological sex (male or
female), core gender identity (woman or man), gender role identity (feminine or
masculine), and sexual expression or behavior." 5 As a biological classification,
sex (male or female) generally denotes "the physical attributes of bodies,
specifically the external genitalia." Gender (masculinity and femininity), on
the other hand, is culturally and socially constructed and consists primarily of
the "expressions" of a person's gender inherent in his or her adherence to
behavioral norms such as standards of dress, demeanor, and conduct typically
associated with masculinity or femininity." 7 Thus, gender is used to "describe
personality attributes and socio-sexual roles that society understands to be'masculine' or 'feminine' and that society ascribes on the basis of sex." 8
Because of the history of male domination in many sectors of the
employment market, many attributes stereotypically associated with
masculinity have come to be associated with valuable, capable workers, while
the attributes stereotypically associated with femininity have come to be
444. See supra Part IV.A.1.
445. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination: The Disaggregation of Sex
From Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7(1995).
446. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender & Sexual
Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 170 (1996).
447. See JuDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 25 (1990) ("There is no gender identity behind the expressions
of gender, that identity is perfornatively constituted by the very expressions that are said to be its results.").
448. Id.
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perceived as inconsistent with occupational proficiency." 9 Thus, stereotypically
masculine attributes such as physical strength, assertiveness, and sexual
aggressiveness have come to be associated with power and dominance in the
workplace, while stereotypically feminine qualities such as physical frailty,
passivity, and sexual submissiveness have become signifiers of powerlessness
and marginalization in the workplace.45 °
The powerful associations that have historically existed between biological
sex, gender attributes, and allocations of power and privilege have led to a
conflation of these distinct phenomena of sex, gender, and power, and a
tendency to polarize notions of gender and power into simplistic conceptions of
masculine power and feminine powerlessness, which are presumed to exist in
binary opposition to one another as corollaries of the male-female dichotomy of
449. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text. There is significant literature on the characteristics
stereotypically associated with men and with women. See Case, supra note 6, at 12-13 ("Among the adjectives
conventionally coded masculine are 'aggressive,' 'ambitious,' 'analytical,' 'assertive,' 'athletic,' 'competitive,'
'dominant,' 'forceful,' 'independent,' 'individualistic,' 'self-reliant,' 'self-sufficient,' and 'strong,' while
characteristics conventionally gendered feminine include being 'understanding,' 'warm,' 'able to devote oneself
completely to others,' 'gentle,' 'helpful to others,' 'kind,' and 'aware of others' feelings."); Craig, supra note 11,
at 106, 112 (qualities such as passivity or sensitivity are generally considered feminine, while power and
dominance are usually considered masculine traits); Law, supra note 254, at 208 ("Traditional concepts of gender
cast man as strong, woman as subservient; man as not responsible for family care, woman as nurturant; man as
sexually aggressive, and woman as passive victim, whether virgin or whore."); and Valdes, supra note 446, at 179
(discussing the Greek and Euro-American origins of the active/passive gender paradigm and explaining that:
'male' was viewed as socially and sexually 'active'-the strong, public, self-willed master of the universe; in
contrast, 'female' was constructed as 'passive'-the male's weak, volatile companion, whom he managed and
protected for the benefit of all").
The Oakland Men's Project, a non-profit organization devoted to community education about issues of male
violence, sexism, racism, and homophobia, conducts workshops where they ask young people what it means to be
a man or a woman. Robert Allen reports that the children consistently express the same set of expectations about
how men and women should behave:
Men are expected to be in control, tough, aggressive, independent, competitive, and emotionally
unexpressive (with the exception of anger and sexual desire, which are allowable emotions for men).
Women, on the other hand, are expected to be polite, dependent, emotional, and sexy, to take care of
others, and not to be too smart or pushy.
RACE, GENDER, AND POWER IN AMERICA, supra note 99, at 131. When asked about the messages they get about
appropriate behavior from their role models, the boys said things like: "A man is tough. A man is in control. A
man doesn't cry. It's okay for a man to yell at someone. A man can take it. A man is responsible. A man is
competent A man doesn't take crap from anyone else." Id. at 132. Regarding expectations of female behavior the
young people say things like: "A girl should be polite and clean, she shouldn't argue, she's pretty, she doesn't fight
or act too smart, she helps others, she's emotional." Id. at 133.
450. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text; see also Case, supra note 6, at 12; Craig, supra note
11, at 106, 112; Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1280 (1987) (noting
that "those things culturally identified as 'male' are more highly valued than those identified as 'female,' even
when they appear to have little or nothing to do with either biological sex"); Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on
Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1178 (1988) (noting that perceptions of successful professionals
diverge significantly from perceptions of women). A study of American women working in professional fields
such as medicine, college teaching, scientific research and psychiatric social work at the turn of the century, for
example, describes successful professionals of the time "not only as being 'objective, competitive, individualistic
and predictable' but also as being 'scornful of nurturant, expressive and familial styles of personal interaction."'
Celia Davies, The Sociology of Professions and the Profession of Gender, 30 BRIT. SOC. ASS'N PUBLICATION LTD.
661 (Nov. 1, 1996); see also Law, supra note 254, at 209 ("The prevailing social meaning attached to gender
systematically denies the value of traditional women's work.").
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biological sex.45' Because of the traditionally close correlations between sex,
gender, and power, biological sex has been used as a proxy for an individual's
workplace gender identity and resulting status in terms of workplace gender
hierarchies.452 Thus, in many circumstances, issues of gender and power have
been conceptualized in accordance with the male-female biological dichotomy.
However, this polarized, binary conception of gender-based attributes and
power dynamics obscures the reality that individual men are distributed across a
broad spectrum in terms of the degree to which they exhibit traditional
signifiers of masculinity such as aggressiveness, physical strength, and sexual
dominance. Individual men are thus also distributed across a broad spectrum in
terms of their status on the workplace gender hierarchies that allocate power
according to images of masculinity.453 Accordingly, although two males may
share the same biological sex identity in terms of chromosomal composition
and genital configuration, they may be situated quite differently from one
another in terms of their gender-derived projected and perceived sex identities
and the power relations that result therefrom. In these circumstances, a gender-
centered analysis of their sex identities will expose numerous gender-based
distinctions and resulting power differentials between these two males, while a
biologically-centered analysis will obscure these potent gender-based power
dynamics."'
451. See DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OFNATURE 138 (1991)
(noting that hierarchical social relation of sexual difference gives men ideological, political and economic power
over women); Davies, supra note 450 ("There is a focus on gender relations as power relations that take a binary
form, a form in which women (or rather the qualities that women represent) are constructed as 'devalued other,' as
carriers of qualities that thereby remain unacknowledged and denied."); Valdes, supra note 446, at 170 (arguing
that our society has bifurcated personhood into "male" and "female" components, polarizing these male/female
ideals into "mutually exclusive or even opposing identity composites").
452. See PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTUCnON OF REALITY: A TREATISE
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 48-74 (1967). The conflation of sex and gender has historically and popularly
been accepted as a truism: "[P]ersons born with penises are supposed to exhibit a particular social personality and
persons born with vaginas another, if not, they are disclaimed as 'sissies' or 'tomboys."' Valdes, supra note 446, at
166. While divergence from gender-defined norms ascribed to one's biological sex creates problems for both
males and females, studies reveal greater social intolerance for feminine traits in males than for masculine traits in
females. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Zucker et al., Sex Differences in Referral Rates of Children with Gender Identity
Disorder: Some Hypotheses, 25 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 217, 221 (1997). Because these dynamics operate
more powerfully among males and have given rise to more disputes in the same-sex sexual harassment
jurisprudence, this discussion focuses on gender distinctions and hierarchies among males.
453. See generally Koppelman, supra note 8, at 234-35 (discussing distinctions between males that underlie
"rankings of masculinity," and that are used to distinguish "between males who are 'real men' and have power
and males who are not" (quoting Joseph Pleck, Men's Power with Women, Other Men, and Society: A Men's
Movement Analysis, in THE AMERICAN MAN 417,424 (Elizabeth L. Pleck & Joseph Pleck eds., 1980))); Valdes,
supra note 446, at 169-70 (discussing "hetero-patriarchal categories and hierarchies that privilege masculine,
heterosexual men and subordinate all other sex/gender types"). See also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing masculinity-
driven power hierarchies in the workplace).
454. In assuming that all members of the male biological sex and all members of the female biological
sex are similarly situated, the courts also implicitly assume that there is a clearly discernible line between
biological males and biological females. This assumption is called into question by the increasing presence of
transgendered people for whom:
one's sense of being a man or woman has no relation to the anatomical characteristics that label
her as male or female.... The sex of a transgendered person is only partially based upon [the]
genitals; the rest is a sometimes strange admixture of complementary and competing
The Myth of the Gender Monolith
Same-sex sexual harassment often occurs in instances where an individual's
gendered attributes diverge from the qualities typically expected from members
of the plaintiff's biological sex, giving rise to a gender-based power differential
between two members of the same biological sex. 55 In these circumstances, the
individual's outwardly projected and perceived characteristics converge to
produce the gender identity that, in turn, determines the treatment he receives in
the workplace. It is the individual's gender-related attributes that relegate him to
a position of lesser masculinity, and therefore lesser power, despite his
biologically male chromosomal composition and genital configuration. In terms
of workplace power dynamics, the gender-based aspects of his sex identity
assume a significance that far surpasses that of his biological sex identity, as
demonstrated by the fact that his male chromosomal and genital attributes are
powerless to elevate him to a status equal to that of his harassers who
marginalize and demean him on the basis of deficiencies in his projected and
perceived masculinity.456
Accordingly, a focus on biological sex ignores the aspects of "sex" that, in
many instances, most powerfully and directly determine a person's identity,
status, and treatment in the workplace. By emphasizing the fact that both the
harasser and the target share male biological traits, courts erroneously equate
biological maleness with privileged workplace gender status. In doing so, they
effectively presume gender to be a monolithic notion coterminous with
biological sex, thus obscuring the reality that the harasser and the target occupy
markedly divergent positions on the workplace gender hierarchies by virtue of
their differing projections of the stereotypically masculine traits that, often more
directly than simple biology, signify power and privilege in the workplace.457
When harassers subordinate targets based on their projection of
stereotypically feminine traits or their failed projection of stereotypically
masculine traits, they perpetuate and reinforce the gender-suffused power
dynamics underlying patterns of sex-based exclusion in employment, and they
subject specific individuals to unfavorable conditions of employment based on
aspects of their sex identities. By formulating notions of "sex" in a manner that
focuses myopically on biological status, courts arbitrarily exclude the aspects of
anatomical secondary physical characteristics, behaviors, life histories, psychological
presumptions, and stereotypes.
Kristine W. Holt, Reevaluating Holloway: Title VII, Equal Protection, and the Evolution of a Transgender
Jurisprudence, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 283, 296, 301 (1997). While an exploration of the implications of transgendered
identity in the context of sex discrimination doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note
that the courts' uncritical reliance on simplistic notions of "sex" will become increasingly problematic as courts
attempt to apply their conceptions of "sex" to persons who do not fit into the courts' restrictive dichotomies and
whose legal 'sex' may be the subject of some controversy. Compare, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832
(Ohio Probate Ct. 1987) (holding that male-to-female transsexual was still considered male under Ohio law) with
M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 208-09 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that male-to-female transsexual was
considered female under New Jersey law).
455. See supra Part I.B (discussing forms of harassment and subordination directed at men who exhibit
stereotypically feminine traits or who fail to exhibit appropriately masculine demeanor and sexual expression).
456. See supra Part II.B (analyzing instances of harassment based on differences in projected and perceived
masculinity).
457. See supra note 453 and accompanying text (discussing masculinity-based hierarchies among males).
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sex identity that are most relevant to Title VII. Thus, when courts predicate
their sex-based causation analysis on biologically centered notions of sex, they
arbitrarily exclude from the definition of sex-based conduct acts that are not
based solely and directly on biological sex, but that nonetheless are inextricably
intertwined with biological sex because they penalize the male target for failing
to satisfy gender-based expectations that are imposed upon him only because of
his male biological sex.458
Only by viewing all males monolithically, as presumed equals in the
workplace based on their shared biological traits, and thereby obscuring the
otherwise apparent gender-based distinctions among them, can the courts hold
that conduct that exploits gender-based distinctions and vulnerabilities is not
based on essential aspects of the target's "sex" as that term is commonly
understood. Courts that have so held have relied on a rigid, constrained notion
of sex that recognizes only a simplistic dichotomy between biological males
and biological females, with no analysis of the complex facets of an
individual's sex as it is projected to and perceived by others in the workplace.
This restrictive formulation of the concept of "sex," which focuses narrowly on
biological attributes, while disregarding gender traits and sexual expression,
lacks critical insight into the complexity of each individual's projected and
perceived sex and the complex interrelationships between sex, sexuality, and
power in the workplace.
As one scholar has explained, "[I]n every way that matters, sex bears an
epiphenomenal relationship to gender; that is, under close examination, almost
every claim with regard to sexual identity or sex discrimination can be shown to
be grounded in normative gender rules and roles."459 Thus, the distinctions upon
which individuals are singled out for differential treatment in the workplace are
not directly a function of the individual's anatomical configuration or
chromosomal composition, but rather arise more immediately from the
individual's projected sexual identity and gender-based characteristics that
reflect a "degree of sexual agency beyond the rigid determinism of biology." '
Accordingly, because it is the hierarchy of gender differences that transforms an
anatomical difference into a socially relevant distinction, the courts' insistence
on ascribing to an individual male plaintiff a privileged status among the
dominant males in the workplace, merely because he shares their biological
traits, reveals a conceptually flawed focus on what is arguably the least relevant
aspect of an individual's sex in the context of employment discrimination.
Numerous developments have converged in recent years to complicate the
traditional associations between biological sex, gender identity, gender roles,
and power in the workplace and in the broader society. The entry of women
into traditionally male-dominated workplaces, 1 the increasingly shared
458. Cf. supra Part W.A. I (examining broader Title VII jurisprudence recognizing sex-based nature of such
conduct that arises from gender-based perceptions and expectations).
459. Franke, supra note 445, at 2.
460. Id. at 8.
461. See Nancy Barrett, Women and the Economy, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1987-88: A REPORT IN
DEPTH 100 (Sara E. Rix ed. 1987) (describing how the number of married women with pre-school age children
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responsibility for parenting,462 and the growing visibility of sexual minorities
and transgendered persons have all played a role in destabilizing the alignment
of sex, gender, status, and power which has historically perpetuated the
biologically dichotomous view of gender and gender-based power relations.463
As the associations between a person's biological attributes, gender, and
projected sexual persona further destabilize, a more precise, sophisticated
analysis of sex and sex-based interactions will become increasingly necessary
in order to assess more accurately an individual's sex identity as it is relevant to
workplace interactions and power dynamics.464 The biologically dichotomous,
gender-monolithic conception of sex that has already produced so many
anomalous results in the same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence is
particularly ill-suited to this analysis. Thus, in the context of increasingly
complex alignments of sex and gender traits, this constrained conception of sex
will continue to obscure more than it illuminates about the sex-based dynamics
that affect workplace interactions, 465 and will further perpetuate unrealistic,
gender-stereotyped perceptions that identity, power, and status in the workplace
can be understood primarily as a function of biological sex.466
Contemporary understandings of the nuances of an individual's "sex" thus
reveal that numerous aspects of the term-including those that are most
relevant to assessing claims of sex-based employment discrimination-are not
adequately captured by a biologically centered definition. Accordingly, these
insights into the multi-faceted nature of the phenomenon of sex, as an aspect of
an individual's identity that is projected to and perceived by others, highlight
the profound deficiencies of the biologically focused, gender-monolithic
conceptions of "sex" underlying much of the same-sex sexual harassment
jurisprudence, further underscoring the urgent need for courts addressing same-
sex sexual harassment claims in the future to look beyond the confines of this
who were working outside the home and the percentage of women pursuing advanced professional degrees has
increased substantially since 1960); Jennifer Merritt, Jump Seen in Number of Top-Paid Women Execs, BOSTON
BUS. J., July 1, 1998, at S8 ("Times have changed for women in the business world, with women on this year's
Top 40 list experiencing a 16.2 percent increase from last year."); Susan Page, Study: Women Make 75 Cents for
Every $1 a Man Earns, USA TODAY, June 11, 1998, at 9A (showing that an increasing proportion of women are
entering professional and other higher-paying fields).
462. Changing Roles of Fathers, TALK OF THE NATION (National Public Radio Broadcast April 22, 1998)
(available at 1998 WL 2933630) ("Many American men are shedding the traditional image of breadwinner by
taking a more active role in child-rearing and household chores.").
463. See supra Part I.A. 1-3. (analyzing biologically dichotomous, gender-monolithic conceptions of sex
implicit in same-sex harassment jurisprdence).
464. See Case, supra note 6, at 16 n.36 (noting increasing complexities in sex, gender, and sexual identity
that have "broken down the binaries of masculine/fenmine, male/female, and gay/straight").
465. See supra notes 388-391 and accompanying text (discussing self-perpetuating ramifications ofjudicial
failures to acknowledge gender-based dynamics within a biological sex).
466. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1210 (1989) (discussing associations between gender, identity, status, and power in the
workplace); Allan C. Hutchinson, Part of an Essay on Power and Interpretation with Suggestions on How to
Make Bouillabaisse, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850, 875-76 (1985); Valdes, supra note 446, at 170. The biologically
centered notion of sex and gender identity adopts an essentialist approach that attributes gender-based differences
to essential, biologically defined attributes of sex rather than to culturally and socially constructed gender
paradigms that recognize differences between members of a biological sex. See ELIZABETH B. SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMEN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 4 (1989); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 582, 584 (1990).
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flawed jurisprudence and to analyze notions of "sex" and sex-based interactions
in a manner that better comports with contemporary legal and social
understandings of these phenomena.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as courts once failed to discern the sex-discriminatory nature of sexual
harassment directed at women and accordingly characterized such conduct as a
legally inconsequential expression of natural sexual desire,467 so the courts have
been reluctant to recognize the sex-discriminatory nature of sexual harassment
directed at men, and have trivialized such conduct as mere "locker room antics"
or "horseplay.""46 In recent years, however, an increasing number of courts have
begun acknowledging that sexually degrading and abusive conduct perpetrated
by males against other males, particularly when combined with a pattern of
gender-based derision, can constitute a powerful form of sex-based and sex-
discriminatory harassment that targets individuals based on their projected and
perceived gender attributes and perpetuates gender-based patterns of
segregation and exclusion in the workplace.46 9
When it handed down its decision in Oncale affording all plaintiffs an
opportunity to challenge severe, pervasive sex-based harassment as a form of
employment discrimination under Title VII, regardless of the sex or sexual
orientation of the harasser and target, the Supreme Court made important strides
toward extending Title VII's coverage to many individuals who were denied
recourse under the prior jurisprudence. Yet, while Oncale's holding recognizes
such claims as a matter of law, its dicta reflect constrained notions of sex and
sex-based causation that view members of each biological sex monolithically,
obscuring potent gender-based power dynamics among members of the same
biological sex and making the sex-based nature of many forms of same-sex
harassment difficult to prove as a matter of fact.
Although some courts have adopted the restrictive formulations of sex and
sex-based causation implicit in Oncale's dicta, nothing in Oncale compels them
to do so. Thus, in adjudicating questions of sex-based causation, the courts
should resist the impulse to revert to the constrained conceptions of sex
introduced in the earlier same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence and
perpetuated sub silentio in Oncale, and should instead undertake a rigorous,
principled analysis of the conduct before them in light of the extensive
467. See Franke, supra note 11, at 698-701 nn. 19-30 (discussing early cases rejecting sexual harassment
claims).
468. Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va. 1996); accord
Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003 (1998) (emphasizing the importance of distinguishing sex-discriminatory harassment
from "ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay"); McWilliams v. Fairfax County
Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1198 (4th Cir. 1996) (Michael, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
characterization of challenged conduct as mere "meanness and horseplay"); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F.
Supp 1044, 1049 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (quoting Tietgen).
469. See supra Part IL.A.4 (discussing cases acknowledging sex-based nature of same-sex sexual
harassment); supra Part II.B (discussing sex-based nature and sex-discriminatory consequences of such conduct).
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jurisprudence and scholarship elucidating concepts of sex and sex-based
causation in other contexts.
By incorporating the broader, more flexible notions of sex that have
evolved outside the same-sex sexual harassment context, courts can begin to
delve beneath biological dichotomies and dispel the myth of the gender
monolith that has pervaded same-sex sexual harassment cases and precluded
recognition of deeply-rooted patterns of gender-based subordination among
members of the same biological sex. In this manner, the courts can begin
adjudicating same-sex sexual harassment claims in a manner that better
comports with the broader Title VII jurisprudence and better serves Title VII's
purpose of allowing each individual to pursue employment opportunities
unimpeded by discrimination based on his or her sex.

